CHAPTER XII.

KRISHṆARĀJA WOḌEYAR II, 1734-1766—(*contd.*)

Causes of Haidar's usurpation—Army: the key to the situation—The traditional *vs.* the historical Haidar—Haidar's early vicissitudes—His marriage, etc.—His personal appearance—His daily life and personal habits and characteristics—His soldierly qualities—His love for the horse—Haidar's exercise of authority: (*a*) *In re* the Mysore Royal House —Haidar, a Royal servant—(*b*) *In re* Hindus and their religion—(*c*) *In re* the Army—Garrisoning of forts and fortifications—Adoption of European military discipline—Recruitment of Europeans of all nations—Haidar's aim, a well-trained and well equipped army—His displacement of the territorial system by the paid personal service system—The displacement, a corollary to his policy of unification—His policy of unification—Policy of unification only a means to an end —The implications of the policy—The policy both a political and an economic move—The means he employed to carry it through—The evolution of a new Mysore army under Haidar—The example of the French at Pondicherry—The example of the English at Madras—The army of the English at Madras as it stood in 1761—Haidar's adaptation of European discipline—Infantry—Cavalry—Artillery—Military recruitment open to all—Medical aid; compensation for wounds received—The Army department—Camp routine—The military Bakshi and Secretary—Salaries to the army: (*a*) To Infantry—(*b*) To Cavalry—(*c*) To Europeans—Fair treatment to European Officers—Policy underlying the adoption of new discipline—Haidar's belief in the value of military discipline—Encouragement given to Topasses as a military counterpoise—Financing the army—Other financial sources tapped—Formation of a Fleet—Arsenals—Limitations on French and other European aid—Character of Haidar's Revolution—An appreciation of Haidar's work as the creator of a new army: comparison

between the armies of Haidar, the Nizam and the Mahrattas —The Nizam and his army organization—The Mahratta army system as evolved by Sivaji—(*a*) Infantry—(*b*) Cavalry —The Mahratta army as it came to be under the Peshwas—Mysore and Mahratta army systems: a comparison and a contrast—Haidar's Standing Army—Levies from tributary chiefs—Haidar, the military organiser.

Causes of Haidar's usurpation.

THE mediate cause of the usurpation of authority by Haidar was the disproportion in the troops under his command and the troops under his colleagues, which gave him a superiority in strength which he was not slow to utilize; its immediate causes were a series of circumstances which promoted active discontent against Nanjaraja, his master. During the half a century which elapsed between the death of Chikkadēvarāja and the reign of Krishṇarāja II, the Mysore army had been converted into a miscellaneous motley crowd of people belonging to different nationalities—Hindu, Muhammadan, Portuguese, French, Abyssinian, Zanzibari, etc., besides those of mixed breeds[1]—and divided into groups, each attached to its particular master. The national character of the army had been lost. He who paid won the army's loyalty and service. The system of assignment of revenue to army leaders had degenerated into rank personal aggrandisement of large territorial areas.[2] Territorial control led to higher ambition, and from ambition to treasonous designs was but an easy step. Cultivation and commerce suffered as the result of wars and even larger territorial assignments failed to yield adequate returns. Irregular payments led to indiscipline

1. The last two are thus described by Mirza Ikbal, an annalist of the period: "Africans from Habsh and Zung Bar, 1400." See statement of troops in Haidar's service given by him [in *Ahwāli Hydur Naik* appended to Kīrmāṇi's *Neshauni-Hyduri* (*History of Hydur Naik*)—Col. Miles's translation, 513].

2. For a description of the Army system, see below.

in the ranks, while they proved an open invitation to ambitious soldiers of fortune who had laid by treasure. The man with money could recruit more easily and more rapidly and thus add immeasurably to his material strength and man power. There are cases on record of whole regiments going over from one dead leader to another or from one side to another, for they saw in the change an advantage to themselves. New methods of warfare had, at the same time, come into vogue, and before them the old order was rapidly giving way. Plunder assumed a new position in the army code of the day. The recognition of the *Looty-Wāllah*, as he was called, shows the premium put on this profitable task.[3] The troops were in a chronic state of debt. The infantry depended for its pay on the leader to whom they were attached and if he could not pay it, sat *dharṇa* at his doors.[4] The cavalry was on the old *Sillāhdāri* model, and provided its own horse and provender in return for a monthly pay. When on the move, one of the conditions of the service was that the money collected by way of contribution from the enemy country, went to the army as *Ghāsdāna* (*Hullu-kāḷu*), maintenance allowance for grass and gram. If the payment of the contribution was delayed, the leader had to meet this charge himself in whatever way he could. Often he borrowed from *Sāhukārs* and merchants by offering personal or other security.[5] If he failed to meet it, the discontent may well be imagined. Already in debt, the troops were nearer rebellion than any one else. They would naturally have favoured any attempt to upset the existing order of things. With such forces as these in full play, the

3. See Innes Munro, *A Narrative of the Military Operations on the Coromandel Coast* (1789), to which a picture of "A Looty-Wallah Chase" is prefixed as frontispiece. Innes Munro describes a *Looty-Wāllah* as a *hussar* (*Ibid*, 131).

4. See, for instance, *Ante* pp. 181, 210 of this Vol.

5. See, for instance, *Ante* p. 224 of this Vol.

possibility of rebel dictators rising in the land was great. There were deeper causes as well at work. The discontent among the dispossessed *Pāḷegārs* was always smouldering. What was in store for those still in possession of their *Pāḷayams* was another source of discontent. The sword of Damocles was always hanging over their heads. What they feared from was even worse than what they or their kind had already suffered. It was from among their retainers that the main body of the army had been in olden days recruited. The hereditary principle had been set at naught. The new recruits came from different countries and different castes and creeds and they broke through the old traditions of the army under which it had been for long recruited from father to son from the families of those who had made warfare their primary occupation. Then, again, the increasing introduction of Muhammadans, Topasses and Europeans, the last two mainly to make up the new artillery wing, had produced a further breach in the old composition of the army. Its corporate unity had been destroyed. Discipline became sectional and the co-ordinating influence was weak, because of the other heavy work that fell on those who controlled the army or administered its affairs.

Army, the key to the situation.

It was in these circumstances that Haidar rose to power. He early saw that the key to the situation was the army. He realized that a regularly paid and well cared for army meant power. He amassed treasure by every way open to him and got together men who would stand by him. Soon he had under his command armed forces which could cope with simultaneous attacks from the Mahrattas on the one side and the Nizām and the English on the other, or any combination of these three. He saw to it that he could open a campaign suddenly and soon carry the war into the enemy's territory and

before the latter thought of a defence, Haidar so swooped down on him that he was paralysed in his activities. It was the strength of his army and the command he had over it that made possible the revolution he actually wrought in the twenty-first year of his service under his sovereign. After pursuing above the fleeting reigns of seventeen sovereigns of Mysore for three hundred and fifty years, we now arrive in the reign of the eighteenth, Krishṇarāja II, at a period in the history of Mysore, which saw its name famous in the far West. While the State was exhausted by the incessant wars waged by its generals, and the adjoining kingdoms were distracted by the collapse of the central power, and there were ready representatives of European nations near by to take sides in furtherence of their own interests but whose material organization was not equal to their political ambitions, Haidar, with sword in hand, tried to supplant his sovereign master and found a dynasty of his own on the ruins of those he pulled down. The military genius of this unkown Muslim who had found his way into Nanjarāja's army from an obscure corner of Mysore and the spirit of political adventure that had seized him firmly on the plains of Trichinopoly, involve the causes of the rise of a great European nation in India and the redemption of the State itself from the savage grip of a supplanter who neither cared for king nor for humanity at large. And our eyes are curiously intent on perhaps the most memorable revolution which India has so far known—a revolution which has impressed it with a character which has all but transformed it from a mere geographical expression into a political nation.

The traditional vs. the historical Haidar.

The traditional picture drawn of Haidar as a clever but cruel man who cared more for the end than for the means he employed in attaining it, is one that deserves to be examined closely. We have to-day evidence enough,

first, to see the man clearly, not as his enemies or partisans painted him to us, but as he actually was; secondly, to see him against his own background, not ours, and to understand what limitations it imposed upon him, and to what extent he overcame them. His life covers nearly three-quarters of the eighteenth century, the critical period in which modern India was being born. Haidar devoted most of his life to the defence of Mysore against those who invaded her territories or tried to impose their will on her; to her advance towards the north-west from where came the Mahrattas to disturb her peace; to her extension toward the south, where the pretensions of Muhammad Alī, aided by the English, had despoiled Mysore of her just rights to Trichinopoly and barred her further advance southwards; and to reform the army in such a manner as to make it practically invulnerable against not only the country powers but also against the European nations whose military organisation and methods of training had impressed him deeply. In this titanic struggle, he literally wore himself out. It was largely his achievement that Mysore attracted to her standard almost every one of any nationality who could make her army strong or invincible; that she became early famous in the far-famed capitals of Europe; and that she expanded on all sides and became a compact kingdom, as it was intended she should be, from sea to sea. He fought with astonishing patience and tenacity; and as he alone withstood the powers that tried to absorb Mysore, he won their sincere ill-will and opposition. His methods may not have been always right but there can be no question that he held to the right itself with singular devotion. And in defence of it, he fought his wars in a manner that made his name to be feared and in his own age respected. It was not for nothing that he came to be described later as "the most formidable Asiatic rival the British ever encountered in India."

He was accused by his enemies of many crimes, but except one, most of these may be refuted by the evidence available to-day. But curiously enough, or perhaps naturally enough, the general outlines of his portrait have been fixed for all time by the historians of the past century. He is still the cruel, severe, terror-striking, merciless, extortionate, exacting, unjust, deliberate, calculating, autocratic, arbitrary, unfeeling man who stood beside the Mysore throne, hiding who knows what behind that sly smile of his—really an inhuman person, a perfect master in the art of dissimulation. How much of this picture is true? Was Haidar a mere treacherous usurper and no more? Did he not possess any redeeming features? Did he attempt anything useful or good for Mysore? To this question our answer is definitive to a degree. In developing it, we are resolved upon not accepting anything of importance unless upon trustworthy contemporary evidence. We do not think that anything more would be required of us or of any writer of authentic history.

Haidar's early vicissitudes.

Haidar, as we have seen,[6] was of humble origin, though, after his successful career, attempts were made by annalists to represent him as having sprung from the very tribe of Koreish, the most illustrious of the Arabs, to which the Prophet Muhammad belonged.[7] Whatever the truth in their stories, there is scarcely any doubt that he was born in a family that had some pretensions to religious piety and to military talents. The former developed into the religious bigotry which came to be associated later with the name of Tipū and the latter into the genius for military leadership which distinguished Haidar throughout his career. Among the many

6. See *Ante* Ch. X. 205, f. n. 2, where his ancestry and early career are very briefly dealt with. This section fills in certain lacunae left over for inclusion here. The authorities are quoted below.

7. See Appendix III, for a note on the *Ancestry of Haidar*.

different accounts that have come down to us, one says that he started life in a small way in the family of a Brāhman landlord, whose lady was particularly kind to him. One day, it is said, at about noon, she called for him once or twice, and receiving no response from him, stepped into the garden to look for him. Strange to relate, she found him fast asleep under a little tree, with a cobra playing over his head. She retreated hastily and the cobra shortly thereafter quit the place, leaving Haidar still asleep. The mistress of the house came back to where Haidar lay and bid him get up and go with her into the house. Here she fed him on "rice and curds"[8] and told him he was destined to become a great ruler and when he did become one, she entreated, their poor family may not be forgotten. Whether true or not, the story shows that there were not wanting signs early in his life of his future greatness. He had his meed of trial and suffering. In his infancy, he was bereft of his father. He had, however, a cousin—uncle, according to other sources—his namesake, who took interest in him and his elder brother, Śābās. Both owed much to this cousin and Haidar owed a great deal to his brother as well. Kīrmāṇi records a tale on the authority of "an historian," as he says, who had "sought for historical documents" relating to the life of Haidar,[9] which shows how Haidar was saved from death shortly after his birth. Immediately after the birth of Haidar, goes the story, "certain astrologers cast his nativity, and disclosed that though this boy would certainly arrive at the dignity of the crown and throne, and rise to be the sovereign of the Karnātics, yet, that he would, in a short time, suffer the pain and grief of becoming an orphan; that is, his father would be taken from him. On hearing this prediction, his relations, with one accord, determined that the child

8. Food usually given to a fondled child in the household.
9. Kīrmāṇi, *Neshauni-Hyduri*, 10.

should be fed with the milk of death, and laid to sleep in the cradle of eternity. His father, however, on being informed of this intention, said, 'If the evil omen attendant on his birth rests on me, well and good, be it so; but I will not allow him to be put to death; for good and bad proceed alike from God's decrees.' In consequence of this, the mother and relatives of this light of the eyes of prosperity and good fortune spared no pains in his nurture and preservation." And Haidar lost his father in his third year! Not only that. Immediately on the death of his father, he and his brother suffered imprisonment at the hands of Abbās Kuḷi Khān, son of Darga Kuḷi Khān, the cruel Killēdār of Doḍballāpur. Abbās Kuḷi proved himself not only unfriendly but also wholly ungrateful. For all the service rendered by Futte Muhammad, the father of Haidar, his only return was to cruelly ill-treat the family of his loyal colleague who had yielded his life in his service. Abbās Kuḷi plundered Haidar's mother of all she possessed, including her personal trinkets, utensils and jewels, and what is worse, seized her two young sons, Śābās and Haidar, then eight and three years old, and confined them in a kettle-drum, the head (or parchment) of which being stretched on the drum, it was beaten, in order that, by the pain and distress of these poor orphans, he might extort more money from their family! From this horrible imprisonment, the boys were rescued by the intervention of the King of Mysore who, through the efforts of Haidar Sāhib—the Gulām Haidar of other sources—the cousin of Haidar Alī, called on Tāhir Khān, the Nawāb of Sīra, to require Abbās Kuḷi to liberate at once Futte's widow and children from the indignities to which they were being subjected. Haidar Sāhib, in due course, got Futte's widow and his two cousins to Seringapatam and brought them up with care and affection. He taught them the use of arms and horsemanship.

Śābās was married immediately he reached the age of discretion and he tried to shift for himself by seeking service under one Abdul Wāhab Khān, an younger brother of Muhammad Alī, Nawāb of Arcot. Abdul Wāhab held the *Jahgīr* of Chittoor, and he appointed Śābās to the command of 1,000 foot and 200 horse and Haidar Alī to "the command of the horse," the number being probably too insignificant for mention. But either the brothers did not fare well at Chittoor[10] or Haidar Sāhib, the cousin, desired their presence at Seringapatam, and they both joined him soon at Seringapatam with their families and belongings. Here they were presented to Nanjarājaiya, the Dewān, and they were each appointed to the command of 350 horse. Shortly after, Haidar Sāhib, who then commanded Chikballāpur, fell in an attack on Dēvanahalli. On this, Nanjarājaiya transferred to Śābās the command of Chikballāpur and its dependencies, together with the command over the troops of his cousin Haidar Sāhib. Śābās settled down with his family at Chikballāpur, despatching his brother Haidar Alī with his own and Nanjarājaiya's troops to Seringapatam. Here, Haidar Alī conducted himself with such prudence and discretion that he rose in the estimation of the king (Krishṇarāja II) and his minister Nanjarājaiya. He was granted a *Jahgīr* for maintaining his horse and regular foot and was even dignified with the title Haidar Alī Khān. He had so far ingratiated himself with Nanjarājaiya at this time that, in the words of the chief annalist of the period, "neither in business nor pleasure" did Nanjarājaiya "ever separate himself from him."

10. Kīrmāṇi says that "Shabaz received an affront from Abdul Wāhab Khān, and being offended, with difficulty obtained his discharge from his service, and having no employ, he, at the invitation of his relative (Hydur the elder), joined him with his brother, their family, followers, and property." (*Ibid*, 22).

His marriage, etc.

In his nineteenth year or so, while serving at Seringapatam, Śābās made arrangements for the marriage of Haidar Alī. He found a bride for him in the respectable and pious family of one Saiyid Śābās—who was commonly known as Shāh Mean Sāhib—who resided at Sīra. This Saiyid Śābās was a *Pīrzaḍā*, one learned in the Law. His spiritual glory had been crowned with domestic happiness; he became the father of six children, three sons and three daughters. He was sent for to Seringapatam and his eldest daughter was married, in the Deccani manner,[11] to Haidar Alī. She bore him, not long after, a daughter, but, owing to some unfortunate neglect or other cause, while yet in child-bed, she was attacked with dropsy and became a cripple for life. He could not marry again at once, as he desired and arranged to do, as he had to proceed on military duty down the ghāṭs with Nanjarājaiya.[12] On his return home, his wife gave him, of her own free will, permission to take another wife. His brother Śābās Sāhib selected for him the sister[13] of one Mīr Alī Razā Khān, who, after having

11. This touch is supplied by Kīrmāṇi (*Ibid*, 24). Kīrmāṇi, though inaccurate in some of his dates and also confused in his accounts, supplies details which need not be disbelieved, especially as he is confirmed by the other annalist Mirza Ikbal.

12. Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 24-25. Kīrmāṇi says that Haidar had to postpone his second marriage and accompany Nanjarājaiya on his expedition "to reduce the country of the Payanghat, which is south of Mysore, and consists of Calicut, Coimbatore, Dindigal, Palghat, etc., some of the Naimars of which had rebelled." He took "a year and a half" to "reduce the country to order and punishing the discontented Naimars." This would fix his second marriage in about his twenty-second year. This would also fix Śābās's death after Haidar's second marriage.

13. Described by Kīrmāṇi as "sister-in-law" (*Ibid*, 25-26). This is a mistake for "sister," as is evident from Mirza Ikbal's *Ahwāli Hydur Naik*, who so describes her. But Mirza Ikbal is wrong in calling her his first wife, because Haidar Alī's first wife was the eldest daughter of Saiyid Śābās of Sīra, as mentioned in the text above. It is possible, however, that this lady was dead at the time Mirza Ikbal wrote his account. See Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 500. A translation of Mirza Ikbal's work will be found in this publication (*Ibid*, 493-512). The *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 7, 108) also corroborates the above information relating to Haidar's marriage. According to this work (ff. 108), Haidar's second wife was known as Fātimā Bēgum.

been Killēdār of Gurramkoṇḍa, had been living in the Bārāmahal. Haidar, though he took a second wife, was considerate to his first one. We are specially told that he "still considered his first wife as holding the principal sway in the home," Haidar continuing to her "all her privileges and honours," and he "moreover regarded her as the ornament of his family, and placed all his family under her authority." [14] Haidar, however, had no children by his second wife for three or four years. He sought the intervention of a saint named Tipū Mustān Aulia, whose tomb is to be seen in the market-place at Arcot. Through his blessings, he had a son, the celebrated Tipū Sultān, named after that Saint. He was born on November 19, 1749,[15] when Haidar had attained his twenty-seventh year. Haidar strengthened his relationship with his second wife's family by marrying his first wife's youngest sister to his new brother-in-law Mīr Alī Razā Khān, while he married her second sister to one Saiyid Burhan, a learned man. His three brothers-in-law by the first wife—Saiyid Kamāl, Saiyid Mokhdum and Saiyid Ismail—and all his other relations were found some kind of service or employment, with the result that he had men to depend on in times of need. Indeed, a part of the policy of Haidar after settlement of his differences with the Mahrattas over the conquest of Bednūr was to place the more important

14. Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 26.

15. *Ibid*, 26-29. Also see Major Charles Stewart, *Memoirs of Hyder Aly Khan and Tippoo Sultan* (Cambridge Uni. Press, 1809), where it is stated that Tipū was born in or about 1749 (pp. 5,43). According to the *Haid. Nām.*, however, Tipū was born in 1752, for he was eight years of age in 1760 (see *Ante* p. 234 of this Vol.) The Saint Tipū Mustān, referred to above, was well-known during his time for his miracles in both Hindustān proper and the Deccan. He had two brothers, one being Numīd Sāhib who sleeps at Trichinopoly, and the other lies buried at Hunūr, Rāyadurg taluk, present Bellary district (Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 26-27). Tipū Mustān Aulia's tomb at Arcot bears the date 1142 *Hijra* or 1728 A.D. It was erected by Nawāb Sādat-ullāh Khān, who died in 1732.

places under the charge of men closely related to him or in men in whom he possessed confidence. Invariably these were Mussalmans in religion. After the return of the Mahrattas from Bednūr, Haidar left his son Tipū in the command of that place, appointing at the same time Lālā Mean, his sister's husband, to the command of a stronghold a few miles off. He put Sīra under Mīr Sāhib, whose sister he had recently married. Similarly, he appointed Fyzullā Khān to the command of Mysore fort and district, while Mokhdum Sāhib was nominated to be in charge of Seringapatam itself. Ibrāhim Sāhib, uncle of Haidar, continued at Bangalore, and Amīn Sāhib, his nephew, commanded the Bārāmahal valley.[16]

His personal appearance.

According to contemporary accounts, Haidar was neither distinguished by the beauty of his person nor the eloquence of his tongue. He was a plain man, his features coarse, his nose small and turned up and his lower lip rather thick. Of average stature, he was robust in build, bulky in size but characterized by spirit and vigour, and hot-blooded. He was of active habits and capable of bearing fatigue as well on foot as on horse-back. Brown in complexion, he wore neither beard nor whiskers, contrary to the custom of Muhammadans.[17] Though not handsome, Haidar's countenance

16. Robson, *Life of Hyder Ally*, 34; De La Tour, *Ayder Ali*, I. 97-98. Robson refers to Fyzullā or Fuzzul-ullāh as "Phasula." De La Tour calls Mīr Sāhib as Mirza; he also mentions Mokhdum Sāhib as having been nominated to Mysore and Amīn Sāhib to the "government of the kingdom of Bisnagar," meaning thereby Bednūr itself (see *Ibid*, I. 98). He further states that in the patents given to his relations on this occasion, he prolonged their names, evidently by ennobling them. (*Ibid*, I. 97, f.n.).

17. See M. La Maitre De La Tour, *History of Ayder Ali Khan* (History of Hyder Ali Khan), first edition in two Vols. (London, 1784), Vol. I. p. 22. De La Tour was commandant of Haidar's artillery and knew him well personally. His description has been widely copied. Bowring, in adopting it in his *Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan*, adds that Haidar's eyes were small. So far as one can see, there is no warrant for this elaboration of De La Tour's description. Kīrmāṇi does not give us any lengthy description of Haidar's personality as De La Tour does. But what he

was open and calculated to inspire confidence. Though a perfect master in the art of dissimulation when the occasion required it, he did not of set purpose cultivate the habit of disguising his aspect which was either gay or overspread with chagrin as the circumstances demanded it. He dressed in white muslin and wore a big turban of ancient style, made of the same cloth, or of red or yellow cloth of Burhanpur manufacture, nearly 100

sets down, though brief, is expressive. Haidar was, he says, "very dark and strong bodied, but of middle size" (see Kīrmāṇi in *Neshauni-Hyduri*, 491). Kīrmāṇi adds that Haidar was "accustomed to shave his beard, moustaches, eyebrows and eyelashes." (*Ibid*). These descriptions, though furnished by those who had known Haidar personally, do not help us to visualize the man. Contemporary portraits enable us to do this better. One of these shows him as a thin built, tall man, with whiskers and a short clipped beard, in light-fitting military vest and a peaked up turban with a feather in it. The nose is aquiline and small, and the eyes not small but medium in size. It is a picture of a slim, active, though somewhat awe-striking personality. In a portrait representing Haidar as sitting in his Durbār, which originally appeared in the *European Magazine*, he is shown as a tall, handsome, beardless, small-nosed, striking personality, of gigantic proportions, dressed in flowing robes and slightly resting on a pillow at his back, with a rounded flat turban. This evidently depicts him as he was nearly at his end. In a third one, prefixed to Prince Gholām Mohammed's edition of De La Tour's *History* (Thacker & Co., London, 1855), he is represented as he should have looked in his comparatively younger days. This is a reprint of a portrait, engraved in steel by Morrish. It depicts Haidar as of average stature, with the small hooked-in nose, in military dress, and with turban on. In the portrait which depicts Admiral De Sufferein's interview with Haidar, we have Haidar presented to us, as in the *European Magazine*, as a distinctly tall man, with an aquiline nose, flowing robes and a flat turban. The main ideas conveyed by these portraits are that Haidar impressed his contemporaries as a tall man with aquiline nose, clean shaven face, with fairly regular features, though somewhat bulky in body. As De La Tour says that he was "5 feet 6 inches high," Haidar may be correctly described as of average human stature. According to anthropologists, the average human stature appears to be about 1·675 m. (5 ft. 6 in.). Those who are 1·725 m. (5 ft. 8 in.) or more in height are said to be tall; those below 1·625 m. (5 ft. 4 in.) are short; while those who fall below 1·500 m. (4 ft. 11 in.) are now usually termed pygmies (see A. C. Haddon, *Races of Man*, 3). Haidar's black complexion, average height, long face, fairly regular features and convex narrow nose would suggest his affiliation with the Indo-Afghans, an intermediate race. His marital and other connections with the Afghan families of Cuddapah and Kurnool—his second wife, who became the mother of Tipū, was the daughter of Nūr Moin-ud-dīn, who had been Governor of Cuddapah, and his brother-in-law Mīr Alī Razā Khān had been Governor of Gurramkoṇḍa—seem to afford some

hands long and flat at the top.[18] His robe was made up in accordance with the fashion of the time—the body and sleeves fitting neatly, and drawn close by strings, the rest of the robe being ample and in folds, so that when he walked, a page supported his train, from his first stepping off the carpet to his entering into his carriage. In the army, however, he appeared in a different manner. He wore a military habit, said to have been invented by himself for his generals.[19] It was an uniform composed of a vest of white satin, with gold flowers, faced with yellow, and attached by cords or strings of the same colour. The drawers were of the same materials,[20] while

ground for this affiliation. On the conquest of Cuddapah, Haidar married the sister of the Nawāb of Cuddapah and made her the head of his harem, with the title of Bakshi Bēgum. He also gave his daughter in marriage to the eldest son of Abdul Hakīm, the Nawāb of Savaṇūr, who was of Afghan descent, and received the latter's daughter in marriage to Karīm, his second son. One version of his ancestry states that his great-grandfather Muhammad Bahlol was a Muhammadan devotee who left the Punjab to seek his fortune in Southern India, accompanied by his sons (see Appendix III, on *Haidar's Ancestry*). It must be added here that Bahlol is an Afghan name and was that of the founder of the Lōḍi dynasty, which was uprooted by Babar, the founder of the Mughal dynasty, in 1526. The aquiline nose and long face would indicate, perhaps, original Arab ancestry. The fine regular features, white complexion and short stature (5 ft. 4 in.) associated with the Arabs of South Arabia (Semites), seem to have been modified by later admixture.

18. This turban of red or yellow colour was, according to Mirza Ikbal, of Burhanpur manufacture—see *Ahwāli Hydur Naik*, 506-507, in Kīrmāṇi's *Neshauni-Hyduri*. Burhanpur is a town in the Central Provinces, about 280 miles N.E. of Bombay. It was a flourishing manufacturing centre in Mughal times. In those days, it extended over an area of 5 square miles. Akbar built a palace in it, still in existence, while Aurangzīb added a mosque, which is yet in use. Taken by Wellesley in 1803, it came under British control in 1860.

19. De La Tour says that it was "invented" by Haidar. But there is no reason to doubt that Haidar was only continuing the existing fashion in this respect.

20. Mirza Ikbal gives some additional details: "He did not wear his *Jamah* (coat or tunic) often; but a vest, open in front, made of a broad kind of white cloth, which is called in India, *Doria*, that the width of the cloth might allow of its being broad at the breast." He also tells us that "his trousers were made of Masulipatam *Chintz*; and he was fond of *Chintz*, the ground of which was white, strewed with flowers" (l.c.). What De La Tour calls "boots" must be taken to be the "*Chaḍāv*" worn by Muhammadans. He also wore large slippers with a long point turned back, resembling those usually worn in France and called *Souliers ā la pou laine*.

the "boots" were of yellow velvet. He wore also a scarf of white silk about his waist; and with the military dress, his turban was either of a red or aurora colour.[21] When he was on foot, he commonly used a gold-headed cane; and sometimes on horseback he wore a sabre hanging by a belt of velvet embroidered with gold, and fastened over his shoulder by a clasp of gold, enriched with precious stones.[22] He did not ordinarily wear much jewellery either on his turban or his clothes—neither necklaces nor bracelets.[23]

His daily life and personal habits and characteristics.

Haidar was, from all accounts, a simple and plain man, free from vanity and self-sufficiency. He was not fond of delicacies nor particular in what he ate. He gave no orders about his table, eating only whatever was placed before him. He ate of all the dishes available, showing a preference, however, for salt and sour ones. In his journeys and marches, he subsisted mostly on parched gram, almonds and dry bread, made of rice, *jawār* or *rāgi*, with which, soldier-like, he appeared well-contented.[24] His mode of living was much unlike that of a man of rank, being more like that of a private soldier. At his table, twice a day, some of his most intimate friends used to join, but the food and the quantities served to all were alike.[25] Though in later life he was accused by some[26] of being arbitrary and as indulging in abuse and the whip

21. What De La Tour calls "aurora" is the "yellow" of Mirza Ikbal, "aurora" meaning here nothing more than "golden." According to Kīrmāṇi, Haidar was very fond of the red and purple colours (*Neshauni-Hyduri*, 475).
22. Morrish's engraving of Haidar Alī generally fulfils this description.
23. We use advisedly the word "ordinarily," qualifying the version of De La Tour. But in the portrait reprinted in the *European Magazine*, he is shown as wearing a bracelet on his left wrist. This picture shows him as sitting in his Durbār and confirms Mirza Ikbal's description. According to him, Haidar "wore diamond clasps on his wrists and two or three diamond rings on his fingers" (l.c.).
24. Kīrmāṇi, *Neshauni-Hyduri*, 474-475.
25. Mirza Ikbal, *Ahwāli Hydur Naik*, 506, in *Ibid.*
26. *Ibid*, 507.

even towards those belonging to the army,[27] there is no doubt that he was essentially a man who attracted people to himself.[28] He was easily accessible and possessed facility for conversing on any subject.[29] He had, indeed, none of that stateliness or taciturnity that is generally associated with those in power.[30] When he first received a stranger, he was reserved and appeared to speak with gravity, but soon recovered his usual ease, and conversed with all the world, repeating himself the news and common topics of the day with the utmost affability.[31] An astonishing characteristic of his was that he asked questions, gave answers, heard a letter read, and dictated an answer to another, beheld a theatrical exhibition, and even seemed to attend to the performance that was on—at the same instant that he delivered decisions concerning things of the utmost importance.[32] Every one who had any business with him, whoever he might be, could go to him. Only to strangers, he was more formally introduced, a *chōbdār* or mace-bearer preceding and announcing him. It may seem strange, but yet it is true, *fakīrs* (or religious mendicants) were excluded from this indulgence of free audience, they being dealt with by a special official, who had instructions to provide their wants.[33] Haidar was unsparing with himself in doing the day's work, and expected all to do the same. From morning till night, he never remained a moment idle. He was a slave, we are told, to the regulations of his working establishments, or manufactories.[34] His memory was excellent to such an extent that he could recollect a word, or an incident, for years. It was said of him that any one whom he had seen twenty years before, in the

27. *Ibid*, 495. 28. *Ibid*, 494.
29-31. De La Tour, *Ayder Ali*, I. 24-25. The Rev. C. F. Schwartz, writing, in 1779, of Haidar's mode of transacting business—just after he assumed full power—bears testimony to the same effect.
32. *Ibid*, I. 25. 33. *Ibid*.
34. Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 474.

common dress of the people of the world, he could recognize, after that period, in the patched garment of a mendicant. The story goes that one day he asked the official in charge of his stable to bring an old saddle, which had been laid by and neglected for a long time. When it was brought and examined, he said, "There is another saddle missing; it is a Mahratta saddle, with a housing of yellow broad-cloth, moth-eaten, and I desired it might be wrapped up in a cloth and taken care of." This also, on search, was found! And he had given the orders he mentioned eleven years before! He began his day as the morning dawned. As he sat down to wash his face, his messengers and spies stood about him on all sides, repeating the news and intelligence of the day before.[35] His capacity for hearing was even more excellent than his capacity for remembering.[36] It is said that he could readily distinguish and comprehend the different voices and the different details. This was really astonishing. People, indeed, would not give credit to what was said of him. But on trying repeatedly, it was found that they were wrong and that his capacity for following simultaneously many and giving orders only to those and to them only when on the points they really needed, was indeed great. When the news-reporters began repeating their news, whatever did not require inquiry, he passed over in silence. But, when he heard any news which required examination, or might be deemed important, he, after listening to it, at once stopped all further talking, and entered into the investigation of its truth, bearings or relevancy to the topics on hand.[37] The human side of the man appealed to many who, hearing of his daring deeds, wished to join his ranks. One of the annalists of the period, indeed, says of him

35. De La Tour, *Ibid*, I. 26; Mirza Ikbal, *Ibid*, 505-506.
36. Mirza Ikbal, *Ibid*.
37. *Ibid*.

that "his humble and agreeable manners attracted from all parts many adventurers to his service," and it is added of him that even in public he assumed no distinction between himself and one of his private troopers, nor were any deductions made from the pay of the soldiery in his employ.[38] Whatever changes may have come over him in his later years,[39] in the earlier part of his career—when he was still on the first steps of the ladder of fortune—he was simple, unostentatious and inviting to a degree.

His soldierly qualities.

Brought up as a soldier from his infancy, Haidar had some eminently soldier-like qualities. Plain as he was in his bearing, simple in his dress and accessible to all, he did not like persons who indulged in long-winded speeches. One of the annalists of the period curtly says "he did not like great talkers."[40] He was essentially a man of action, and severely practical in his outlook. "In penetration and in store of practical wisdom," Kīrmāṇi says, Haidar "took the lead from all the State ministers, princes and kings of former days."[41] The subject of conversation at his public audience generally related to matters affecting the State or the order and regulation of kingdoms and empires, or to swords, muskets, horses, elephants or invigorating medicines,[42] so that the body may be well maintained to aid the mind in its desire for achievements. His understanding was quick and, according to contemporary opinion, may be described as "wonderful,"[43] while the noble desire to attempt great things was a marked feature of his mental make-up.[44] Of foolish pride or vain glory, he had none; indeed,

38. *Ibid*, 494.
39. *Ibid*, 494-495. It should be remembered that Mirza Ikbal, though he writes with apparent candour, cannot be described as in any sense partial to Haidar in his delineation of his character or even his achievements. Where such a man agrees with the opinions of Kīrmāṇi or De La Tour, we may not be far from the truth.
40. Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 473. 41. *Ibid*.
42. *Ibid*. 43. *Ibid*, 474. 44. *Ibid*.

if Kīrmāṇi is to be believed, he had expelled them from his mind.[45] As became a soldier, he loved his kind. "He was the friend and protector of the soldier," writes one who knew him well, and adds that he was "altogether full of kindness and generosity" to him.[46] His estimate of the value of the brave and experienced soldier was, we are told, very high; and any man, who distinguished himself by his bravery, he heartily cherished and protected, and used his endeavours to promote and exalt him.[47] But he demanded hard work from him and nothing but the best he was capable of would satisfy him. He treated his colleagues as his equals and even shared his food with them. In his dealings with them, in the social as in the military sphere, he treated them with the utmost cordiality and goodwill, making no distinction between himself and his private troopers. Unlike Muhammad of Ghazni, who seldom, if ever, shared the hard life of his soldiers, Haidar attached no dignity to his position. He was ever ready to put himself to the severest tests that he presented for his men.[48] While on the field, *rāgi* or dry rice bread and gram satisfied him as much as it did the common soldier serving in his ranks.[49] Nor would he allow any deductions from salaries due to them.[50] No wonder his friendliness and kindness inspired deeds of valour on the field of battle and added to his renown. There is some reason to believe that towards the close of his career he was a changed man, but it is clear that he was in his earlier life both a steadfast friend and well-wisher of the common soldier who helped him to attain higher distinction and office. Everything relating to the army interested him. His understanding in regard to it was

45. *Ibid.* 46. *Ibid*, 473. 47. *Ibid*, 474.
48. Muhammad Habib, *Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni*, 77, f.n. 42.
49. Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 474-475.
50. Mirza Ikbal, *Ibid*, 494.

as keen as in regard to territorial or revenue affairs.[51] One keen glance of his, we are told, decided without difficulty the enlistment of recruits, the merits of horses about to be purchased, and their price, and the appreciation of valuable articles, and their selection.[52] He had a singularly profound knowledge of the quality and value of arms and instruments of war. Such knowledge, indeed, seemed to come to him almost instinctively, so quick and so spontaneous were his decisions on them.[53]

His love for the horse.

Next only to the soldier was the personal attention Haidar paid to the horse—the noble animal on which depended so much success in the warfare he continuously engaged. Every one who has written of him has remarked eloquently on the great regard he showed to dealers in horses. Himself an excellent judge of horse-flesh, his interest in horses, their purchase, their upkeep and their safety was unbounded. If he could write, Haidar's choice to declare his knowledge of the letters would have fallen on the horse, and then we would have had a treatise on the horse and horsemanship which would have delighted not only the horse-lover but also have given us a literary parallel to the work of that celebrated warrior-literate Xenophon, whose famous treatise stands unique in the world's literature.[54] If Haidar had been duly blessed and could have written—he knew not more than putting topsy-turvy his initial 'Hai' in Urdu—he would have given us hints not only on the points of a good horse; on how to approach it and in what mood or temper; on how to break it in; on how to keep a stable fit or where it should be located; on how to acquire a good steed and to

51. Kirmāṇi, *Ibid,* 482. 52. *Ibid.* 53. *Ibid.*

54. Dakyns on Xenophon in *Hellenica*, iii-2 p. 93, 52. Xenophon on *Horsemanship* (*Hippi Ke*) is a classic on the subject of horses. No one interested in the horse should miss reading it. Xenophon not only wrote pure Greek in a plain, perspicuous and unaffected style, but had also an eye to the practical in his estimate of things.

train it for cavalry work, including the arts of "leaping ditches, scrambling over walls, scaling up and springing off high banks," and on how to make it a valuable ally in war; but also on how to treat the merchant who brings and sells the noble animal to you. This is the one thing that Xenophon, perhaps the greatest western writer on the horse, has failed to touch on, though he even furnishes elaborate suggestions for guidance in buying a horse. The horse has played a great part in Indian history, and there be some who say that it is the horse that brought the Muhammadan into India.[55] Whether this is so or not, there is no doubt that successive dynasties of kings in India have befriended the merchant who specialised his trade in horses. The Vijayanagar kings were particularly interested in this business and treated Portuguese dealers in it with marked goodwill.[56] Indeed, it has been said that the Portuguese languished with the disappearance of the Vijayanagar rulers, whose valued patronage they lost with the extinction of their dynasty.[57] But there seems some exaggeration here, for the trade in horses soon readjusted itself and the Mysore dynasty of rulers began to encourage it. Haidar continued the patronage and that in a manner which shows that he had improved on what he had learnt from his teacher Nanjarāja. If a soldier is known from the horse he keeps, Haidar would be reckoned to stand easily first. If the majesty of men themselves is best discovered in the graceful handling of the prancing horse, Haidar would have shown himself to the best advantage. And he would have agreed with Xenophon that "a horse so prancing is indeed a thing of beauty, a wonder and a marvel, riveting the gaze of all who see him, young and gray beards." He valued the horse, as it should be, for its own qualities; not only as a useful servant and a

55-57. On the patronage extended by the Vijayanagar Kings to the Portuguese in this matter, see *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iii. 1783-1784, 2089, etc.

splendid ally in warfare, but also as a beautiful natural object and a noble creature meriting the best attention. Else we cannot understand the uniform praise that local annalists and foreign observers of Haidar's period bestow on his fondness for horses and the special manner in which he treated those that brought them in numbers to him. Thus Mirza Ikbal, who is not always partial to Haidar, says that while his relations with and management of merchants generally was so excellent as to be beyond praise, his kindness to horse-dealers was more particularly so.[58] The exacting businessman that he was, while he extended his favour to them, he, in return, expected them to conform to his pleasure. He especially stipulated that the horses they brought should not be sold until he had seen them. If any horse died after it entered his boundaries, and the tail and good evidence of the fact of death were produced, he paid half the price of the horse.[59] He always saw the horses himself, and, having seen them, fixed their prices. After four days had elapsed, he sent for the merchants, and having paid them separately for as many horses as he had approved, he presented them with an order for the discharge of the customs duty due, and told them they must consider themselves his guests the next day and after that depart. When the morning arrived, he sent them a large quantity of rice, some sheep, butter and other things, enough to make a good feast.[60] Kīrmāṇi, the other historian of the period, amply confirms these statements.[61] To horse-dealers, he says, Haidar gave presents of gold and raiment, besides the value of the horses he purchased; and so liberal was he that, if on the road through his territories, any horse by chance died, he paid half the price, after

58. Mirza Ikbal, *Ibid*, 502-503.

59. This custom obtained in Vijayanagar also [*vide* Nuniz's account (*c.* 1536) in Sewell's *A Forgotten Empire*, 307]. Haidar was, it is significant, following an old custom which had descended to him from Vijayanagar times through the Mysore Kings.

60. Mirza Ikbal, *Ibid*.

61. Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 475.

the arrival of the tail and mane, with a certificate from the civil officers of the district.[62] The result of his liberality was that horses were brought to him from all quarters; but if any horse-dealer sold a horse before Haidar saw it and his messengers became acquainted with the circumstances and reported the same to him, he would neither buy any of the horses himself nor allow any one else to buy them. On this account, no one else could get a good horse; and if they bought any of the horses rejected by Haidar, they had to pay higher prices and such higher prices too for horses which manifestly were "good for nothing."[63]

Haidar's exercise of authority:—(*a*) *In re* the Mysore Royal House.

When he came to power, Haidar set to himself certain rules of conduct. Realising the circumstances under which he had come to power and the nature of persons he had to deal with in and outside the State, he set certain limits to the exercise of the authority that came to be vested in him as the result of the downfall of both Nanjarāja and Khaṇḍē Rao. First, he desired, as far as may be possible, not to come into conflict with the Royal Family. There can be no doubt that when he got the substance of power into his hands, he did not desire more. There is reason to believe that later other circumstances supervened, and he changed his mind and tried to build up a kingdom, if possible, for himself, apart from that of the sovereign of Mysore. This change of attitude—if not mind—reacted adversely on him, with the result that popular goodwill began to evaporate slowly but steadily. But he did not reach this position

62. *Ibid*; see also f.n. 57 *supra*.

63. Mirza Ikbal, *Ibid*, 503. The price for high class horses paid for by Haidar varied from six to fourteen thousand rupees each, and special arrangements were made for their upkeep on a regal scale. There were horses in his stable which came from Bāghdād, Irāk, Arabia, Gujerāt, etc. The daily food supplied to each horse amounted to forty seers of choice stuff including horse-gram, Bengal-gram, green-gram flour, wheat flour, almonds, parched gram, sugar, ghee, milk, butter and spices (see *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 104).

all at once. Indeed it may be said of him that the idea of assuming the royal position seemed always unwelcome, if not repellent, to him. Though foreign observers of his time spoke familiarly of him as "sovereign" and a "prince"; of his assumption of supreme power as "usurpation" of "sovereignty" itself and not merely of the power signified by it; and his audience to those who visited him as his "court," there is reason to believe that he himself did not pretend either to supersede the sovereign or to assume the Royal dignity or insignia.[64]

64. The first writer who unwittingly—it is to be presumed—did this was De La Tour in his *History of Ayder Ali Khan*, written while Haidar was still alive but first published in 1784, about two years after his death. He spoke of Haidar, indeed, as "this sovereign," "sovereign" and "prince," quite commonly, and of his "court"—language that might have been in keeping with his assumed power in the State but not certainly in keeping with the position Haidar assigned to himself at the Royal Court. As mentioned in the text above, he spoke of himself as the "agent" of his king and master and actually never went beyond that description to the end of his life. He always pretended to act for and in the place and under the orders of the king, and, as stated above, he rendered a formal account annually at the Dasara Court to the king of what he had done under his orders. Foreign observers could not naturally have grasped all this, and seeing the power wielded by him both at home and in the outside world, should have thought he was "sovereign" himself. But the position was really something different. Throughout the whole period covered by Haidar and Tipū, the English at Madras refused to recognise anything more than the *de facto* character of their (Haidar and Tipū's) authority. The English, both by their conduct and by their attitude—implicitly and explicitly—may be said to have wholly repudiated to recognise any *de jure* authority on their part. The limit Haidar set to his usurpation is thus found reflected in one of the drafts of Lord Macartney, Governor of Madras (1781-1786): "Hyder Ali Khan, when he usurped (as a traitor or rebel) the throne of the Prince of Mysore, his master, was from policy obliged, or thought himself so, *to continue the name and seal of his dethroned Prince to whom he had been a hireling servant*" (see the *Macartney Papers* in the Satāra Historical Museum, Sec. I. No. 288C). [Italics ours]. This seems confirmed by De La Tour himself, who says in one place: "The letters signed by Ayder are closed by the seal of the sovereign, of which the principal secretary is guardian" (*Ayder Ali*, I. 31). The reference to the "sovereign" here is possibly to the King of Mysore while the reference to the "secretary" is to Haidar's representative at the Court. De La Tour refers also in the same place to the "particular or private seal" of Haidar himself, "which he always wears on his finger." The differentiation between the public and private seals is very significant from the point of view of sovereignty during the usurpation period.

Indeed, De La Tour, the French writer, who was his first annalist, though he popularised the wrong idea of Haidar being "sovereign" and "prince," was careful enough to point out, whenever he spoke of him with reference to Mysore itself, that he (Haidar) was only "Regent" or "Dayva" (*i.e.*, Dēva) of Mysore.[65] In one place, he explicitly states that Haidar occupies the position of Dewān once held by Nanjarāja.[66] This is enough to show that he knew that Haidar was only minister and not King of Mysore, though by the loose manner in which he used the words "sovereign," "prince," etc., he

65. De La Tour, *Ibid*, I. 46-47, 52, 58. De La Tour translates "Dayva" into "Regent," evidently following the custom of the time. Nanjarāja was termed "Regent" and his supplanter was styled the same. But Nanjarāja was really "Regent," as the king was young at the time he began his reign. But the name stuck to him in his later years as well. The word "Dayvas," plural, appears in another part of the narrative of De La Tour (I. 178). It means "lords". "The Dayvas, notwithstanding their great power, are only the first subjects of the king," says De La Tour, thereby suggesting that though they wielded power in the land, they were still subjects of the king and that the most powerful of them, who was Regent, was also no more than a subject. (*Ibid*). De La Tour, in describing the Nizām's Minister "Rocum Dawla" (Rukn-ud-daula), speaks of him as "Divan Rocum Dawla", and adds that the title "Divan" signifies the Minister and Keeper of the great seal of the Suba, (*Ibid*, I. 177, f. n.). De La Tour thus knew the significance of the word "Dayva" as distinguished from "Divan." Other writers of the period describe Haidar not as "Dayva" but only as "Divan," which word appears in many disguised forms in them. Thus it appears as "Duan" (spelt as pronounced) in Captain Robson's *Life of Hyder Ally* (1786) (see pp. 15, 16, 17 *et passim*); as "Dewanni" in Kīrmāṇi (see p. 62); and as "Dewan" in Mirza Ikbal (see p. 512). Kīrmāṇi translates the term into "Prime Ministership" (see p. 62) and "Prime Minister" or "Purdhan," which is *vulgo* for *Pradhāni* or Chief Minister (*Ibid*). In a section devoted to the titles of Haidar Alī, De La Tour describes him as "Suba of Scirra," *i.e.*, Subādār of Sīra; "King of the Canarin and Corgues," *i.e.*, ruler of the Kanarese and Coorg countries; "Dayva of Mysore," *i.e.*, Regent of Mysore; "Sovereign of the Empires of Cherqule and Calicut," *i.e.*, ruler of Chirakkal and Calicut by virtue of his conquest of these countries; "Nabob of Bangalore," *i.e.*, Nawāb of Bangalore, etc. (see pp. 46-48). It will be seen that so far as Mysore is concerned he is only termed "Dayva," *i.e.*, "Regent."

66. De La Tour's exact words are "Nand Raja (*i.e.*, Nanjarāja) was Dayva, which signifies regent, as Ayder is at present. It will hereafter be seen how this prince lost the regency" (pp. 52-53, f. n.). The indiscriminate use of the word "prince" is here seen in its application to Nanjarāja also.

spread abroad the impression that Haidar was actually "sovereign" of Mysore. This, added to the fact of the actual exercise of power by Haidar, confirmed the wrong notion of foreigners that Haidar was really the "sovereign" of Mysore. As a matter of fact, this was far from being the case. Haidar himself did not pretend, in the beginning, at any rate, to be more than Dewān or Prime Minister. That was the position held by Khaṇḍē Rao to which he succeeded, Khaṇḍē Rao having succeeded Nanjarāja in it. Haidar, the cautious man that he was, described himself from the beginning to King Krishṇarāja as "his servant."[67] After the downfall of Khaṇḍē Rao, he sought an audience of the king only in the capacity of "his servant," a statement as diplomatic as true from the point of view of mere description of relationship. Kīrmāṇi, who describes this first interview, speaks of Haidar's visit as one sought by himself. "On the following day—the day following Khaṇḍē Rao's fall—he (Haidar) sent word to the Raja," writes Kīrmāṇi,[68] "that if he were permitted, he, his servant, would visit his family in the fort." Permission having been granted "to admit" him, he visited King Krishṇarāja the next day, and made his obeisance to him. A more detailed account gives the outline of what took place a little more plainly. Haidar, on his first visit, was, it would seem, "profuse in his protestations of fidelity and attachment," and on the second, when he repaired to court, "demanded a patent or commission conferring on him and his posterity the perpetual office of Delaway (Daḷavāi)." King Krishṇarāja, we are told, "acquiesced in this demand," but required from Haidar "a written engagement stipulating that he and his posterity should prove

67. Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 96.

68. *Ibid*, 96-97. Capt. Robson, writing in 1786, states that Haidar had "artfully given the king (Krishṇarāja II) such full assurance of his perfect obedience, that he prevailed on him to open the gates."—*Life of Hyder Ally*, 23.

themselves loyal and obedient subjects." Haidar thus did not aim, either for himself or his son, anything more than the perpetual office of Daḷavāi, *i.e.*, the hereditary chiefship of the army which had been held by Nanjarāja, his master. Though he thus acquired the authority he coveted, "he continued his respectful behaviour to the Raja. All the public acts of Government were made in the name of the Prince; and on occasion of any new conquests, congratulatory letters and presents were sent to him," evidently in recognition of the fact that they had been made in his name and for the benefit of his kingdom.[69] And the name of "Sirkāri Khoḍādād" (the government given by God) with which Mysore came to be associated from then, shows that it was a trust in his hands to be discharged loyally and dutifully in the interests of its Ruler, his sovereign.[70] And Kīrmāṇi, likewise, writing as he did after the fall of Seringapatam, speaks of Mysore in the usual manner as the "Khoḍādād State," *i.e.*, the God-given State,[71] and does not go beyond suggesting that Haidar was virtual master of the situation but not "sovereign" of Mysore, after the fall of Khaṇḍē Rao.

Haidar, a Royal servant.

Haidar is, as a matter of fact, described by De La Tour himself as succeeding to Khaṇḍē Rao's place; indeed he goes so far as to state that the widow of Krishṇarāja I, whom he describes as privy to Khaṇḍē Rao's downfall, prevailed

69. See Major Charles Stewart, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Oriental Library of the late Tippoo Sultan* with *Memoirs of Hyder Aly Khan and Tippoo Sultan* (1809), 13. This work, especially the *Memoirs*, is based on Persian Mss. from Hyderabad, supplied to Col. Kirkpatrick, see *Ibid*, 94. Indeed, according to one of these Mss. (*c.* 1800), Haidar, at the time of his usurpation, is said to have "demanded a *sanad* conferring the office of Dalavoy on him and his posterity" and "the Rājah acquiesced in the demand and entered into a contract (*ahed nāma*)," etc. [see *Asiatic Annual Register* (1800), 2-7].

70. For *Sirkāri Khoḍādād*, see Stewart, P. 8, where it is stated that that name was stamped on at the top of every volume in the library of Tipū.

71. Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 97, 116, 160. See also f. n. 80 *infra*.

on King Krishṇarāja II "to declare Ayder regent instead of Nand Raja (Nanjarāja), who expected the appointment, and supposed Ayder would be contented with the post of generalissimo." [72] And, De La Tour significantly adds, "upon his accepting the regency, Ayder made every submission to appease Nand Raja (Nanjarāja)."[73] De La Tour next mentions that it was "by virtue of his power as regent" that Haidar spared the life of Khaṇḍē Rao and "commuted his punishment," and that he began work only in discharge "of the duty of a regent."[74] It will thus be seen that in total disregard of what he himself states in one part of his work, De La Tour describes Haidar in the rest of it in another light, a description which naturally confuses his readers and creates an impression which was the reverse of the correct one. Haidar, indeed, to be fair to him, did not represent himself as more than Dewān. At the annual Dasara, which he continued as of old, he submitted a formal account of the transactions he had conducted and obtained Royal recognition for them. After the conquest of Bednūr (1763), the first idea of founding a kingdom for himself seems to have crossed his mind. It was then, according to De La Tour, that he first assumed the title of "King of Canara (Kanara) and of the Corgues (the people of Coorg)." [75] In keeping with this assumption of a Royal title,[76] he formed the design of having absolute personal control over it, evidently as its ruler in his own interest, as distinguished from his administrative control as Dewān, his professed office, over the Mysore kingdom, which had Seringapatam for its capital. His plan was to entrust the civil administration of Bednūr to the officials of the deposed Rāṇi's government, to which he made up his mind to appoint a

72-74. De La Tour, *Ibid*, I. 72-73. 75. *Ibid*, I. 91.

76. This subject is dealt with at some engtth below—see under *Conquest of Bednūr*.

separate Minister to act under himself. He thus affected, as Wilks plainly puts it,[77] "to treat it (Bednūr) as a separate kingdom," while "Seringapatam and its dependencies he on all occasions professed to consider as belonging to the *Kartar* (Sovereign)" of Mysore. He went one further step. He gave Bednūr the name of *Haidar-nagar* and "he avowed" it, as Wilks adds,[78] "to be his own." It is certain that he formed the deliberate determination of transferring to Bednūr the seat of his government. He gave orders for the removal of his family, the erection of a splendid palace—which was never finished—and the establishment of a mint, and struck coins for the first time in it in his own name, and even prepared for the erection of a dockyard and naval arsenal on the West Coast for the construction of ships of war. The conquest of Bednūr, in fact, formed the turning-point in Haidar's career.[79] But it was not long after that he discovered that he would be making a mistake in pinning himself to a place which was neither central from an administrative point of view nor of any strength whatever from a military point of view. While he dropped promptly the idea of centralizing his administration at Bednūr and removed his family and himself from there without delay, he probably did not give up the idea of a kingdom for himself in that region until

77. Wilks, *Mysoor*, I. 279. This position seems to find remarkable corroboration in the contemporary local chronicle *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 106), from which we learn that the circulation of the *Bahadūri* or *Haidari Varaha* issued by Haidar on the conquest of Bednūr (1763) was ordained by him to be restricted only to the *Nagar-sīme*, while in the *Seringapatam-sīme*, directly under the sway of Krishṇarāja, the institutions of the early rulers of Mysore in respect of coinage, weights and measures, etc., were to be continued intact. Haidar was also, according to this work (ff. 24-25), in the habit of reporting his activities to the *Kartar*, *i.e.*, King Krishṇarāja (*Kartara baḷige arji baradu*).

78. *Ibid.*

79. Wilks, *Ibid*, 279-280. Wilks goes so far indeed as to write: "The conquest of Bednore, in short, seemed to form a new era in the history of this extraordinary man" (*Ibid*, 281). Kīrmāṇi is silent on this aspect of the matter (see *Neshauni-Hyduri*, 125-139). See further on this subject below, under *Conquest of Bednūr*.

later. Indeed, contemporary writers state that he did not usurp the supreme power until Krishṇarāja's death. It was, according to them, only after the death of Krishṇarāja that he usurped the authority under the title of Regent.[80] Thus, Adrian Moens, the Dutch Governor on the Malabar Coast, writing in 1781, records that Haidar treated the king as a "mere child" and on the plea that he "had not sufficient understanding to govern the country," he undertook to "administer it for him and on his behalf."[81] Having commenced this exercise of authority in the reign of Krishṇarāja II, he continued it in his successor's reign as well, as we see Moens states in the very next sentence: "This he does to this day in

80. Innes Munro, who wrote in 1789, records thus: "Upon the demise of his sovereign, the old king of Misore, he immediately usurped the throne under the title of regent and guardian of the young prince (who was then an infant), and has ever since assumed the supreme authority," etc. See *Narrative of Military Operations on the Coromandel Coast*, 120. He compares the "usurpation" of authority by Haidar to the usurpation by the English E. I. Company at Madras of the authority of Muhammad Alī, Nawāb of the Karnātic (*Ibid*). Whether the comparison can be justified or not, there is no doubt that the "divesting" of authority in either case was understood to be more constructive than actual. While the regal authority rested (or was supposed to rest) in one, the actual exercise of it was passing to another. Among other writers, Capt. Peixoto refers to Haidar as "regent of the kingdom" [*Memoirs of Hyder Ally* (1770), 148]. Col. Fullarton mentions him as "the Prime General and Chief Minister" of Mysore [*View of English Interests in India* (1787), 59]. Another English writer speaks of him as "regent of thē kingdom of Mysore" [see *Memoirs of the Late War in Asia* (1788), I. 121]. Even the local Muslim historian Kirmāṇi admits, though tacitly, Haidar's position as the agent of the Hindu kingdom of Mysore when he, writing of him, asserts, "service or agency of the infidels is not infidelity" (*Neshauni-Hyduri*, 489). Haidar appointed himself as *Rector Regis et Regni*. He of course made it known he was assisted by the Cabinet of Ministers which we know was always functioning in Mysore in association with the king. He was thus *governor of the king and ruler of the kingdom*, i. e., one who exercised regal authority or had a predominant share in the exercise of regal authority. In one word, he made himself Regent and in that capacity was to some extent guided, if he chose, by his Cabinet of Ministers. For a Note on the subject of Haidar's position as Regent, see Appendix IV.

81. See *Selections from the Records of the Madras Government*: *Dutch Records* No. 13, p. 151.

the name of the heir of the king who has since died." [82] But the continued exercise of authority made him steadily autocratic with the result that he lost both the goodwill of the people and of the Ruling House itself. His treatment of king Nanjarāja and old Daḷavāi Nanjarājaiya, to be referred to below, will show how he had estranged himself as much from public goodwill as from the confidence that the Royal Family had placed in him since his rise to power in the place of Khaṇḍē Rao.[83] The behaviour of King Nanjarāja towards Haidar shows how far the latter had been transgressing the limits of his authority in regard to his sovereign and master, while the manner in which he (Nanjarāja) met his end indicates the recklessness Haidar had slowly but steadily developed in his attitude towards the Royal House that had given him and his forbears opportunities to rise in its service.[84] It is from about 1770 that he began definitely his downward career in this behalf and from that date we may observe a hardening of the Royal attitude towards him.[85] Chāmarāja Woḍeyar VII, King Nanjarāja's brother and successor, was but a youth. He bided his time and died in 1776. Haidar, true to his better instinct, paid homage to him as king, though he wielded his authority unabated as his Minister.[86] The untimely death of Chāmarāja VII in 1776 and the succession to the throne of Khāsā Chāmarāja Woḍeyar (Chāmarāja VIII) only made it the more easy for Haidar

82. *Ibid.* The "king" referred to here is Krishṇarāja II while the "heir" adverted to is Nanjarāja Woḍeyar who, as will be seen below, succeeded Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar in 1766. Nanjarāja was only eighteen years of age at the time of his accession. He was the eldest son and heir of Krishṇarāja II. (See below).

83. See text below. 84. *Ibid.*

85. Pēshwa Mādhava Rao's invasion of Mysore was the direct result of King Nanjarāja's attempt at assertion of his own power—see text below.

86. An inscription dated in 1774 (*E.C.*, V Bl. 65) truthfully represents Chāmarāja VII as the king and the Nawāb, the most excellent Bahadūr Haidar Alī, as "the administrator." The relevant text reads thus: *Chāmarājē nṛpālē śāsatyurvīm Nawāba pravara Bahadarē Haidaralyākhyā bhūpē.*

to use his power the more absolutely. Indeed, these frequent successions to the throne of young kings after the death of Krishṇarāja II—Nanjaraja, Chāmarāja VII and Chāmarāja VIII—only increased the opportunities for Haidar aggrandizing all power to himself, while all the while he kept up the formal *de jure* position of the King of Mysore unimpaired to the world outside. The fact that between the twenty-one years (1761-1782) covered by the first usurpation of power by Haidar and his death there were four kings is enough to show the conditions in which Haidar developed his *de facto* authority and exercised it. But it is clear that he limited the exercise of this authority to that of Dewān and Regent and never really went beyond it even during his last years. Though he went far, he did not attack the throne or prevent the succession to it. Kīrmāṇi, indeed, gives us a circumstantial account of the story relating to the manner in which Haidar tried to get "the patents of the appointment of Prime Minister (Pradhāni or Sāhib Dewanni) from Nanjaraj, the Dalwai," from which it is clear that his main objective was to obtain the supreme executive power vested long in the Dewān and nothing more.[87] That this was the actual position was widely known at the time even beyond the State and it was this knowledge that induced the English at Madras to enter into Treaty relations with the Mysore Royal House in later years.[88] The main governing idea of Haidar being self-assertion and not the subversion of sovereignty as such, he may be acquitted of ever having aimed at Royal power. Mirza Ikbal plainly states that he was neither "fond of the throne" nor of "state display."[89]

87. Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 61-65.
88. See below. The *Sullivan Treaty* is dated in 1782. Khaṇḍē Rao's correspondence with the English at Madras is based on the essential idea that Haidar was trying to assert his authority beyond his legitimate limits. See p. 244, f.n. 76 above.
89. Mirza Ikbal, *Ibid*, 507.

He sat by himself, we are told, spreading a special seat for himself. He never pretended—at any time—to occupy the traditional throne any more than he tried to abolish the ancient Royal House itself. He might have even gone beyond the prudential limits of exercise of the authority vested in him, but he never involved himself in assuming or pretending to assume the Royal position or status. That is where he differed from his son and successor Tipū. As it was, Haidar alienated from himself the goodwill of many among his own following and if Tipū eventually fell from power, it was due as much to his inflaming public opinion against himself by his attitude towards the Royal House as by his other acts which brought him into conflict with his neighbours.[90] It will be seen from what follows that so far as Haidar acted within the limits of his authority as executive head of the State, he had little or no trouble internally to surmount. When, however, he went beyond it, he got into the meshes of his own action, with the result he had to resort to autocratic, if not tyrannical, methods to maintain his authority. That he still strove to compromise his authority with the superior one of his master and sovereign, at least formally, should stand to his credit.

(*b*) *In re* Hindus and their religion.

The second limit that Haidar laid to the exercise of his authority was one dictated by prudential considerations, if not by the environment in which he found himself and the chief objective he aimed at. He avoided conflict with the Hindus, who formed, as now, the main population of the State. There is enough evidence to believe that though by birth and faith he was a Muhammadan, Haidar treated the Hindus with goodwill and toleration :- it might, indeed, be said that he was every inch a Hindu

90. This subject will be found discussed at some length below.

alike in temperament and training.[91] Mirza Ikbal, for instance, notes the fact that "he never allowed any reduction of the allowances of the Hindu

91. This aspect of Haidar's position finds itself adequately reflected in the contemporary local chronicle *Haid. Nām.*, utilised in this work. In this connection, we may also note the following interesting anecdote recorded by Viscount Valentia in 1804: "A celebrated Mussulman saint, called Peer Zaddah, resided at Seringapatam, and was greatly reverenced. On the festival of *Shri Runga*, the Goddess (? God) of Abundance, when her (? his) statue was, as usual, carried in procession from the temple through the streets, it unfortunately passed the door of the Peer, whose pupils, being irritated at the idolatry, sallied forth, beat the people, and drove them and the Goddess (? God) back to her (? his) sanctuary. The Brahmins complained to Haidar, who told them that they ought to defend themselves when attacked. The next day the procession again went forth, and was attacked by the pupils of Peer Zaddah. The event was, however, very different; for the Hindus, being by far the most numerous, beat their assailants, and continued their procession in triumph. The next day the Peer presented himself, with all his pupils, at the Durbar of Hyder, and complained of the injuries they had received. Hyder heard them patiently, and then asked them what they wanted of him: they had attacked the party, and had been deservedly beaten; what else could they expect? and what had induced them to act so? The Peer replied 'that the procession was an insult to the Mussalman religion, and ought not to be suffered under a Mussalman government, whilst he, a Mussalman Prince, was at the head of it.' Hyder instantly interrupted him by asking, 'who told you that this was a Mussalman government, or that I was at the head of it? I am sure I never did.' On this the Peer desired a private audience, which was granted; when, finding he could not change Hyder's determination, he declared his intention of quitting the place. Hyder told him he might go wherever he pleased. Extremely indignant, he retired to Arcot, where many fakirs at that time resided; but not finding his new residence as pleasant as his old one, he shorlty returned to Seringapatam, and wished again to live within the fort. Hyder, however, positively refused his permission, telling him 'that he had proved himself unworthy of doing so, but that he would give him a house anywhere else.' The Peer retired in wrath to the Black Town (Madras), where he died, and was buried at Chinapatam (Madras)" (Valentia, *Voyages and Travels to India, Ceylon*, etc., I. 417-418). The reference to "*Shri Runga*" in the above passage is to God Śrī Ranganātha, the presiding deity of Seringapatam. Possibly by a slip it is referred to as a "goddess." Wilks refers rather sarcastically to Haidar's more than "half-Hindoo propensities" which "had induced him to grant unqualified indemnity to the sacred temple of Tripety (Tirupati), only 9 miles distant from Chandergherry (Chandragiri), to the extent of not even interfering with the payment of a tribute to Mohammad Ali for similar indemnity." (*Mysoor*, II. 97). Elsewhere Wilks once again sneeringly describes Haidar as "half a Hindoo" and as sanctioning the performance of Hindu ceremonies, and adds the remark that that was for him "in the ordinary course of human action." (*Ibid*, I. 813).

temples."[92] The national festival of the Dasara was not only kept up but carried out on the scale on which it had been traditionally celebrated. Though he was never proverbially liberal in the matter of largesses, Haidar is said to have been "comparatively liberal" during this period of the year and to have donated freely to his friends and to those who took part in the celebrations.[93] It is clear from the accounts given by contemporary writers that he kept up the festival not because it was diplomatic to do so but because he could not well dispense with it. Indeed, Kīrmāṇi goes to the extent of stating that to Haidar "every heart was dear" and adds the special plea that "service or agency of infidels is not infidelity."[94] Haidar was, in fact, in matters of this nature, more Hindu than the Hindus and did not desire interference in anything that helped him to keep close to the reigning king and his subjects. And this is exactly the confession plainly made by Kīrmāṇi, when he says that in this connection Haidar desired "to please" King (Krishṇarāja II) and his successors, and their ministers.[95] Haidar also endeavoured to enforce Hindu customs and even pay homage to the common prejudices of the people. Adrian Moens, the Dutch Governor, in his account of Haidar, thus suggests that Haidar at first not only enjoyed the confidence of the people on account of his former services but also "employed a little policy to secure their (the people's) goodwill more and more."[96] This seems a just appraisement, for, as he says, "although he was a Moor

92. Mirza Ikbal, *Ibid*, 505.

93. This is admitted even by the generally critical Mirza Ikbal (*Ibid*, 504). Kīrmāṇi, indeed, as may be expected, remarks that though the celebration of the Dasara was "a custom of the infidels" and "to follow which he (Haidar) in his heart was averse, still, with a view to please and gain the affections of the Mysoreans," he adhered to the ancient custom (*Ibid*, 489-490).

94. Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 489. 95. *Ibid*.

96-97. See Adrian Moens, *Memo on the Administration of the Coast of Malabar, dated 18th April 1781*, included in the *Selections from the Records of the Madras Government: Dutch Records* No. 13, P. 151.

or Muhamedan and the Kingdom of Mysore is a heathen country, in which, as is well-known, cows are not eaten, much less killed, he gave out at once strict orders against the killing of cows and announced at the same time that every one was free in the exercise of his religion and if he was obstructed in it, he might complain direct to himself and would obtain satisfaction."[97] Haidar, in the restraint he laid on himself in this regard, had evidently even higher motives governing his conduct. He had designs on the English at Madras, who had come in the way of the Mysorean conquest of Trichinopoly and the country beyond it. Haidar, it is evident, had schemes in that direction and he desired to keep well with the Hindus, if he was to succeed in his attempt. He even aimed—as will be seen later—at a compromise with the Mahrattas for winning his objective. And, as the sequel will show, he endeavoured to get them to join him in his attempt to drive the English simultaneously out of all their settlements "from the Ganges to the Cape Comorin."[98] One who had such ambitious projects could not but be friendly to the Hindus and, exceptions apart, could not but have felt the utmost need for the strictest limitations on his powers, however easy their exercise might have seemed to him in his position.

(c) *In re* the Army.

The third limit that Haidar set on himself was his recognition of the duty he owed to his army. Whether in recruiting, organising or managing it, he showed both talents and energy. A born soldier himself, brought up

Major Charles Stewart, writing in 1809, says that Muhammadans accused Haidar "of reverencing Hindu deities." See his work "*A Descriptive Catalogue of the Oriental Library of the late Tippoo Sultan of Mysore, Memoir of Hyder Aly Khan*, 42. This *Memoir*, as stated above, is based on two (Persian) memoirs of Haidar written by two persons formerly in the service of Tipū Sultān. Col. Miles, writing in 1842, says that Haidar was, "from policy, and perhaps from superstition, more indulgent to the Hindoos than his son Tippoo." See *History of Hydur Naik*, Preface XX.

98. Innes Munro, *Narrative*, 124. Also see below.

in war and accustomed to the vicissitudes of warlike conditions, he possessed the insight to see that his army was so made up that it could not rise against him, come what may. He recruited his men in many ways. He is known to have given loans or made advances of money for securing men. Indeed, one annalist says that these loans and advances "were scattered like sand over the face of the Earth."[99] The same writer, though never lacking in hyperbolic language, is perhaps not exaggerating when he describes Haidar's instinct for good men. Haidar's estimate of the value of the brave and experienced soldier of whatever tribe or caste he might be, was, he says, very high.[100] And he adds that any man who had distinguished himself by his bravery he heartily cherished and protected, and used his endeavours to promote and exalt him.[101] His humility and agreeable manners attracted from all parts many adventurers to his service.[102] He was so far mindful of their services that, at his public audience, he assumed no airs and made no distinction between himself and a private.[103] Nor was he unmindful of what was owing as his due to the soldier.[104] He would not tolerate—at any rate in his earlier years—any deductions from the salaries of the soldiers.[105]

99. Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 476. 100. *Ibid.*

101. *Ibid.* The *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 80) records the following interesting particulars relating to Haidar's appreciation of the services of one Balavant Rao, a tried and trusted Mahratta cavalier in his army: Balavant Rao, says the chronicle, was once despatched by Haidar from Chitaldrug with a detachment against the Māpiḷḷas of Calicut, his wife accompanying him. The Nairs, however, treacherously surprised Balavant Rao, whereupon his wife, galloping the horse, successfully charged the assailants and extricated her husband. Haidar, on receipt of this news, duly honoured her with *Khillats*. The gallant lady died in Seringapatam in November 1781, at just the time when Balavant Rao was himself seriously wounded in an action with the English contingent from Trichinopoly. So grieved was Haidar with the news of these happenings, and so solicitous was he about Balavant Rao's welfare, that he allowed him to retire forthwith from the field, and granted him an allowance of rupees one thousand for the curing of his wounds and a gratuity of rupees three thousand for the expenses of his second marriage, together with suitable *Khillats*.

102. Mirza Ikbal, *Ibid*, 494 103-105. *Ibid.*

The first thing he did when taking over troops disbanded from the service of another was to pay them their accumulated arrears, an act which at once bound them to himself.[106] His plan of recruitment was so all embracing in character that even the blind were not left out of account.[107] The story is told of him that as he was riding out one day, a blind man asked him for alms. Haidar desired his servant to ask the beggar if he would take service with him. The beggar consented, and Haidar sent him off to the arsenal with the direction that he might be employed in blowing the bellows of the blacksmith's forge, and be allowed a *faṇam* a day and two cotton cloths every year. When the artillery marched, the blind man was placed on one of the artillery tumbrils and brought along with them! Haidar's passion for enlistment of all and sundry was so great that he directed the chief of his artillery to enlist as many blind men as he could find.[108] This excessive zeal for enlistment led him sometimes into acts which smacked of oppression. If any one, for instance, arrived in the country, and did not ask for service, Haidar became exasperated. The man was siezed and examined, and was then forced to accept service, or was turned out of the State. Apart from these extreme examples of his desire to recruit good men in all possible ways, he was the friend and protector of the soldier, and towards him he was altogether full of kindness and generosity.[109] He ate, while on the march, what the common soldier ate—parched grain and dry bread made of rice or *rāgi*.[110] His love for horses and the care he bestowed on their selection and upbreeding has been mentioned above. Strict in exacting duty, he was even stricter in issuing his commands and commissions. He was precise and exact in

106. He is known to have done this repeatedly.
107. Mirza Ikbal, *Ibid*, 498-499.
108. *Ibid*, 499.
109. Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 473.
110. *Ibid*, 474-475.

his directions and in their execution did not spare even his son. Whenever Tipū was ordered to repel enemies, or to attack forts, to whatever quarter he might be sent, he was first summoned to the presence and admonished in the manner characteristic of Haidar. Haidar would turn to him, look him full in the face, and with his own lips, tell him that he had selected him for the particular service, because he thought him worthy of it; that he committed a force of so many horse and foot, so many guns, and a treasury of so much money to his orders; that he was to take great care to see that no neglect occurred; and that he was to use great prudence and caution, and return successful. He was then dismissed.[111] If anything went wrong, Haidar was not the man to excuse. He is known to have personally chastised his own son for remissness of duty on the day he escaped from Chinkurli.[112] But, true to his soldierly instinct, Haidar was ever thoughtful of his kind, while on duty in the field. Whenever he despatched a body of troops to perform any particular service, he was never free from anxiety in regard to their safety. Constant supplies were going to them—money, military stores and grain for men and cattle. He paid personal attention to the smallest detail relating to the equipment of the army, so much so, that even leather, the lining of bullock-bags or tent-walls, and strands of rope, all passed under his inspection, and were then deposited in the stores. The suppliers of various things required—merchants and traders—and those who provided the sinews of war—bankers and money-changers—he kept always in good humour. So great was his desire to please them that he made "kingly presents" to them and bought their goods with the greatest avidity and at the highest prices.[113] In the repairs of forts and the construction of new defences, he was unremitting, expending as he did lakhs or crores

111. *Ibid*, 478. 112. See below. 113. Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 475.

of rupees.[114] The state of preparedness he always exhibited in this regard was one that could not be contradicted.[115]

Garrisoning of forts and fortifications.

It is not, however, to be supposed that Haidar invented a new system of administration for forts or that he did anything more than enforce the discipline by which they were bound. The forts were mostly intended for defence purposes and were mainly of three kinds: situated in a plain surrounded by low ground, on a hill, rock, or a rocky tract; or in the midst of a river, *i.e.*, on an island. Seringapatam is a good example of the last of these varieties. From time immemorial, hill and rock fortifications were much valued, as they were deemed best suited to defend populous cities. Kautilya refers to them in his *Artha-Śāstra* (*c.* 4th cent. B. C.) Haidar appears to have maintained a corps of pioneers at a large expense for military purposes in war. They were employed on useful labours in peace time, more particularly to took after the keeping in repair of fortifications. Each fort had an establishment, at the head of which was the *Killēdār*. The *Killēdār* was both commandant and administrative head. Under him were various officers who had charge of grain, water, stores, ammunition, etc. There was also a clerical staff attached to his office. Discipline was strict. Egress and ingress was strict, while watches and patrols were provided for with scrupulous care. Haidar did not introduce any system of his own in this connection, but enforced the system to which he succeeded—and it had descended to him from a time anterior even to the days of the Vijayanagar kings and going back to the Chōḷa and Hoysaḷa times—with the utmost rigour, especially in his later days when

114-115. *Ibid*, 487. Kīrmāṇi's words are: "Indeed, the state of the strong hill forts in the Payanghaut and Balaghaut will afford sufficient testimony."

war became almost a passion with him. The garrison was usually made up of both infantry and cavalry units, each fort having a complete establishment of its own. This establishment was usually made up of different classes of people and included Brāhmans, Lingāyats and others, who were known by the common designation of *Gurikārs*. A *Gurikār* was usually a headman of armed peons, whom he controlled. He himself was one well-trained—at least originally—in archery, and was invariably an excellent marksman. The *Gurikārs* generally had assignments of rent-free lands in the vicinity of the forts they served in and they were faithful to a degree, being in many cases those who had already rendered faithful service. Some of their descendants—in Mysore at least—still draw hereditary pensions of varying amounts, being included in the Palace establishment. Some of these belonged really to the intelligence department of the army and as such brought in useful information as to the movements of the enemy. The *Haidar-Nāmāh* not infrequently mentions these *Gurikārs* by name and refers to the particular services rendered by them.

Adoption of European military discipline.

As the main objective of Haidar was the acquisition of territory—in the directions in which Mysore could expand on natural lines, where it had been prevented for some time through machinations—he perceived early that that objective was capable of realization only through force of arms. He was under no delusion whatever as to that. He had seen the fate that had overtaken Mysore in the matter of Trichinopoly after it had fulfilled its part of the contract. He had seen how the English, in the alleged interests of Muhammad Alī, had stood in the way of its surrender to Mysore. Accordingly his first aim was to establish a good army, good by reason of its careful recruitment, and good also because of its improved organization. Haidar had, within the fifteen years he

had served in the army,[116] learnt a few lessons from which he tried to profit, now that he had an opportunity to put them to practical use. Chief among these was that discipline was at the very root of a sound military policy. He had realised why Nanjarāja had failed at Trichinopoly. Though he had a large army, though he had expended large sums of money, though he had tried all possible expedients, though he had spent much time on the adventure and though he had risked all his name and fame on it, he had failed in his attempt. He had seen that ill-disciplined masses of men could not make headway against the picked and disciplined few of the English and the French. He had been impressed as much with English strategy and cunning as with French genius for warfare and diplomacy. Beyond all, he had been deeply impressed, during the course of his frequent conflicts, that European discipline was a *sine qua non* for the efficiency of an army. He had learnt this important lesson from personal experience and the first thing that he did, immediately he got power into his hands, was to introduce it into his own army. In fact, he tried to make it the sheet-anchor of his military organization.[117] The story is told of him that when Nanjarāja got the

116. Haidar distinguished himself at the siege of Dēvanahaḷḷi in 1746-1747 and received an independent command in that year. In 1761, he successfully displaced both Nanjarāja and Khaṇḍē Rao and came to occupy their posts. In the interval between 1746 and 1761, he had seen much of the Anglo-French warfare in the Karnātic and had even taken part in it. See *Ante* pp. 206-209, 229-231, etc.

117. There is hardly a European writer left—contemporary or post-contemporary—that has not remarked on this important fact. For instance, Innes Munro, writing in 1789, says that Haidar was early impressed with the need of "European discipline" if he was "to establish a good army."—*Narrative*, 121. De La Tour (1784) says that he learnt to appreciate French discipline and exercised his troops in French evolutions even.—*Ayder Ali*, I. 56. Adrian Moens (1781) remarks that while with the French "he applied himself diligently to the science of war and observed everything carefully."—*Dutch Records* No. 13, p. 150. Col. Miles (1842) attributes his success to his "ready adoption of the advantages of European discipline."—*History of Hydur Naik*, Preface XXI.

French to join him against the English and Muhammad Alī at Trichinopoly in 1752, Haidar, who had been despatched, at the head of eighteen hundred horse, in aid of the French Commandant, showed how observant he could be of things that were taking place round about him. Immediately the Mysore and French armies came together, Haidar, whose camp then formed the left wing of the Mysore forces, came and encamped himself to the right of the French, in spite of the protestations of the French Commandant and even Nanjarāja himself. However disagreeable it might have been to the French to see themselves, as it were, cooped up, he would not remove himself from the station he had occupied. He told the Commandant that he wished to be near the French that he might learn from them the art of war! In fact, he was very observant and exact in noting everything that passed in the French camp and caused several of their evolutions to be repeated, as well as he could, in his own camp! This repetition, it is said, caused some diversion to the French officers and soldiers, whom he was attentive enough to please by his politeness and good manners.[118] Whether literally true or not, this story shows that Haidar had come to value discipline for its own sake. It was, however, the first step in the reform of the army. The second was to secure the services of European officers to train his men. As to this, his personal knowledge of the French and his experience of

118. De La Tour, l. c. M. de Maissin, who commanded the French at that time, is mentioned to have been the author of this anecdote. It was held by the French to confute the several stories that had been, prior to its publication, circulated respecting Haidar's intentions in being in a place where he was not wanted. It may be added that though Haidar was an officer of cavalry in Nanjarāja's army at Trichinopoly, he had troops of his own, with whom evidently he had gone over to the right of the French Commandant's troops to learn at close quarters French evolutions. M. Maissin, it may be noted, commanded the French troops in the attempt to surprise Trichinopoly, November 27, 1753. See Orme, *Indostan*, I. 321, 357, 360, 368, 370, 396-397.

their ways and manners had impressed him so deeply that he appears to have first turned to them for help. It is recorded by De La Tour that when Haidar accompanied Nāsir Jang during his descent upon the coast of Coromandel in 1750, he was present at the battle at which Nāsir Jang was killed, and the bravery of the French, who, to the number of but 800, seconded by 4000 sepoys, had the courage to attack the army of the Nizām, numbering more than 3,00,000 strong, made such an impression on Haidar's mind that he was persuaded that the French were capable of undertaking the most difficult enterprises. Following Muzaffar Jang, successor of Nāsir Jang, to Pondicherry, Haidar was even more deeply impressed with the prowess of the French. He there saw with his own eyes that newly sprung city, a bit of real France, both in its setting and make-up, while the observations he made while in it on the manners, discipline, fortifications, buildings, arts and industry of the French gave him the highest idea of that great nation, more especially of Dupleix, their then Governor.[119] De La Tour would have us believe that this personal experience of French life and French greatness and its possible causes made Haidar ever after lean towards the French and follow their example. Without going so far, it might be conceded that Haidar had had personal knowledge of the English and the French, and probably also of the Dutch and the Portuguese,[120] and had learnt to appreciate the European mode of warfare and the iron discipline that dominated it. He clearly perceived how invaluable that discipline would prove when applied to large masses of his own soldiers who lacked the training that would have made them all but invincible in the field. Many fruitful results followed this study of

119. *Ibid*, I. 51-52.

120. See below for Haidar's relations with these nations. Also Adrian Moens, *Ibid*, 151, 166.

European tactics and methods of warfare. Foremost among these were his ready adoption of the advantages of European discipline; his application of them to his own troops, even the English words of command being taken over by him, many of his subordinate officers having been decoyed from the English army at Madras; and the increased employment of Europeans in his service, as also of those who had had training in their mode of warfare. Abundant proof of all this is to be found in the history of his career. His contact with Europeans had also a more important effect on him. It strengthened him in his idea of territorial ambition not only in the South of India but also in the West and the East coasts. He saw the Dutch and the Portuguese ill-equipped for warfare and knew that with the troops he could put on the field at any moment, they could not stand him. What could not ample funds, disciplined troops and well directed effort achieve? His mind widened as his perception of the situation he saw before him grew clearer. He saw at his feet unfolding, as it were, an Empire in the South of India coterminous not only with the old Vijayanagar Kingdom but also including the whole of the Malabar coast from Goa to Cape Comorin. That became, as the result of European intercourse, Haidar's imperishable dream.

Recruitment of Europeans of all nations.

When we remember this, we can understand easily the passion with which he cultivated in turn the friendship or enmity of the European settlers in the South; tried to seek offensive and defensive alliances with them; and used their men, in so far as he could absorb them into his own army, for building his arsenals, for manning his artillery, for training his troops, for constructing his ports and, when occasion demanded, for fighting in his ranks against his adversaries. A well-authenticated story is recorded of his first attempt to pick up Europeans for

service in Mysore. As it is one which belongs to the earlier part of his career, it is well worth relating here, especially as it is illustrative of the acuteness of Haidar's character.[121] On his return to Mysore from Muzaffar Jang's camp in 1751, one of the first things he appears to have done was to inform his brother Śābās, then still alive, of the advantages to be derived from the adoption of European modes of warfare, of the superiority of the European arms and of the effective manner in which the Europeans managed their great guns. He succeeded in inducing his brother to despatch a Parsi to Bombay to purchase there, from the English Governor, cannon and muskets with bayonets.[122] The Parsi purchased, we are told, ten thousand muskets and six pieces of cannon, and, on his way back, enrolled on the Malabar coast thirty European sailors—evidently of different nationalities—to serve as gunners, and returned to Mysore. Śābās thus became "the first Indian who formed a corps of sepoys armed with firelocks and bayonets, and who had a train of artillery served by Europeans." De La Tour, who tells this story, sets the credit of adopting Haidar's advice to his brother Śābās. It is, however, clear that Śābās himself was in the employ of Nanjarāja, the Daḷavāi of Krishṇarāja II, and without his aid and co-operation, this purchase of European artillery and small arms,

121. De La Tour, *Ibid*, I. 52.

122. De La Tour calls Haidar's brother "Meer Ismael Saheb." He may be identified with Śābās. He styles the person despatched as "a Guebre," which is a contemptuous term used by Iranians when they refer to a non-Muslim Iranian, particularly a Zoroastrian. Though the word "guebre" is not restricted to Indian Zoroastrians, and Haidar's agent might have been a Persian Zoroastrian, it is more probable that he was an Indian Zoroastrian who had arrived at Mysore and been employed by Nanjāraja at the request of Śābās and Haidar Alī. De La Tour notes the fact that this Parsi died in 1767. (*Ibid*). Parsis in India have not been too passionately attached to their religion; they also have followed trade and commerce with the utmost zeal. Dastur Meher-ji Rāṇa, a Gujerāti Parsi theologian, who first met Akbar at the siege of Sūrat in 1573, became his initiator in Zoroastrianism about 1580. Parsis appear to have reached Calicut pretty early. From Calicut to Mysore, the route cannot have been a matter of any difficulty.

and the importation of European arms and gunners, would have been impossible. Nor is it improbable that Nanjarāja would not have perceived equally clearly the advantage of Haidar's suggestion, if indeed he had not already in his army gunners and others conversant with the use of firelocks and bayonets. There is evidence to believe that he had these in his service, as we see mention made both of *pirangis* (cannon) and *parangis* (Europeans) in the *Bhāshā-patra* (deed of promise) he entered into with King Krishṇarāja in 1758.[123] Probably the practice of maintaining guns and gunners is much older than this date, though Haidar's ardent desire for a more effective mode of warfare gave it a prominence never known before. This is the more probable as we see not only a growing desire on the part of Haidar, as

123. The *Bhāshā-patra* between king Krishṇarāja II and Nanjarāja, his Minister, is dated in *Śaka* 1680 or 1758 A.D. Under this agreement which was come to at the mediation of Haidar and Khaṇḍē Rao, Krishṇarāja II allowed to Nanjarāja the sum of 224,000 *varahas* "for the pay of 700 horse, 2000 *bārr* (sepoys), 500 Karnāṭakas (Karnāṭak sepoys), 500 *janjālu*, 106 guns (*pirangi*), 10 *parangi* (Europeans), *kāfer* (Kāfirs), *Kārēgārs* and others" for service under him, the same to be raised from districts assigned to him. Evidently the use of a fixed number of guns and the employment of a fixed number of European gunners had been in vogue for some years past in Mysore. Presumably their numbers were in proportion to the general strength of the army under its different heads. The *Bhāshā-patra* was concluded shortly after Krishṇarāja's attempt to throw off the authority of Nanjarāja in 1756, and the retirement of the latter's brother Dēvarāja from his official position. It will be found referred to at p. 202 above and further down below at some length. The use of guns in Indian warfare goes back to Vijayanagar days. During the reign of Krishṇadēvarāya of that dynasty (1509-1530), guns and muskets were employed in the reduction of Raichūr in 1520. The Portuguese were prominent in this battle. A large force of Portuguese fought on the Vijayanagar side and the spoil that fell to Krishṇadēva Rāya included 400 heavy cannons, besides small ones and 900 gun-carriages. At the siege of Raichūr itself, Krishṇadēva Rāya was assisted by one Christovao de Figueiredo, a Portuguese horse-dealer, who was evidently an adept in the use of guns and led a contingent of musketeers, whom he had brought with him (see *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iii. 1843, 1845). Gunpowder was introduced into Indian warfare by the Portuguese in or about 1500 A.D. In 1526, the Mughals adopted it as a means of warfare. Krishṇadēva Rāya of the Vijayanagar dynasty was the first to use it in Southern India at the siege of Raichūr. See Appendix III, for a note on gunnery in India.

time passed, to increase the number of European troops but also to remake his army on new lines with their aid. Among the Europeans thus recruited by him, the greater number were French, though there were representatives of other European nations as well.[124] There were

124. Among the French were M. La Maitre De La Tour; Sieur Stenet (De La Tour, *Ibid*, I. 56); Lally (Wilks, I. 415); Hughel (*Ibid*, 49, 167) who probably was Swiss in origin; and M. Allen, who took service under Haidar at Seringapatam in 1761, after the capitulation of Pondicherry, with his party of 300 Europeans, who subsequently were "of the greatest utility to him in disciplining his infantry and in the management of his artillery and arsenals" (Major C. Stewart, *Memoirs of Hyder Aly Khan*, 15). The last-mentioned must be the Mons. Alain referred to by Wilks (I. 264). M. Alain and M. Hughel were operating in 1761 between Thiaghur and the hills for the purpose of collecting and covering supplies to Pondicherry, then being besieged by the English. When they heard of its fall on 16th January 1761, they joined Haidar at Bangalore. Their troops consisted of 200 cavalry and 100 infantry, all Europeans and some scattered detachments of Indians. They were on Haidar's side in his first vain efforts against Khaṇḍē Rao at Nanjangūḍ. Orme styles Alain Major Allen and speaks of him as an officer of Lally's regiment. (*Indostan*, II. 703, 714, 715). According to Orme, Allen led the French cavalry on the night of 3rd December 1760, rushed out of the pettah of Thiaghur and went to the west of Tiruvaṇṇāmalai. According to Orme, Allen offered Thiaghur and Gingee to Visāji Punt with Rs. 500,000 for helping the French for relieving Pondicherry in January 1761. When he went over to Haidar on the fall of Pondicherry, he was accompanied by the person called the Bishop of Halicarnassus. (*Ibid*). Lally was joined a little later by a number of French deserters or prisoners, who escaped from Pondicherry during or after the siege of 1778 (*Ibid*, 28). Another Frenchman in Haidar's service was M. Jani, who commanded a regiment of Anglo-Indians [Kirmāṇi, *Ibid*, 390. He describes the regiment as one made up of "Chittikars," evidently a corruption of the "Shattaikars," a Tamil word still in current use in the Tamil districts of Madras for "Anglo-Indians," i.e., those who wear the "Shattai" or coat, the reference being to the principal dress (red coat) worn by these people to cover the main part of their body. The word is often written to-day as "Chattaikārs" or "Chettaikārs." Col. Miles was right when he explained the term thus: "Chittikars" are so called, I believe, from their clothes, perhaps the tiger-striped cotton—*Ibid*, 46 and 211, f.n.]. Belonging to the Portuguese nation was one Mequinez (De La Tour, *Ibid*, I. 157), and after him his wife, whom Haidar appointed as woman-Colonel of his corps until her adopted son came of age. To the same nation belonged Eloy Joze Correa Peixoto, Captain of the Portuguese troops at Goa, who entered the service of Haidar in April 1758 and served in the Mysore Army till August 1770, with a short break between November 1767—May 1769. He was "chief of the Vanguard and of all the European Fusiliers and the Regiment of Grenadiers." (See his Ms. entitled "*Anecdotes relative to the rise*

at least "one hundred European cannoneers of different nations" in the service of Haidar, if we are to believe De La Tour,[125] apart from the rank and file forming the European forces serving in the Mysore army at the time.[126] That these European employees were highly prized as gunners is also evident from the fact that the annalists of the period speak of them in terms of high praise. Thus, Kīrmāṇi describes the artillery men in Haidar's service as "the sureties of conquest."[127] Not a campaign was undertaken by Haidar without an adequate artillery train forming part of its equipment nor a battle fought without its aid. Thus, at the taking of Arcot, Haidar, it is said, employed seventy guns.[128]

of Hyder Ally"—British Museum Addl. Mss. 19287. The references in this work, however, are to a copy of this Ms. in the Mysore Archæological Office, entitled *Memoirs of Hyder Ally*—see p. 99). Of the same nationality were Joze Austin de Menezes, who was Captain Commandant of Artillery in Haidar's army in 1770 (*Ibid*, p. 145), and Manuel, who joined him in 1761 (Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 50, 91, 93). Among the Irish were Turner (De La Tour, *Ibid*, I. 150), and his first Captain Minerva (*Ibid*, I. 153). Of the Swedish nationality, there was at least one, who was an accomplice of Turner in an infamous spying affair (*Ibid*, I. 169, f.n.). Among the Germans, there was Constantin, a native of Andarnac on the Rhine in the Electorate of Cologne, who was serjeant, when M. Hughel commanded the Europeans in Haidar's army (*Ibid*, II. 25, f.n.); and there was Lene, a Westphalian, who was Captain of the Grenadier Topasses (*Ibid*, II. 183-184, f. n.); under him served one Mammon, a Maltese, who with this officer distinguished himself at the battle of Raṭṭihaḷḷi (*Ibid*). And among the English, there was one who had been appointed by Haidar as Admiral of his fleet (*Ibid*, II. 15). Elsewhere De La Tour calls him Stanet. Stanet displaced Alī Rāja, whom Haidar dismissed for his ill-treatment of the King of the Maldives. (*Ibid*, I. 98). He was evidently Admiral on the Malabar Coast.

125. De La Tour, *Ibid*, I. 206.

126. M. Lally joined Haidar with the following forces, which represented about one-fifth of the number which he had stipulated to bring: 100 European infantry, 50 European cavalry, 1000 Indian infantry and 2 guns. See Wilks, I. 415. While in the Nizām's service, he bore the title of Rustum-Jang (Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 313). Cf. Kīrmāṇi (*Ibid*, 390), who says that Haidar entertained Lally "with a body of 2000 regular infantry, 500 Europeans or Portuguese, and 100 Allemand horse." Haidar's arsenal at Diṇḍigal was under the superintendence of French artificers, whose services he obtained from Pondicherry. This was in 1755.

127. Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 297.

128. *Ibid*, 380.

Haidar, indeed, appears to have been most indebted in all his battles to his artillery and his European and regular infantry under these European officers. These officers seem to have done duty with the artillery in times of need, as was actually the case when Baillie's detachment was defeated, the blowing up of the tumbril being entirely ascribed to Lally.[129]

Haidar's aim, a well-trained and well-equipped army.

There can be no doubt that Haidar was early impressed with the importance of a well-manned, a well-trained and a well-equipped army. When exactly he added the artillery to his equipment is perhaps inferable from the Śābās story narrated above. But, apart from the statement of De La Tour, we have other evidence to support the view that Haidar got his first lessons in European military tactics while serving with the French, when the French were at the height of their reputation in India under Dupleix. Moens, indeed, specifically states that it was during the period of his service with the French, in or about 1751, that "he applied himself diligently to the science of war and observed everything carefully."[130] A short time later, when he increased his corps from 500 to 3,000 men, "he provided his men with artillery, further informed himself of everything that belonged to warfare and in this way soon got an idea of European tactics, so that he was able to manœuvre fairly regularly and did much execution with his corps of 3000 men, well provided with artillery wherever he was employed or stationed."[131] When he took Bednūr,[132] he not only secured and fortified it but also took hold of Honāvar, Basrūr, Bārkūr and Mangalore, the four well-known ports of Canara, and the country

129. See Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 93, f.n. Also below.
130. Adrian Moens in *Dutch Records* No. 13, 150
131. *Ibid.*
132. See below.

beyond them forming part of the uplands.[133] He also made himself strong at sea at the same time by building ships, *palens* (country boats), *gallivats* (large row-boats) and other vessels.[134] The Portuguese, it would appear, "assisted him on the sly by allowing many private soldiers and even officers to enter his service in order to keep this dangerous conqueror their friend."[135] It would thus seem that between 1751 and 1763, *i.e.*, between his 29th and 41st years of age, covering a period of service in the Mysore army of about 13 years,[136] he had not only convinced himself of the need for modernising the army, if he was to succeed in his ambitious designs, but had also adopted the military tactics, equipment and discipline of the European nations and had even successfully absorbed into his ranks as many of the European adventurers as he could get at or induce to join. He also attracted unto himself European artificers and sepoys who had undergone training and won experience in the service of the English Company. To these he held out high hopes of rapid advancement and the most tempting rewards. To win such over, he never lacked suitable emissaries in the English Company's service. He was so signally successful in this endeavour of his that before long his forces had so far imbibed the new training and the new discipline that English words of command came to displace the local ones throughout his army.[137] These and other changes directly helped Haidar to remake his army on modern lines, so that his troops soon became capable of meeting on equal terms those in the employ of the European settlers in India.

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133. Adrian Moens, *Ibid*, 151.
134. *Ibid.*
135. *Ibid.*
136. Assuming that he was born in 1722 and counting his personal service from 1740, when he received an independent command.
137. Innes Munro, *Narrative*, 121.

His displacement of the territorial system by the paid personal service system.

The reason why Haidar remodelled the army is to be seen in the conditions of the time. The *mansabdāri* system, in which he had been brought up, was found to be practically unwise to continue and, from the military point of view, useless. It had had a long and ancient history to back it but it was compatible only with the existence of a strong centralized government, a government that could keep the *mansabdārs* in check, make them do their duties by their sovereign and keep the forces under their control in proper condition. The competition for men was beginning to be felt about the time that Haidar rose to power. Numerous local potentates and chiefs were competing for power. They depended on their armies for realising their ambitious designs. The French, the English, the Dutch, the Portuguese and the Danes were in the field and each of these to some extent were recruiting for their old-established or new-fledged armies, particularly the English and the French. Their hold on their men was personal; their contact with them continuous; and their training was on lines that made for efficiency. Their equipment too was modern and their corporate character had an effect on their discipline and their conduct in the field. Haidar had observed all this and had been deeply impressed by what he had seen. The *mansabdāri* system was essentially territorial in character. The officers were spread over the land. The State taxes granted to them in the districts assigned to them for military service could not often help to maintain the horses, elephants and the men they had to keep. The system had, besides, bred laziness, license, extravagance and greed in the *mansabdārs* who ate up all the grant, no money being left to pay the men who formed the ranks. The result was the *amīrs* dressed up their grooms and servants as soldiers and passed them off at the muster, and then sent them back to their own

work. As Badauni had observed as early as the reign of Akbar, the Mughal Emperor, " the treasure, tax-gathering and expenditure of the *mansabdārs* remained unchanged but in every way dirt fell into the plate of the poor soldier, and he could not gird up his loins. Weavers, cotton-dressers, carpenters and Hindu and Muslim chandlers would hire a charger, bring it to the muster, obtain a *mansab* and become a *crōri*, trooper, or substitute for some one; a few days later, not a trace would be found of the hired horse, and they became footmen again.[138] The dangers, evils and uncertainties of the system were probably too well realized by Haidar to be perpetuated by him any longer, especially in the conditions in which he found himself. Those competing for power—principally the French and the English—made the individual soldier the unit of recruitment; they had made direct control the principle of their military policy; and they had made the maintenance, upkeep and well-being of the soldier a matter between themselves and the soldier, allowing no intermediary to step in and claim either his service or his loyalty. Haidar was not slow to grasp the advantages of the new system he saw in actual operation before him. He not only adopted it but also tried to improve on it by making it the lever for centralizing all authority in himself, thus paving the way for the unification of the country as quickly as he might, so that the expansionist policy he so ardently aimed at—adopting in this respect wholesale Nanjarāja's policy—may be pursued without let or hindrance from within. His policy was essentially one of peace at home and force abroad, a policy without which he could not have made any impression either on his own contemporaries or on posterity, however talented personally he might have been as a soldier.

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138. Badauni, II. 189 *et seq.*

The displacement, a corollary to his policy of unification.

The policy of unification inside appealed to him not only as mere good policy but also as eminently practical politics.[139] His ideal of peace within and force abroad required as its first corollary the early subjugation of the *Pāḷegārs* on the one side and the few independent States left in the north-west and the west on the other.[140] They were sources of trouble and weakness to him. His great advantage over his opponents was the possession of all power in his hands. The new army policy put all his forces also at his personal disposal. All his resources could thus be used against each of them in turn to overcome them. He could, in fact, fight them one by one at his own convenience and subdue them. They had neither the willingness nor the opportunity for combining against him. Each of these in turn became thus an easy prey, though some of them appear to have fought him bravely and even with obstinacy. They did not lack fighting spirit nor a cause to defend. The love of independence had bred in them, for ages, the love of their hearths and homes, and the love of their religion and their country was so great that they would not yield except after a struggle. But Haidar's devotion to the principle of unification, his determination to overcome all obstacles in this regard, and his great anxiety to finish this work as quickly as may be possible, had made him steal his heart. He refused to yield to any compromise in this matter. He wanted nothing less than complete surrender. He was a firm believer in the principle underlying the maxim *parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos*. Whoever stood in the way was not spared. His organized army did its work, and his enemies told the

139. Haidar seems to have foreseen the need for unification about 1761-1762. In a letter dated January 18, 1762, he says : "By the blessing of God, if we may be united, many affairs will be dispatched" (*Fort St. George Records*: *Mily. Count. Corres.*, X. No. 21).

140. See Chs. XIII, XVII-XIX below.

rest in sorrow. Before his trained men, his disciplined cavalry and his fire-spitting artillery, the Pāḷegār retainers or even the better bred soldiers of ancient kings could make no headway. The result was, as might be expected, total annihilation and the annexation of their country and the absorption of their military forces into that of Haidar's own.

His policy of unification.

Haidar thus early realized the inter-relation that existed between the unification of the country and the unification of the army and its control by a centralized authority. There is hardly any doubt that he definitely understood the advantages of the new system and he worked to make it not only the basis of his army organization but also the corner-stone of his political ambitions. He went on the principle that the more he kept his eye on the individual soldier and made him look to him for his living, preferment and promotion, the more he would be able to achieve the ambitions he had set his heart on. He took a comprehensive, common-sense view of the situation he was in at the time he came to power. Haidar, though an admirer of the French, was not, in the beginning, at any rate, for an intensification of the relations of Mysore with the French at Pondicherry. He realized that both the French and the English aimed at power and that they used the country powers as pawns in their own game. His attitude towards all the European nations in India was the same: to use them, to keep them away or to subdue them, as his needs may dictate. It was the attitude of the English that dispelled him from them. As the years sped, his cry against them became louder and louder. At the time we are writing of, Haidar, with a view to eventualities, evidently reviewed the immediate past with a view to provide for the immediate future, so that chaos may be avoided at home and a step taken to assert its advance all round to avoid chaos

beyond it. The impression that his European neighbours had made on him determined him to wipe them out successively out of the country, if they did not voluntarily agree to come to terms with him on the basis of a friendly agreement. With this view, he sought (*a*) unification of territory; (*b*) unification of army; and (*c*) unification of administrative control, civil and military, in himself. He desired to lead the country politically and the army in its military defence. He made it plain as to who was the authorized leader in the task he took on himself. Nobody could in the least doubt that. Hence the mistake of foreign writers of the period that he was "Sovereign" while he was only asserting a right vested in him by virtue of his office, both as Dewān and as Generalissimo. He had gone so far as to make known to foreign circles that if necessity arose he would know how to strike for his country. He made his peace army his war army supported by military stores, commissariat, arsenals and a navy even to protect the coast and the frontiers. Much as he desired peace, he said, in effect, that he would not suffer any weakening of the one instrument he possessed, which was best fitted to maintain peace. With the army he rose, and with the army he remained, worked and died.

Policy of unification only a means to an end.

The policy of unification of the country was only a means to an end. That end involved the execution of the policy of expansion initiated by Chikkadēvarāja Woḍeyar and sought to be given fuller effect to by Nanjarāja, his (Haidar's) Chief. To it Haidar was fully wedded. Indeed, it would be right to say that the unification of the country under one ruler was with him the first step in the execution of the larger policy of natural expansion southwords, in which Mysore had been lately thwarted by Muhammad Alī and the English at Madras. Haidar, to overcome the odds against him, would seem to have

evolved a workable policy of unification coupled with expansion. The first aim of that policy was to secure the country, adding to it all such parts, within and without, in the immediate vicinity, as to make peace at home possible and maintain that peace at all cost. Next, to make Mysore internally so strong that every one casting covetous glances at it would be afraid to attack it. His newly evolved army was to function in such a way as to make possible attacks on the integrity of the Mysore realm impossible. Not only that. He aimed at using the favourable home position, the strength of his army and the new-born ardour of his forces for prosecuting Mysore's advance southwards. That, at any rate, was the load-star that guided his military and territorial ambitions in the first instance. Vengeance, always sweet, was sweeter in this case. The diplomatic intrigue which had made Mysore lose Trichinopoly had left a deep impression on him. He had made up his mind definitely as to what he was after, and all his preparations had for their objective, its realization. His aim, briefly put, was : "Our goal is the South, to which Trichinopoly is the key. With its capture, our goal will be reached. One people from Mysore to Cape Comorin ; one State ; one Ruler." [141] He was anxious to avoid conflicts in the South with the English at Madras ; with the Nīzām ; and with the Mahrattas. Neither did he want to get himself involved in conflicts with the Dutch and the Portuguese. With all these nations, he tried to make offensive and defensive alliances. But all this was only to effectuate the more easily his objective, if possible peaceably, if not, by the application of force. He would not accordingly agree to the British protest to his friendly overtures, time and again, either on behalf of themselves or their ally Muhammad Alī ; or to their intervention in

141. *Vide* on this point, Chs. XVII, XXI below.

the name of the Imperial House of Delhi, or its representative, the Nizām. Such a protest, such an overture, such an intervention carried no meaning to him. It did not possess any moral weight with him, nor did he consider it of even formal importance. His appeal was to the sword.

The implications of the policy.

Haidar well knew what such an appeal meant. It plainly suggested to him the reduction of his opponents by every means open to him. Experience had taught him that it would not do to stay still and hope for the much desired advance towards the South. He felt it his duty to take hold of every opportunity to prosecute that aim; to take every active step to further its realization; and to remove every obstacle that stood in the way of its achievement. He thus came to evolve a policy which might help him to attain the end he had in view. That policy may be summed up as the policy of peace at home and force abroad. Its rapid evolution was rendered possible by the power that came to be vested in him; by the immediate sensible use he made of it, especially in getting together a cabinet of ministers who gave to it a national character; and by the creation of conditions which would not mean anything detrimental to himself, or provoke any enmity in court circles, or outside the State, especially among the Mahrattas who were ever ready to intervene, ostensibly in the interests of Mysore but actually in their own, as competitors for the vacant Southern Empire.[142]

The policy both a political and an economic move.

This move at unification was necessitated as much by political as by economic causes. The free movement of armies was not the only thing aimed at; nor was the suppression of petty chiefs who might be got at by a designing enemy the only concern. The State was expanding and

142. See Chs. XIII, XVII-XIX below.

the free movement of goods and the free interchange of merchantable articles from one part of the country to the other was also found necessary in the interests of the people who had come increasingly under the sway of Mysore since the days of Chikkadēvarāja. Trade was seeking to find new outlets and there was no reason why the demands of trade—both local and foreign—should not be met. Haidar knew that he would meet with opposition—strenuous opposition—in the working out of his policy. There was, first, the new Muhammadan element from the north, let loose by Aurangzīb's subjugation of Bijāpur and Gōlkoṇḍa; he knew also the forces of the Nizām, who claimed as much as the agent of Imperial Delhi as in his own interests; he knew also the invented claims of the Nawāb of Arcot; and he knew the ambitions of the Mahrattas. But he had no regard for the pretensions of any of these. He regarded all of them as interlopers, as poachers in a field not their own. Though the first three of these professed the same religion as himself, he felt that any toleration of their claims in the South and their existence in the South for any length of time was a source of danger to the peace and prosperity of the South. He conceived it his duty, as the representative of the biggest organized State in the South, despite the fact that he professed the same religious faith with them, that he should maintain the long recognized political and territorial integrity of the South. He was ready to treat with them so long as they were ready to peaceably deal with him in the matters he was interested in. Immediately they showed a tendency to thwart his aims, or to work against him by any combinations, he made no secret of his determination to take all steps necessary to put them down. It was this determination—a determination which dominated his unification policy from first to last—that brought against him the combined wrath of all his enemies, the English, the

Nizām and the Mahrattas. In his policy of unification of the South, they saw their own ruin, their own fall, and their own final disappearance from the land, which each of them had desired to dominate. Each of these thought—rightly or wrongly—that he had a right to consider the effect of Haidar's policy of the unification of the South of India on his own fortunes. They jointly and severally disputed Haidar's right to dominate the South. They failed to note that he, in prosecuting this particular policy of the unification of the South, was only asserting the right of Mysore to stand forth as the natural successor of the Vijayanagar Empire and for its traditional policy of keeping the South outside the ambitions of extraneous powers, whoever they were, Muhammadan, Mahratta, or from over the Seas. Haidar did not stand for himself personally in this matter but for Mysore, just as much as Nanjarāja did before him or even Khaṇḍē Rao or any other minister would have done in his place. This simple fact affords the key to Haidar's whole political and military policy, and why he ever had his eye fixed on Trichinopoly and why he adopted a ruthless policy of internal subjugation and outward expansion from sea to sea.

The means he employed to carry it through.

Haidar's views and objectives were soon perceived by his contemporaries, though some would not believe in his capacity to prosecute or realize them. Among these, the English at Madras easily stood first, despite the persistent goading of their ally Muhammad Alī. Haidar's means, however, for the realization of his objectives were many and among them the chief were: the building up of a strong army, disciplined and equipped on modern lines; the adding of an artillery wing to each army corps; the rapid manufacturing of weapons and implements of warfare; the perfecting of a well-ordered system of commissariat; the opening up of communication by sea

and fixing up contacts with friendly nations beyond it; and making the country self-sufficient and stronger and stronger daily, so that Mysore may be listened to with respect by the powers fighting for supremacy in the South, among whom she had not been an insignificant figure so far. When Haidar put into operation his policy, the English saw, for the first time, to their dismay, what it would mean to them and to their very existence.

Evolution of a new Mysore army under Haidar.

There is, so far as it is at present known, no contemporary description available of the Mysore army as it was developed by Haidar. But there are indications in the writings of the period as to how it was evolved by him and how he came to be influenced by what he had seen of and learnt from the army systems in vogue among the French, the English and other foreign nations with whom he had come into close personal contact during the earlier part of his career. He had seen that the efficiency of the armies maintained by these nations depended on the personal loyalty of the men forming it; on the systematic manner in which they were trained and officered; on the punctuality with which, so far as it was possible, their salaries were met; on the regularity and readiness with which their needs were satisfied while in the field; and on the confidence that the army commanders, and in the last resort the head of the army, infused into the rank and file by their general disposition and conduct towards them. He had seen also that though the armies of these nations had been drawn from different races and even different nationalities and creeds, they were held together by discipline; by the inculcation of personal loyalty and by the interest shown in the welfare of those composing them. Haidar, shrewd as he was, saw that if the foreign nations could build up well-trained armies from the material available in the land, there was no reason why he should not attract unto himself suitable

men for carrying out his aims and objectives. There is hardly any doubt that he remodelled the Mysore army broadly on the lines on which the English and the French had modelled their own.

The example of the French at Pondicherry.

As regards the French, Haidar was, as we have seen, a careful student of the French army and its discipline. The French not only undertook to train Indian troops but also to keep them entirely Indian in character. The European part was recruited in France itself, though it was diluted by men chosen in Bourbon and Mauritius. They also recruited men of mixed parentage, known as *Topasses*, who were mostly of Portuguese extraction. They also imported *Coffres* from Madagascar. Locally, they chose recruits from the different Hindu castes and from the Muhammadans. The first sepoys appear to have been recruited in 1740 for carrying on a petty local war in Mahé. Dumas brought over three companies of them to defend Karikal against Tanjore. La Bourdannais, who had been greatly impressed with their valour, induced a further importation in 1746.[143] Dupleix who saw the advantage of possessing such troops—raised at a cost considerably lower than European or imported—left the discipline and command to Indians themselves, except when they were fighting in conjunction with European troops under European officers. Haidar had personal knowledge of French discipline and valour and was from all accounts greatly impressed by both. When Pondicherry fell in 1761, Haidar took over all the

143. Ananda Ranga Pillai represents Dupleix as raising the first set of Indian troops—see *Di. A. Pi.*, VII. 168 *et seq.* But see *Ante* p. 112. *Coffres*: Natives of Madagascar and of the west coast of Africa, first recruited by the French for service in their settlements in India and later by the English at Madras. The name is a corruption of *Kāfir*, a non-believer; a non-Muslim; a name given to non-Muslims by Muslims. Kāfiristan in the N. W. of India is a part of what is now Afghanistan which did not yield to Muhammadans. A company of Coffres served with credit during the Karnātic War, 1751-1754.

available French troops—European and Indian—for service under him. His brother-in-law Mokhdum brought with him all the French cavalry under Mons. Allen and Hughes together with such workmen as were at Pondicherry, "a precious acquisition" which highly contributed to the success of Haidar by furnishing him with skilful armourers, carpenters and other workmen from the arsenal of Pondicherry, collected with much expense and trouble by the French.[144] Among these was Mons. Lally who joined him with 100 European infantry; 1,000 Indian infantry; 50 European cavalry and 2 guns.[145]

The example of the English at Madras.

The English raised troops for the first time shortly after September 1746, when Madras capitulated to the French under Admiral De La Bourdonnais. Haidar was in his twenty-fourth year then and had held for six years an independent command in the Mysore army. The troops raised were European cavalry, artillery and infantry, and Indian infantry. Of these, the European cavalry never rose above the strength of a squadron, and were not maintained for more than a few years.[146] The Nawāb of Arcot opposed its strengthening because such a step would have thrown out of employment most of his adherents to whom it was the main source of sustenance and social distinction. Besides, the English found that though the cavalry were useful and efficient, they were too expensive. The English accordingly depended, during their first and second wars with Haidar (1767-1769 and 1780-1784), entirely on their infantry and artillery, while Haidar's forces consisted principally of cavalry.[147] The first troops which were raised by the

144. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 64.
145. Wilks, *Mysoor*, I. 756.
146. Wilson, *History of the Madras Army*, I. 6, 22-23.
147. The French general De La Tour, writing about 1782, observes that the "English have never yet succeeded in the attempt to form a good

English were for the defence of their settlement at Fort St. David at Cuddalore,[148] to which they had transferred themselves after the surrender of Fort St. George to the French in September 1746. The first levies, being drawn from classes unaccustomed to warfare, knew no discipline. They were armed with matchlocks, bows and arrows, spears, swords, bucklers, daggers and other weapons, much like their brethren in the Hindu and Muhammadan armies of the time.[149] They consisted of

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troop of European horse in India." He attributed this not so much to lack of interest in forming one as to their desire to subject such a troop to "good discipline" (*Ayder Ali*, II. 18). He adds: "The excellence of the English cavalry is sufficiently acknowledged in Europe; and its advantages consist less in the goodness of the horse than in the choice of the horsemen. The pay of a horseman in England is such as renders his situation very eligible; so that the sons of rich farmers and tradesmen are very desirous of entering into the service. This being the case, it is in the power of the officers to select handsome, well-formed men of good character, and to keep them in good discipline, merely for the fear of being dismissed. The officers who were first entrusted with the formation of a body of cavalry in India, thought to establish and preserve the same discipline among them without attending to the great difference of time, place and persons. The recruits sent from England to India are in general libertines . . . and as the Company will not dismiss a soldier, all the punishment inflicted on a horseman is to reduce him to serve in the infantry; so that a man is no sooner put in the cavalry than he is sent back again to his former station." Contrasting English and French modes of recruiting to the cavalry division, De La Tour says: "The French have succeeded in forming very good cavalry in India, by attending more to their horsemanship, and less to their discipline and manners" (*Ibid*, II. 19-20). Col. Smith's despatches of September 1767 contain earnest complaints against the want of cavalry. The complaints continued till 1792. The English at Madras considered this subject of the deficiency in cavalry again and again but the expense involved in the forming of a cavalry force seems to have always stood in the way. As mentioned in the text above, the true reason was that the Nawāb of the Karnātic would not agree to the development of a cavalry force by the English because that would have meant the extinction of his own cavalry force and with it the means of employment of his followers and dependents.

148. About 100 miles south of Madras, and 12 miles from Pondicherry. When Madras fell, the garrison at Fort St. David consisted of 200 Europeans, 100 Topasses, a few Mahratta horse and about 2,000 Indians, who were mostly undisciplined and only partially supplied with fire-arms (Wilson, *Ibid*, 24).

149. See below for descriptions of the armies of Haidar and of the Nizām.

bodies of varying strength, each under the command of its own chief, who received from the authorities the pay of the whole body and distributed it to the men, or was at least supposed to do so. Not infrequently these chiefs were the owners of the arms carried by the men, and received from each man a rupee a month for the use of the weapons. This system, though seemingly lax, was sound in principle and worked well. The salary due was paid regularly to the chiefs and was, relatively speaking, so good as to make dismissal from the service a punishment. But the English took time to perceive the value of the South Indian as a fighter. They had, indeed, such a poor opinion of him that despite what the French had, before their very eyes, made of him by discipline, they looked, at least for twelve more years (1746 to 1758), to other fields for recruitment. During this period, they continued to prefer any material to what lay immediately by their hand. They enlisted European adventurers of all nations, the refuse of their respective countries; they tried Topasses and Coffres; they sent to Bombay for Arabs, Rajputs and Hindustānis; they imported and purchased slaves from Madagascar; and, indeed, exploited all sources except the country in which they had settled and lived in for over a century. In 1756, however, the Nawāb of Bengal took Calcutta and they were compelled to send every man they could spare under Lieut.-Col. Clive to retrieve their fortunes there. They did this with great reluctance, for it was known that war between France and England was imminent, and a large French force was expected daily on the coast of Coromandel. But the position in Bengal was so pressing that they resolved to run the risk, giving, however, the strictest injunction that the Madras troops should be sent back as soon as Calcutta was retaken. This, however, was found impossible; the French force did arrive; and the English at Madras found themselves in great danger.

Fort St. David fell and the French proceeded to lay siege to Fort St. George. Under this severe pressure, the English for the first time realized that they should make the most of the South Indian sepoy a better fighter by discipline. In August 1758, the Indian forces in their employ were formed into regular companies of 100 men each, with a due proportion of Indian officers, Havildārs, Naiks, etc.,[150] and sound rules were also evolved for regulating their pay and promotion. Next, the companies were formed into battalions, five being formed in September 1759, a sixth being added shortly after. Others were raised during the next eight years, the establishment standing at sixteen battalions in February 1767. Shortly after, the battalions were drawn together (by Col. Joseph Smith, a master of both strategy and tactics) and brigaded and placed under picked officers, European and Indian. Necessary regulations were also adopted in January 1766 for the better management of the force, the same being made into a code and published for the information and guidance of the officers.[151]

The army of the English at Madras as it stood in 1761.

The example of a South Indian army thus brought into being by the English at Madras, at the very time that Haidar was rising to power and watching the development of the events in the country, cannot have been lost on one so shrewd and observant like him. By about 1761, the English had organized an army made up of European Cavalry, Indian Cavalry,[152] Artillery, Engineers, European Infantry and Indian Infantry. The European Cavalry was a small one. It consisted of 100 privates drafted from the battalions of infantry and divided into two troops of 50 privates each, though as a matter of fact each troop did not actually exceed 40 men. The Indian

150. Spelt as *Naigues* by the writers of the 18th century.

151. Wilson, *Ibid*, 6-10.

152. Then called *Native* cavalry. In conformity with modern terminology, the word *Indian* has been substituted for *Native*.

Horse consisted of about 900 men, quite undisciplined. They had seen no service during the war except as scouts and foragers, and in the way of laying waste the enemy's country. The Artillery consisted of two companies, each suitably officered. The train consisted of two 12 pounders, ten 6 pounders and three $5\frac{3}{4}$ inch Howitzers. The establishment of Indian officers attached to Gun Lascars was fixed at one Tindal to each gun and one syrang to every two guns, this establishment being required to make the lascars do their duty satisfactorily. The superior corps consisted of one Chief Engineer and three officers. The European Infantry at the time Fort St. George surrendered in 1746, consisted of about 200 men. This was raised in 1747 to 550 by drafting 100 each from Bombay and Bengal and 150 from England. In the same year, an adaptation of the English articles of war was introduced, in order to keep the troops under control and in proper discipline. These provided against mutiny and sedition, the use of violence against superior officers, disobedience, show of force, desertion, escape from lawful custody, misbehaviour, etc. These articles enjoined trial by Courts-martial.[153] In June 1748, the Infantry was, under the orders of the Court of Directors, formed into seven companies, further regulations being introduced, at the Court's instance, for maintaining strict discipline. The war in the Karnātic necessitated additional troops. The Court of Directors, in 1750, offered inducements to secure recruits. They also arranged for the raising of two companies of Swiss in Protestant cantons, and detachments of these arrived at Madras in 1751 and the following three years. These altogether numbered about 500 men, besides eight officers. These two companies enjoyed for a time certain privileges, the

153. Major Lawrence was in January 1748 appointed President of all Courts-martial, Lieut. James Cope being nominated to be Judge-Advocate. In October 1753, Major Lawrence was empowered to assemble and appoint Courts-martial when in the field (Wilson, *Ibid*, 52).

men being triable by their own officers and according to their own martial law.[154] These privileges, however, were withdrawn early in 1757, the Swiss Companies being placed in all respects on the same footing as the English infantry and made subject to the same Courts-martial. Besides these mercenary troops, there were from time to time drafts of regiments newly raised in England, granted to the Company by His Majesty's Government in England, and they were sent out for service. There were also Royal troops despatched for service, whose officers took rank before the Company's officers of the same grade, a source of much discontent until its removal.[155] The need for men was so great that the deserters from the French were eagerly entertained and absorbed into the English and the Swiss Companies,[156] or formed into separate companies with officers conversant with their own languages.[157] In or about 1758, the Infantry companies were formed into two battalions and officers were posted to them, thus making for increased efficiency. Then, as regards Indian Infantry, the first Indian foot-soldiers raised by the English in South India was about

154. These two companies evidently belonged to the class known as "mercenaries." Enlistment to these two companies was stopped about the end of 1754. A few of the men belonging to these two companies came from Hanover and Alsace, while the majority belonged to Zurich, Geneva and Basle. Among the officers of the first company was Lieut. George Frederick Gaupp, who became a captain in the Madras European Battalion, and commanded the Madras troops at Plassey (Wilson, *Ibid*, 63). The employment of mercenaries was well known in Europe long before the 18th century. Mercenaries were originally hired soldiers as distinguished from feudal levies, though the name is given now to bodies of foreign troops in the service of a State. The Scots Guards in France from the 15th to 18th centuries were famous, and Swiss auxiliaries once belonged to most European armies. William III had Dutch mercenaries in England. Under the Georges, Germans were hired and were used in the American War, the Irish rebellion, and the Napoleonic struggle. In the Crimean War, Germans, Swiss and Italians were enrolled.

155. In 1788.

156. In 1754, a number of Germans were thus entertained and absorbed.

157. In October 1758, one such company was formed with Capt. Monchanin in charge (Wilson, *Ibid*, 122).

1746. They were called Peons. There were about 300 of them in February 1747, at Fort St. David. Of these, about 900 were armed with muskets. Coming as they did mostly from classes not bred to war and being untrained regularly in military discipline, they were at first of little use. But with the training given to them[158] by carefully chosen commandants—they were mostly drawn, with rare exceptions,[159] from the Royal Army—and the opportunities afforded to them to serve in the field with European troops, they rapidly improved and won repeated approbation for their good behaviour and gallantry.[160] About 1755, the average establishment of a company of Indian Infantry consisted of 1 Subādār, 4 Jamādārs, 8 Havildārs, 8 Naiks, 2 Colourmen, 84 Privates, 2 Tom-tom men, 1 Trumpeter, and 1 Conicopoly.[161] The Subādār received a monthly salary of Rs. 60 and field batta at 8 faṇams per diem ;[162] the Jamādār, Rs. 16 per mensem and 4 faṇams per diem ; the Havildār, Rs. 16 per mensem and 2 faṇams per diem ; the Naik, Rs. 8 per mensem and 2 faṇams per diem ; and the Private, Rs. 6 per mensem and 2 faṇams per diem. European Serjeants commanding companies of sepoys were granted an extra allowance of Rs. 20 a month. The dress was made of broad-cloth.[163]

158. Among these were Major-General Lawrence, Brigadier-Generals Caillaud and Smith, Captains Brown, Mackenzie, Calvert, Baillie and Fletcher. The state of efficiency attained by the Indian Infantry at the time of the first war with Haidar in 1767 is testified to by General Smith and others (see Wilson, *Ibid*, 72-74).

159. The exceptions were Robert Clive, who began his career in the Civil Service in Madras, and Major Preston, who was originally an Engineer (*Ibid*, 72).

160. Wilson, quoting from Orme and *Fort St. George Consultations* dated 26th March 1753.

161. Tamil *Kanakkupiḷḷai*, an accountant, or writer.

162. 12 faṇams—1 Rupee.

163. Called "Europe Cloth." This helped, it was said, "to take off a considerable quantity of Woollen goods." This clothing was introduced, it is said in a *Fort St. George Consultation*, "without compulsion," the President, "the better to establish the custom," taking over "the management of the clothing himself," of course, not without profit to himself (see Wilson, *Ibid*, 126).

For distribution of pay, a Paymaster was appointed,[164] and it was his duty to muster the men that he may see the rolls are just, and to pay them himself, drawing upon the Commissary for the money.[165] In December 1758, the sepoys at Fort St. George and near about in garrison, were formed into four battalions with a European subaltern to each, and a captain to command the whole. In the following year, 1759, a scheme of reorganization was carried out, which put the Indian Infantry into an establishment of seven battalions, each battalion to consist of nine companies.[166] They were distributed over the stations under the control of the English at Madras. The battalions were ordered to be clothed, numbered and distinguished by their colours. Each sepoy was to pay Rs. 6 per mensem for his clothing. The clothing of the Havildārs and Naiks was to be of some distinction, and their stoppage was fixed at Rs. 8 per mensem. Promotions were to go by seniority, except where the person to succeed is held unfit for the station in question. A fund was to be created for providing "for the families of those who may be killed in action and for the maintenance of such whom wounds or length of service may disenable." Each sepoy was to pay from his subsistence allowance one faṇam *per mensem* towards this fund. Officers were to pay in proportion to their subsistence. Inspections were to be carried out by captains and subalterns every month. They were to look into the conditions of the sepoy's arms and ammunition, to see that their discipline had not been neglected, that there had been no defrauding of the men of their pay and that they had not been charged without the knowledge of the officers. All crimes were to be tried by Courts-martial, Regimental Courts-martial being composed

164. Appointed in January 1757 (*Ibid*, 127).
165. *Ibid.*
166. Actually only six battalions were eventually formed as the result of this reorganization.

of one Subādār, two Jamādārs, two Havildārs, one Naik and one Colourman, who were to be chosen, as far as possible, "out of different companies to the prisoner." Only authorized drills were to be followed, and battalions were to change quarters often, at least once in four or six months. Maintenance of discipline among the troops was to be insisted upon, European officers "to infuse as much as possible the spirit of command amongst them and endeavour, by encouragement and good treatment to the active, and punishing the remiss, to make them keep up a good command amongst their sepoys, and to support them well in it."[167] A Surgeon-General to the army was appointed in 1760, necessary regulations being issued for his guidance. This reorganization of the Indian Infantry troops helped the English during the war which ended with the fall of Pondicherry in April 1761, by which time the new discipline had done its work and the sepoys begun to distinguish themselves.[168]

Haidar's adaptation of European discipline.

The English army that had grown up at Madras before his very eyes within the short period of fifteen years (1746-1761) and had defeated the French at Pondicherry and seized all their territories in the South, made Haidar a confirmed believer in the new discipline which had contributed to its success in the field.[169] Haidar's plan appears

167. Wilson, *Ibid*, 142-149, where the text of the scheme for the formation of the Indian sepoy companies into battalions is set forth *in extenso*.

168. *Ibid*, 152-153, where the places in which the Indian sepoys first distinguished themselves will be found. Orme notes the fact that the example of Coote proved infectious. "By constantly exposing his own person with the sepoys," Coote "had brought them to sustain dangerous services from which the Europeans were preserved." Wilson briefly comments thus: "Like examples have been followed by the like result" (*Ibid*, 152).

169. See *Ante* p. 299, f.n. 116. Innes Munro, writing in 1789, noted that "Experience had taught him (Haidar) in the course of his frequent conflicts with the English, that European discipline was absolutely essential to that end" (*i.e.*, the establishment of a good army). He therefore endeavoured, he says, to allure European military adventurers of all nations to his standard, more particularly "European artificers and sepoys that had been trained in the (English) Company's

to have been to introduce the new discipline by stages. This evidently was the only course possible, seeing that officers could not have been available for training all his forces simultaneously.[170] The army as thus reconstituted was made up of cavalry, infantry and artillery. By the time of Haidar, the elephant, though in use for riding and even perhaps commissariat purposes, had disappeared as an arm of the army. Haidar, however, found a new use for them under the changed conditions. He attached them to the infantry—every piece of eighteen

service (at Madras) to whom he held out the most tempting rewards." He had emissaries for this purpose "in every battalion in the Company's service, as appears from the words of command, which are now given in English throughout his army." Though friendly to the French, Haidar appears to have copied more the English than the French in military matters (see *Narrative*, 121). That Haidar actually undertook an army reformation with a view to action is fully borne out by Kīrmāṇi. Thus, at one point, he writes: "The Nawaub, with his newly reformed army, was holding himself in readiness, and looking out for times and opportunities." (*Neshauni-Hyduri*, 232). At another point, he writes: "As the Nawaub, after his return from his last expedition (against the Mahrattas), employed himself in collecting arms and stores of all descriptions, and also in raising horse and foot, in a very short time, he collected and kept ready in a very perfect degree the means of attack and defence; for troops of brave and experienced soldiers, with horses and arms complete, flocked to his victorious standard, where they were entertained in his service, and placed in the receipt of pay according to their merits." (*Ibid*, 242-243). Next, he writes: "The noise of his victories, and the destruction of his enemies, resounding through all parts of the world, troops of brave men, well equipped and mounted, flocked to him, not only from Hind, and the Dukhun, but even from Iraun and Tooraun; and, giving them high pay, he retained them in his service." (*Ibid*, 243). At another point, Kīrmāṇi writes that Haidar "employed his time in collecting warlike stores, and soldiers of approved valour (like Roostum and Isfendiar); so that, in a short time, he assembled under the shade of his victorious standard experienced and able men from all tribes; and, giving pledges of safety and aid to merchants, and the leaders of Karwans of all countries, he attracted (many of those persons, bringing with them) bales of precious stuffs, droves of fleet horses from Irak and Daman, and troops of the bravest men from Iran and Tooran, who had been invited to enter his service, and whom by liberal treatment he made the slaves of his will. He also appointed active disciplinarians, to exercise and teach his troops." (*Ibid*, 309).

170. Haidar's army in 1781, a year before his death, consisted both of well-disciplined infantry and irregulars. Well-disciplined infantry of the new type numbered in 1781, according to one authority, 30,000.

pounds or upwards being provided with an elephant. These elephants proved themselves highly useful. The skill and intelligence they brought to bear on their work has been much admired and written about by contemporary observers. De La Tour says that when a piece of artillery was drawn up a hill, the elephant was behind it, and sustained it with his foot, while the oxen paused to take breath. If the piece was going down a hill, the elephant retained it by a rope fastened to his trunk. If the tackle got entangled, or if a piece got overset, or stuck fast, the elephant assisted the oxen according to the circumstances. A French Artillery-Major affirmed (in 1782) that he had seen the elephant of a piece of cannon—out of patience to see that the oxen did not draw, in spite of the whips of the drivers—cut a branch of a tree and beat those animals till they acted as he thought proper. When an artillery piece was brought before the battery, the elephant himself placed it in the embrasure without any assistance.[171] The military training given by elephant *mahouts* during Haidar's time stood as high as ever before.

Infantry.

Haidar appears to have received some help in the matter of improving the army, especially in the discipline and the interior economy of the infantry regiments, from Razā Alī Khān, son of Chandā Sāhib, who had escaped to Ceylon before the fall of Pondicherry in 1761. He joined Haidar while in Canara, in November 1763, and

171. De La Tour, *Ibid*, I. 239-240, f.n. The elephant has been used in Indian warfare since the earliest times. Kautilya has several chapters on elephants, of which one of the most important is that treating of the "training of elephants." (See *Artha-Śāstra*, Chap. XXXII). The military training of elephants was of seven kinds: drill, turning, advancing, trampling down and killing, fighting with other elephants, assailing forts and cities, and warfare. (*Ibid*). Haidar never made use of the elephant in any battle (See De La Tour, *Ibid*, I. 180). Camels also seem to have been used by Haidar in warfare. Nearly a thousand head of them, taken from the Mahrattas, were, it is said by Kīrmāni, trained to carry swivels. (See *Neshauni-Hyduri*, 243).

was received by him with distinction and granted a *jahgīr* worth Rupees one lakh. Trained under French auspices, he showed considerable spirit in military skill. It was under his advice that the infantry in Mysore came to be clothed in an uniform manner and classed into first and second,[172] corresponding to grenadiers and troops of the line. The first was in conformity to the suggestion of Razā Alī, a distinction not exclusively regulated by stature and physical strength, but by tried steadiness and courage; and was rewarded by a superior fixed pay.[173] The infantry consisted of Indians and Europeans, and of the Indian part, there were those who had come under the new discipline and called *regulars* and those who did not and called *irregulars*. The regular infantry, called *Bārr*,[174] really cut a good appearance, being clothed in red and green with different coloured facings.[175] They were armed with French and English muskets and bayonets of a good kind. The

172. *Avval*, first; *Duyyam*, second. See also *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 30.

173. On this subject, see Wilks, I. 513. Razā Alī is also mentioned by De La Tour as one interested in the adoption of European discipline (*Ibid*, I. 121, f.n.).

174. The derivation of this word is uncertain. *Bārr*, or *Bār*, means, in Kannaḍa, a line, or row, from which it might be inferred that it refers to a line of foot-soldiers arrayed for being disciplined to war, by drill and other military training. *Bārr* or *bāru* also indicates a charge—one who is in charge of a musket or one who charges a musket for gun, and hence a musketeer. The *Bārr* infantry was armed with muskets (see text above). The proverb goes "*Bārinavanige bērē yōchane yāke?*" *i.e.*, what other thought is there to a musketeer? The suggestion seems to be that there is none other thought to a musketeer but to use his weapon and fight. Among other derivatives from the word are, *Bārkōthu*: Infantry-barracks; *Bārinava*: a musketeer or foot-soldier; *Bāru-cuchēri*: the head-quarters or office of the infantry, etc.

175. The *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 105) states that they were dressed in red shirts or jackets (*kempu kuḍate*). Innes Munro confirms this statement (see *Narrative*, 131). During the invasion of Malabar (1765-1766), Haidar's men are said to have struck the Nairs with awe by their red shirts (*kempu kuḍate*), black turban (*karī pāgu*) and bayonets (*sanīnu*)—see *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 35. This is confirmed by Kīrmāṇi, who says that the infantry were clothed in red, yellow, green, or black broad cloth (*Neshanni-Hyduri*, 243), the latter part being rather a bald summary of the "different coloured facings" referred to in the *Haid. Nām.* and in Innes Munro's *Narrative*.

recruitment to the regular infantry was based on standardized lines and governed by set rules. Those who were young, strong and well-built, and aged between 20 and 30, were grouped in one class. They were uniformly to dress in first class green jackets.[176] Those between 30 and 40 years were to dress in ordinary green jackets,[177] while those aged between 55 and 60 were to dress in black woollen jackets.[178] All these three groups, however, were to use only one kind of head-dress. This was a turban in black of a recognised pattern, mounted on an iron frame.[179] It appears that for seven men there was one *Pahare* (guard) and one *Havāldār*;[180] for fifteen *Pahare*, one *Risāldār*[181] and one *Varadi* (reporter).[182] For two *Risāldārs* there was one *Cummundār*,[183] one *Mutsaddi* (writer), two cannons and one elephant. This was the established organization (*khāyide mokarūr*). The irregular infantry consisted of three different classes of men. The first of these were the *Ahashām* foot, who corresponded to those described as matchlockmen by the English writers of the time.[184] They were used in the manner of light-infantry and guards for baggage or

176. The *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 105) calls it *avval hasaru kuḍate*, jackets of genuine green colour.
177. *Ibid.* The word used is *duyyam*, second class.
178. The *Haid. Nām.* (l.c.) calls it *karī banātu kuḍate.*
179. The *Haid. Nām.* (l.c.) describes it thus: *vandē jinasāgi karī muṇḍāsu.* The steel-frame on which it was mounted is spoken of in it as *kabbiṇaḍa paṭṭe.*
180. *Havāldār*: corresponding to the *Havildār* of the contemporary English army at Madras. In his duties, he resembled the Serjeant in the European Infantry, next to the Captain.
181. *Risāldār*: the head of a *Risāla* or a battalion of (regular) infantry.
182. *Varadi*: probably corresponds to intelligence officer; one who ferrets out information about the enemy, while the army is on the move.
183. *Cummundār*: French Commander, from Latin *Commendare*; corresponding to the English Commander. Cf. French Commandant, a Commanding officer of a place or of a body of forces.
184. See Innes Munro, who refers to them (*Narrative*, 131). The *Ahashām* foot are referred to by Kīrmāṇi under the name *Ihshām*, translated by Col. Miles as "irregular infantry", see Kīrmāṇi, *Neshaunī-Hyduri*, 422; see also *Ibid*, 398, where they are referred to correctly as "Ahshām foot."

convoys. Besides the sword, they carried a log-barrelled gun, not wider in the bore than a small pistol, with a trigger which conducted the match by the slightest touch into the pan, which was covered by a slider, excepting when in use. With these, they hid themselves behind bushes and old walls, and killed the enemy at a great distance, being excellent marksmen.[185] These were generally accompanied by the Bēḍar levies, who formed the troops of the Pāḷegārs, whose only weapon was a pointed bamboo spear, eighteen to twenty feet long. They were a brave lot of men, spoken of as " almost savage " in their attacks.[186] When they were attacked by horse, they formed themselves into a close ring, placing the *Ahashām* foot with matchlocks in the centre, and pointing their pikes at the enemy. In this order they all would sit down, and fix the nether end of the pike into a hole in the ground betwixt their legs, whilst the *Ahashām* foot with their matchlocks kept up an irregular fire over their heads.[187] In this manner, they resisted the most violent charges of cavalry and sometimes of infantry as well.[188] The third class of infantry was made of the *Juzail-burdars* or rocketmen, no command being complete without them.[189] Their main weapon was the rocket and their duty was to throw it amidst the advancing enemy. The rocket was a massive weapon, made in the same form as those used by schoolboys, with this difference that the stalk was a thick bamboo, eight or ten feet long with a tube of iron, from six and twelve pounds weight, fixed to its end, in which the fuse and

185. *Ibid.* See also Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 398.

186. Innes Munro, *Ibid*, 131; also Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 153. *Bēḍars*: a body of 300 served under Haidar when he joined Muzaffar Jang's troops, and carried off two camel loads of gold coins belonging to Nāsir Jang (Wilks, I. 300, 734-737, where he describes at some length their infatuation as fighters).

187. *Ibid.* 188. *Ibid.*

189. See Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 7; Innes Munro, *Ibid*, 132. The name *Juzail-burdar* is perhaps identifiable with the *Janjālu* of the *Bhāshā-patra* (see *Ante* p. 202), and the *Genjalls* of Peixoto (*Memoirs*, 144).

the powder were placed. In wet weather, or marshy grounds, they were set off flying in the air and reached usually a distance of a mile and a half. Upon dry grounds they were, however, pointed horizontally, and bound in a very uncertain direction, often creating great damage, particularly amongst cavalry and ammunition tumbrils of the enemy.[190]

Cavalry.

The cavalry consisted of regulars and irregulars. The regulars were known as the *Savārs*. They were clothed in thick quilted cotton gowns, sufficient to repel a blow from any sword.[191] They wore velvet caps;[192] steel helmets wrought on steel frames for the forehead;[193] body-armour inlaid with red *Kincob* and cotton, with tassels hanging down below the elbows;[194] trousers of *Kincob*;[195] arched wrappings on the back;[196] badge and dagger at the waist,[197] besides large and heavy sabres, that were almost semi-circular in form and kept as sharp as a razor, and pistols on either side, in front of the horse.[198] The horse was decked in red-coloured woollen cloth and furnished with a superior kind of saddle.[199] The irregulars were of many different kinds. They were engaged for service during the period the war lasted. Among these were the *Kuzzaks*, corresponding to the *Looty-Wāllahs*, or hussars, who were armed with the matchlock, usually in the style of a carbine, though they

190. See Innes Munro, *Narrative*, 132.
191. *Ibid*, 130. The *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 105) describes it as *kashe*, which is a well-stitched long coat of due proportions.
192. *Makhmal ṭōpi*, see *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.
193. *Ukkina chandravanki*, see *Ibid.*
194. *Chilate*, see *Ibid.* This is confirmed by Kīrmāṇi, who describes the select cavalry as "clad in complete armour." (*Neshauni-Hyduri*, 243).
195. *Pāyijāma*, see *Ibid.*
196. *Kamānu hoḍe*, see *Ibid.*
197. *Davāli* and *Tāku*, see *Ibid.*
198. *Kudure mumbhāga yeraḍu kaḍegū pistūlu*, see *Ibid*; also Innes Munro, *Narrative*, 130-131.
199. *Kempu banātu* and *Jīnu*, see *Ibid.*

sometimes carried a sharp-pointed spear, about six feet long, which they threw with great dexterity.[200] Another class of irregulars were the *Sillāhdārs*, independent horsemen who were engaged horse and man.[201] Besides, there were the *Paigah* or the personal body-guard, who sometimes were as many as 12,000 in number.[202] Some of the irregulars used only a bow and a quiver of strong arrows.[203] Haidar appointed twenty European (French) officers to serve him as a guard, after the campaign against the Zāmorin of Calicut. They were each given a horse free of cost and were to accompany him everywhere.[204]

Artillery.

The artillery was chiefly composed of French and Danish guns of different calibres, but most commonly heavy metal, which were doubly yoked with trained bullocks. They had been bought at different intervals of time and, in 1781, numbered one hundred pieces.[205]

200. Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 272, 380; see also Innes Munro, *Narrative*, 131. Innes Munro's work has for its frontispiece a picture headed "A Looty-Wallah Chase," which gives an excellent idea of the dress and accoutrement of a Looty-Wāllah. The Kuzzaks may be described as forming light troops, sometimes mentioned as predatory horse. When the occasion demanded, they engaged in plunder and hence the sobriquet *Looty-Wāllah* or plunderer.

201. A Sillāhdār was a trooper hired with his horse and arms at a certain rate of pay both for himself and his horse, see Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 380.

202. Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*. They appear to have been mostly Abyssinians. De La Tour calls them "Abyssinian horse-guard" (*Ayder Ali*, I. 30, f. n.).

203. Innes Munro, *Narrative*, 131.

204. De La Tour, *Ibid*, I. 142.

205. Moens in his *Memo* (p. 165) says Haidar had "numerous guns." In 1781, they numbered 100 pieces (from 4 to 24 pounders). Also Sir Eyre Coote, *Letter to Fort. St. George*, 6th July 1781 (see *Forrest, Selections, Maratha Series*, III. 792). The Dutch and the Danes, at peace with the English, had, since 1761, under the sanction of the English at Madras, carried on a brisk business in the sale of military weapons and stores. Anybody with his wits about him could continue to get supplies of these weapons and stores so long as he could pay the price that might be asked for them (Governor Pigot to Yūsuf Khān, the Commandant at Madura, in *Fort St. George Records, Count. Corres.*, September 6, 1759. Yūsuf Khān got his secret supplies from the Dutch and the Danes). The Danes particularly brought out arms as merchandise and sold them as such ("The foreign Companies, particularly the Danes, bring out arms as merchandise."—*Ibid, Letters to Court*, 14th October 1765, Para 80).

They were served as well and as expeditiously as those of the English, being entirely worked by Europeans in the employ of Haidar.[206] Some of the lighter variety seem to have been also employed by Haidar for service as light guns—evidently as gallopers—at short notice.[207]

Military recruitment open to all.

Haidar aimed at a well-equipped and well-trained army for achieving his aims and objects. He was experienced enough to realize that military officers were to be prized for their capacity and not for their caste or creed. For his cavalry, he generally recruited from among the better classes of horsemen in the Deccan, whether Mussalman, Rajput or Mahratta.[208] When he heard that Persian horsemen would improve the composition of his army, he at once made up his mind to arrange for obtaining recruits from the Persian nation. He sent one Shah Nūrulla, the son of a resident Persian, on an embassy to Persia on this errand. The embassy was well received by Karīm Shah at Shirāz and permitted to raise recruits for service in Mysore. One thousand men accompanied Shah Nūrulla on his return. Each of these was duly enlisted and assigned a horse. A second embassy was sent with considerable funds to recruit a further number. But ship, ambassador and treasure were, however, lost in the Gulf of Cutch. Haidar did not renew the experiment.[209] In Cuddapah, where the Afghans were then in power,

206. *Ibid.* Moens' *Memo*, l. c.

207. Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 388; also 107, 108.

208. Wilks, I. 709; also Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 118, 239.

209. Wilks, I. 718-719. Somehow, Haidar was later so much prejudiced against these Persian recruits that he would neither give them any preferment nor permit them to return home. "The climate," adds Wilks, "successively thinned their ranks; and I have not been able to trace one survivor of this thousand men" (*Ibid*). Kīrmāṇi also notes the steps taken by Haidar to recruit from Persia and other countries. Haidar, he writes, attracted "droves of fleet horses from Irak and Daman, and troops of the bravest men of Iran and Tooran, who had been invited to enter his service and whom by liberal treatment he made the slaves of his will" (*Neshauni-Hyduri*, 309). There seems to be some just doubt about his liberality. See Wilks on this point (I. 719).

Haidar once recruited 5,000 to his cavalry.[210] That Haidar priced cavalry is seen from the fact that he had always a select cavalry, accompanied by some light artillery, to act with him. This select cavalry was composed of regular stable horse, and was under his immediate direction.[211].

Medical aid.

The medical needs of the army were looked after by professional physicians and surgeons called *Vaidyas*, to whom a special department was devoted. These physicians and surgeons followed the army and were in attendance in the camp. The wounded were usually brought in and their wounds sewn up and dressed by the physicians ready for their work.[212]

Compensation for wounds received.

The wounded were also allowed compensation money for wounds, a special *paṭṭi*[213] being drawn up for the purpose. Haidar had in his personal employ a French surgeon, who generally attended on him. It is not known whether his services were availed of for army purposes. There is some evidence, however, to believe that there were French surgeons in

210. Wilks, I. 743. He effected this recruitment through Mīr Sāheb, his brother-in-law.

211. On this point, see Wilks, II. 56, 59.

212. Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 172.

213. *Murhum paṭṭi*, as it was called; it included the names of all the wounded. The wounded at the sanguinary action at Chinkurḷi (1771) were so many that Haidar is said to have brought in all the wounded himself into the camp for treatment and to have passed the *Murhum paṭṭi*, money compensation for wounds, to every one (Kīrmāṇi, l. c.). Among the wounded in this action was an English gentleman (afterwards known by the appellation of *Walking Stuart*), Commandant of one of the corps, who was most severely wounded after a desperate resistance. "Others," says Wilks, "in the same unhappy situation, met with friends, or persons of the same sect, to procure for them the rude aid offered by Indian surgery; the Englishman was destitute of this poor advantage; his wounds were washed with simple warm water by an attendant boy, three or four times a day; and under this novel system of surgery they (the wounded) recovered with a rapidity not exceeded under the best hospital treatment" (I. 699-700). Wilks notes that the information pertaining to this mode of treatment of wounds was given to him by Sir Barry Close (*Ibid*, f. n.).

Haidar's service and that they were utilized, at any rate at times, to dress the wounds of the injured. Thus, in 1782, when Col. Braithwaite's troop surrendered, Tipū sent "one of his French surgeons to dress those that were wounded." Capt. Robson who notes this fact states that Tipū, who was then serving in his father's army, ordered all the English officers to be brought to him and after examining them, he sent them into a village close by accompanied by one of his French surgeons. The next morning, Tipū sent the officers "a few pieces of fine calico cloth, to make them clothes; also four pieces of a coarser sort, for bandages for their wounds; likewise thirty pagodas, 12 £ sterling, with further assurance that they should have whatever they wanted." Evidently both Haidar and Tipū carried the main requisites for medical treatment in the field on civilized lines. Similarly after the defeat of Col. Baillie in 1780, when the British wounded "prisoners were brought in, all over mangled and covered with wounds," they "were dressed by his (Haidar's) surgeons." In the action at Perambākam, on the English side one surgeon was killed on the field of battle, another died of his wounds soon afterwards, a third was wounded and taken prisoner, and one Assistant Surgeon was taken unwounded.[214]

The Army department.

The Army department under Haidar appears to have grown to dimensions unknown before, except probably during the time of Chikkadēvarāja. It had many sections,

214. For Haidar's French surgeon, see De La Tour, *o. c.*, I. 176, II. 26, f. n. etc. Moens, the Dutch Governor, in his *Memo* states that his chief informant about Haidar and his doings was this French Doctor, whom he calls his "body physician." It would seem that this Doctor was daily with Haidar "for twelve full hours, toured with him and at last out of antipathy and dissatisfaction on account of his difficult character quitted his service in the year 1778." He remained with Moens for "some weeks" at Cochin about April 1781, and left him to rejoin Haidar, being desired to do so through M. Bellecombe, then Governor of Pondicherry (Moens, *Ibid*, 164-165). As to the other French surgeons in Haidar's service, noticed above, see Robson, *Life of Hyder Ally*, 117-118, 119-120, 147-148.

chief among which were, so far as at present known: the *Bār-cuchēri*, infantry office; the *Kandāchār-cuchēri*, office of the local militia; the *Savār-cuchēri*, cavalry office; the *Ahashām-cuchēri*, office of the irregular infantry; and the *Shāgirdupēsh-cuchēri*, office of the military paraphernalia, which consisted of as many as seventy-seven units including one devoted to *Chaṭṭēgārs*, *i.e.*, officers of mixed European parentage; another to *Gōlandauzes*, Indian artillery officers; a third to *Vakīls*, *i.e.*, authorized agents sent abroad on public duty; a fourth to the *Habish* or Abyssinians; a fifth to Brāhman *Harkārs*, intelligence officers recruited from the Brāhman community; a sixth to *Kaḷḷa-bhaṇṭaru*, spies who passed as soldiers for collecting information useful to the army; a seventh to *Mahaldārs*, those in charge of buildings and fortifications; an eighth to *Vaidyas*, physicians and surgeons; a ninth to *Dhōbis*, washermen; a tenth to *Munshis*, writers, etc.[215]

Camp routine.

Enured as he was to the rigours of field life, Haidar took care to see that he was well equipped in every respect before setting out on a campaign. Indeed his army, while on the march, presented the spectacle of a moving city. At the first beating of the drum at about 3 A.M., the entire camp kit (consisting of tents, provisions, beddings, etc.) would be conveyed to the next intended place of encampment at the head of 4,000 horse and foot. Next day tents would be elaborately laid out on the site reconnoitred by the *Harkārs*. At the second beating of the drum at 4 A.M. that day, the Chōpdār would awaken the men asleep. They would cook their victuals and, after breakfast, begin their march, at 6 A.M., and move towards their destination. At the third beating of the drum, at about 8 A.M., Haidar, having got up, would

215. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 101-102.

finish his meal, and seating himself in a *howḍah* on the back of the elephant *Pongaj* or *Imām-Baksh*—decorated in yellow and black garments—would proceed to the encampment, accompanied by all the military paraphernalia and the officers of the different sections of his army. Among the special items of his dress on the occasion were a filigreed turban of *Paiṭhān* cloth, 120 cubits in length; a diamond necklace; a *Sirpah* of diamonds; trousers of *Kincob* cloth; rings, etc.[216]

The military Bakshi and Secretary.

As in olden days, the military department was under a *Bakshi*, who corresponded to the European Minister for War. He was in charge of the finances of his department, though he could not act without the precise orders of his master. He was assisted by a Secretary, who enjoyed the confidence of Haidar. These were usually Brāhman officers in whom Haidar placed great trust.[217]

Salaries to the army: (*a*) To Infantry.

The payment to the troops was regulated according to the Hindu Calendar, which provided for an intercalary month every leap year. For this intercalary month, there had been no payment to the troops. Haidar, to allay discontent, arranged, in place of a monthly payment, two half-monthly payments. The arrangement varied with the nature of the troops concerned, though the manner of making the accounts was the same. Each person who belonged to the army, from the general to the drummer, received a *paṭṭi* or an account made out in his name. It may be described as a warrant of payment

216. *Ibid*, ff. 102-106.

217. About 1766, one Shāma Rao was Military Bakshi and another Nārāyaṇa Rao, Secretary for War. Shāma Rao (the "Cham Rao" of De La Tour) was formerly attached to Mons. Bussy and had subsequently entered service under Haidar. He enjoyed the confidence of Haidar (De La Tour, *Ibid*, I. 128, 137). Nārāyaṇa Rao's name appears in De La Tour as "Narimrao" (*Ibid*, I. 158).

issued in his name. It contained the name of the person, his father's name and his grandfather's name, for identifying him easily; a description of his person, and of his horse, if he was a horseman; the date of his entry into service; his station and his pay; the amounts paid from time to time, with the dates of payment. In the case of officers, the *paṭṭi* contained simply the name, the station and the sums paid out from time to time. The *paṭṭi* was made out in triplicate and in three different languages—in Haidar's time—in Persian, Marāthi and Kannaḍa. Haidar signed the accounts personally from month to month, which helped him to know the strength and financial cost of each kind of troop. Each *paṭṭi* and each account passed the scrutiny of three different offices, and were accordingly maintained in the greatest order. During Haidar's time no payment could be made by the Bakshi without his first obtaining the signature of Haidar to the accounts, or in his absence, of the General Commandant.[218] The pay of a *Bārr* sepoy—the best in the infantry class—was Rupees twenty-five *per mensem*. Deductions were made in respect of dues from *jahgīrs* enjoyed by him, advances made to him, etc. These deductions were, however, made only once a year

218. De La Tour, *Ayder Ali*, I. 143-144, f. n.; Wilks, *Mysoor*, I. 756-757. De La Tour calls the *Paṭṭi* as *Bati*, which is a corruption. Wilks suggests that the two half-monthly payments, though welcomed by the "improvident soldiers," made them lose their salary for 15 days as the *paṭṭis* covered periods of more than 15 days, varying from 16 to 20 days, "thus reducing the year of account to nine or ten months." The troops, however, were from the first habituated to some irregularity in the period, and there was no calculation for arrears; "it was a fixed rule that whenever a *puttee* or half-puttee was issued, it was a payment in full of all past demands (*Mysoor*, I. 757). Mirza Ikbal, the author of the Persian work *Ahwāli Hydur Naik*, says that Haidar "gave his troops only a month's pay in six weeks, and this also with the deduction or difference of shumsi and kumri, or solar and lunar months. For instance, if a man was in the service, nominally at five hundred rupees a month, he was paid for a period of six weeks (called there a month), by *Puttie*, order, three hundred rupees only. So that, in fact, he received but two hundred rupees a month, and so with the rest in proportion" (see Mirza Ikbal in Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid*, 494-495).

and set off was also allowed. Payments in kind were also not unknown.[219]

(*b*) To Cavalry.

The *Savārs*, who belonged to the regular cavalry, were mounted on horses which were owned by the State. The payment of salary was regulated on the same principle as in the case of the *Bārr* sepoys who represented the regular infantry, except that they received their *paṭṭis* for the same periods as the *Sillāhdārs* did. The *Sillāhdār* cavalry were mounted, as we have seen, on horses owned by themselves. They received *paṭṭis* once in thirty-five days at first, and later for forty or even forty-five days. They received payment in Rupees calculated at two-thirds of their actual value. These *paṭṭis* were called nominally *bīsrōs* (or twenty days), two-thirds of the month which ought to have been paid for, the remaining third being treated as an arrear to be settled at the end of the year, or sometimes two years. The mode of payment of these arrears was generally in kind—turbands, silks, chintz, or articles obtained in plunder, perhaps by the very men to whom they were returned, and estimated to the troops at about double their actual value.[220] The *Savār* stood at a distinct advantage as against the *Sillāhdār* in the mode of payment adopted in his case. He got the full value of the Rupee and there were no arrears in his case.[221] It would appear that the regular cavalry was paid at the rate of Rupees forty a month (man and horse) and that the irregular cavalry at Rupees twenty-five.[222] A good many of the cavalry portion of

219. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 106. 220. Wilks, *Ibid*, 757. 221. *Ibid.*

222. De La Tour, *Ibid*, I. 141. This is also partially confirmed by Orme who says that Haidar Alī paid his horsemen, who provided their own horses Rs. 40 per mensem; to ordinary horsemen, sepoys and artificers he gave Rs. 10 per mensem, and to peons or irregulars Rs. 5 per mensem (see *Orme Mss.*, 33, P. 115). Evidently Orme was not well informed in regard to the salaries paid to the ordinary horsemen, sepoys, artificers, peons and irregulars, and lumped them together under the two rates of Rs. 10 and Rs. 5.

the army were evidently Mahrattas, recruitment being, however, open to all.[223]

(c) To Europeans.

In regard to the European troops employed by Haidar, their pay and allowances were regulated by contract,[224] though Haidar was usually shrewd enough to see that he got full value for the salaries he paid. When Mons. Lally left Nizām Alī and joined Haidar, he stipulated to go over with a large force but actually brought in only 100 European infantry, 50 European cavalry, 1,000 Indian cavalry, and two guns, about one-fifth of the number which he had agreed to. Haidar, in consequence, reduced the pay of Rs. 5,000 a month he had promised to Lally as the Commanding Officer. When the first month's pay was issued, Lally received Rs. 2,000, and, rather aggrieved, demanded an audience, and talked and gasconaded. "Be quiet," said Haidar, "and be grateful for getting so much—you have not fulfilled your stipulation; and I have overpaid you in proportion to your numbers. I do not give an officer Rs. 5,000 a month for the beauty of his single nose!"[225] Haidar, indeed, refused to pay fancy salaries to the European officers he engaged. In fact, contemporary European opinion is naively suggestive of his parsimony. "Although he has in his service Europeans of different nations," Moens wrote,[226] "he shows little consideration for them." He paid them, he adds, but not much. This seems a biassed view.

223. *Ibid*, I. 128-142. At about the time Haidar marched against the Zāmorin of Calicut, he recruited 4,000 Mahrattas for his cavalry. De La Tour gives a vivid account of the troubles they gave in the matter of their salary (*Ibid*).

224. In their case, the salary agreed to was paid on the fifth day of every lunar month after the moon had appeared (De La Tour, *Ibid*, I. 151).

225. Wilks, *Ibid*, 756. This story is recorded by Wilks and shows the wide-awake character of Haidar in making bargains, military or other. *Apropos* of Haidar's sarcastic reference to Lally's nose, it is of interest to note the significance that Napoleon attached to noses. He said: "When I want any good head-work done, I always choose a man, if suitable otherwise, with a long nose."

226. See Moens' *Memo*, (P. 165) in *Dutch Records* No. 13.

Rupees two thousand a month for Lally—considering the high purchasing power of money then—cannot be called a low salary. Haidar's commissariat arrangements were well conceived. They were probably cunning to a degree but had regard to the convenience of the army. He had a number of sutlers[227] and pedlars who supplied the army what it required. All those who belonged to the army, European and Indian, had to buy everything they wanted from these suppliers according to rates fixed by Haidar. These suppliers had to give a strict account monthly to Haidar's officials, and to pay for the goods sold. Thus, the greater part of the stipends paid out to his soldiers came back to him and most if not all the Europeans probably kept little or nothing over for themselves.[228] Those who imagined they could make a fortune with Haidar and to that end took service under him or deserted to him, were, it is to be feared, sorely deceived, without daring to allow their chagrin to appear in the least degree. For, as soon as this was observed by their guards—and there were guards all over—they were conducted inland and were so well watched that escape proved a sheer impossibility. Though Haidar allowed his European officers to go when they desired to leave his service for lawful reasons,[229] there is reason to believe he was generally disinclined to relieve them from his service. When any were caught after having deserted, the punishment was "certain death."[230] The situation of Mysore territories, as they then were, also prevented deserters to easily escape; it was such that one could not "get out of them without the greatest danger

227. Persons who follow the army and sell provisions and liquors to the troops.

228. Moens (l. c.) remarks that the Europeans in Haidar's service could not, in the circumstances mentioned, save anything for themselves. Of course, he writes as one with some prejudice against Haidar.

229. De La Tour, Peixoto and others are good examples of persons whom Haidar allowed to go.

230. Moens' *Memo* (l. c.) is definite on this point.

and exposure to many risks."[231] Haidar was also severe on those who tried to deceive. It is recorded that when one Turner, an Irish officer, whom he had treated well and put in command of the first battalion of Topass grenadiers under him, tried to run away with the salary of his men with a young Swedish officer, whom he had seduced, he was caught and brought before Haidar, who directed that both should be tried as they would be in a similar case in Europe. A Court-martial was assembled,[232] at which the two criminals were tried and convicted of carrying off the public money. Sentence was accordingly pronounced that they should be degraded and hung and their bodies afterwards exposed on the high road. The Council, however, in compassion for the youth of the Swedish officer and the fact that he had been seduced by Turner and did not himself carry away any property, interceded on his behalf and got from Haidar a commutation in his case of the sentence of death to one of imprisonment. Turner, when taken to the place of execution, confessed to his being a spy, and begged to be shot in place of being hanged. This request was allowed him and he distributed all his money among the soldiers appointed to shoot him, and faced death quite determinedly at their hands. After his death, his body was suspended on a tree near the roadside, conformably to the latter part of

231. *Ibid.*

232. Haidar granted to the Europeans in his service, the right to determine by themselves, with the aid of their own usage and laws, all matters in dispute among themselves (see De La Tour, *Ibid*, I. 250, f. n.). The man who undertook to pursue Turner was one Sieur Minerva, who was also an Irishman. He was the first Captain of Turner's corps. He pursued him instantly with a party of fifty Europeans. He departed at two in the morning and arrived at the Cochin frontier at eight. He surrounded the house in which Turner and his associate were both at sleep and immediately secured their persons and conducted them to Coimbatore. It is recorded that Turner, before he suffered the extreme penalty, gave his sword and watch to Sieur Minerva (*Ibid*, I. 150-155.)

the original sentence passed on him.[233] Haidar had no compunction for such men as cheated, especially where a bargain had been made and kept up by him.[234]

Fair treatment to European Officers.

Haidar was, however, ever careful to treat well such European officers as faithfully did duty in his service. In the case of Turner himself, he had been treated well, had been made Commander of the first battalion of Topass grenadiers, and in that capacity was regarded as the general of 5,000 men. He had been entrusted with the most important operations and had won the good-will and affection of Haidar. Though his treachery accordingly seems to have deeply affected Haidar, still he allowed him to be judged by his own compeers and did not interfere with their judgment. When Col. Mequinez, the head of a regiment of Topasses, who had faithfully served under him, died in the war against the Mahrattas, Haidar, in recognition of his service, appointed his widow to the command of the regiment with the rank of a Colonel until the adopted son of her husband came of age and assumed command. She accompanied the regiment everywhere; the colours were carried in her name; and she had a private sentinel at her door. She received the pay; inspected the regiment; ordered out the detachments; and caused deductions to be made in her presence from each company. She, however, permitted the second in command to exercise the troops and lead them against the enemy. Though she was treated

233. It is noted by De La Tour that Turner had been recommended by Boschier (? Bourchier), then Governor of Madras, to Haidar and was in fact a spy of the English in Haidar's army. He had had news at the time of his escape of a promotion in the English army at Bombay—as Major of a regiment on that establishment—and was deserting to join it. He gave out the information that the English and the Nizām had designed to conjointly attack Haidar (*Ibid*, I. 154). The Bourchier referred to was Charles Bourchier, who succeeded Robert Palk as Governor on 25th January 1767. He made over charge on 31st January 1770.

234. De La Tour, *Ibid*, I. 153-155.

in this markedly kind manner by Haidar, she proved herself unworthy of the respect shown her. She brought a false complaint against a Jesuit Father but even then she escaped the punishment she well merited. Haidar tried to control her vagaries by getting her married to Minerva, the Swedish accomplice of Turner, but that officer refused to have anything to do with her. He would rather die than marry her. The woman married, later, a Portuguese serjeant of mixed parentage. Haidar having learnt of this, reduced her to serjeant's pay, as she had dishonoured the name of her former husband, whose faithful services had demanded that she should not be without the means of subsisting in a respectable manner.[235]

Policy underlying the adoption of new discipline.

Haidar utilized the European officers in his employ to the fullest extent. In view of the wars he expected to wage or defend himself against, he prepared himself for garrisoning the places taken. With this view, he made constant levies for the augmentation of his troops. He got the European officers to exercise these troops, himself assisting every day with his own officers and sons at the different exercises and evolutions.[236] With the active aid of the European Commandant, Haidar established a corps of 5,000 grenadiers, divided into battalions of 500 men, composed of four companies of 125 men each. Two of these battalions were selected out of the Topasses, and the rest from the sepoys, each being commanded by an European officer. There was, besides, in each company, an European adjutant or serjeant-major. The officers and private men of every company were chosen by Haidar himself, who, it is recorded, regarded tallness less than martial air, and the activity and robust temperament of the individual. The

235. *Ibid*, I. 157-169 (f. n.).
236. *Ibid*, I. 146.

grenadiers received Rupees ten a month, instead of eight, the pay of the other sepoys. They were exempted from all other labour—not even that of mounting guard, except that of their own Commandant. To keep them ever ready to march at the first signal, every esconade, composed of seven men, including an inferior officer, was allowed a cook and an ox to carry the tents and baggage belonging to it. Each company was further augmented by an esconade of seven men, solely to guard the baggage. These were all youths of but seventeen, intended to replace the grenadiers who fell, and to make the corps capable of rendering beneficial service by the rapidity of its motions. From the time of their first establishment, they were required to exercise every morning in handling their arms by their own officers; and every afternoon, from three till six, five battalions, by turns, were exercised in their evolutions by the French Commandant. After this, they were made to move about from six to eight, marching at the ordinary pace, and returning home at a quick step. All the officers, without exception, were obliged to do this exercise as well as the common soldiers. This direction caused at first much murmuring among them but soon they became accustomed to it—either through a sense of duty or from example and their assiduity afforded great encouragement to the sepoys. It was thus that Haidar formed a body of troops, to whose rapid movements the English afterwards attributed all his success.[237]

237. *Ibid*, I. 146-148. While at Coimbatore for some time, Haidar, it is said, "continued to exercise his troops, and train them to all kinds of evolutions" (*Ibid*, I. 155). This spectacle, it is added, was so "entirely new to the Indians" that it drew "so great a concourse of people to that place, that their number amounted to more than 10,000, exclusive of the army, which exceeded 60,000" (*Ibid*). In view of the intended war, Haidar not only caused all the troops and artillery in his service to be exercised by the European officers, but also he himself assisted every day with his sons and generals at the different exercises and evolutions (*Ibid*, I. 146). See text above.

Haidar's belief in the value of military discipline.

Haidar thought ahead and prepared for the coming fight. That was the reason why he made so much of the new discipline. Indeed there is ground for the belief that he was a firm adherent of the doctrine of iron discipline being the corner-stone of sound military policy. Apart from what he did in adapting the French and English army discipline to his own army purposes, he was ever on the look out for men who could enhance the virtues of his fighting force by imparting even superior discipline to it. Haidar, indeed, was ever anxious to improve the discipline of his troops. Once, being informed by Razā Sāhib, who had resided at Colombo for two years after the capture of Pondicherry (1761), that all the Europeans had introduced the Prussian exercise among their troops, Haidar wrote to Goa, Bombay, Pondicherry, Madras, Colombo and other places, where European military training was in force, to send him officers to discipline his troops. The Portuguese Lieut.-Colonel at Goa arrived accordingly with his officers, and Haidar put under his charge four thousand of the best sepoys in his army forming the right wing. The left wing, composed of Topasses, was commanded by an English officer, while Haidar himself commanded the main body, having behind him a reserve of Europeans, almost all of them French, with whom were joined his select few (*Bara Ademis*, or Great Men, as they were called), a corps composed of all the best of his troops—including generals—who had no appointed posts or command on the day of battle. The Portuguese officer, however, proved unequal to the occasion, his "improper manœuvre" then proving disastrous to the troops he led. Haidar was enraged at him, and agreed to his "dismission."[238]

238. *Ibid*, I. 119-123.

Encouragement given to Topasses as a military counterpoise.

Haidar's good treatment of the Topasses was not only characteristic of his attitude towards those who tried to render faithful service but also his sagacity in not neglecting those on whom he could depend as people of the country as distinguished from foreigners who had their own national interests to serve. The Topasses were of Portuguese descent,[239] being the descendants of marriage unions of Portuguese settlers with Indian women. They called themselves Portuguese, and had the names of the first families in Portugal. De La Tour rather uncharitably suggests that they were the children of slaves, born and brought up in the homes of the Portuguese. The Portuguese treated them favourably and with great humanity, calling them *Creanza de Caza*, or the children of the house. The French recruited them first for military service and used them for guarding their treasure while in transit. It is to be feared that both the French and the English did not possess a high opinion of their martial spirit. De La Tour goes so far as to suggest that "Europeans have never been able to form good troops out of those

239. *Topasses*: semi-assimilated Portuguese half-castes and Indians. There were 10,000 of them at Cochin when it fell to the Dutch in 1663. The Portuguese Topasses continued to serve their new European masters, Dutch, English and the French. Though they were Portuguese in their nationality, they were employed as commercial residents, interpreters, soldiers and schoolmasters. Portuguese remained the *lingua franca* of the West Coast and was the language of correspondence between the different foreign nations in that region. Base Portuguese is still spoken at Cochin (see Galletti, Van Der Burg and Groot, *The Dutch in Malabar*, Selections from Madras Records, *Dutch Records* No. 13, Introd. p. 15). Topasses wore hats, which fact gave them their name, which means "those who wore hats." The fact of their wearing hats is referred to by De La Tour (*Ayder Ali*, I. 136). De La Tour also notes the fact that Mahfūs Khān, brother of Muhammad Alī, Nawāb of Arcot, who was in the employ of Haidar for some time from about the time of the war against the Zāmorin of Calicut, spoke "very good Portuguese" and interpreted in a controversy that arose in connection with a dispute over the amounts due to 4000 Mahrattas who had been recruited for service in the cavalry section under Haidar (*Ibid*, I. 141).

people." [240] But Haidar, seeing the use he could put them to, always placed them on an equality with the sepoys and even preferred them to his other troops. They were invariably put under European officers, though this did not come in the way of their distinguishing themselves or earning their promotion in the army. In consequence of the special regard shown to them, they came soon to be regarded as Haidar's "best troops, and those he can most rely on." [241]

Financing the army.

The army was financed, when urgently required, through the aid of Sowcārs (*Sāhukārs*). At each court in India, during the 18th century, there was a banker attached to it, and much of the financing was carried out through him. There were others beside him financing the trade and commerce of the country as well. They often stood surety to the rulers or their ministers and made up the amounts advanced from the revenues subsequently raised. They appear to have been mostly from the Guzerāt country. Every great city in India had its own Sowcārs, some of them being rich and doing large business. Their integrity and credit was as great as their skill in business. They were, properly speaking, bankers, borrowing or lending money, furnishing letters of exchange on all places, not excepting even those at which they had no correspondents. In these latter cases, they made use of money-porters, who carried

240. De La Tour, *Ibid*, I. 136, f.n. Wilks mentions that a number of Topasses had been entertained in the service of Muhammad Alī, Nawāb of the Karnātic, while in 1790 a small corps of them had been collected for the English service and placed under Lieut. Chalmers, who gallantly defended Coimbatore against Tipū's forces. Wilks, indeed, writes that "general opinion, not very favourable to their military prowess, was destined to receive a remarkable refutation" on this occasion (*Mysoor*, II. 503). The earliest recruitment of Topasses into the English army appears to have been at Fort St. David, Cuddalore. When Madras fell in 1746, the garrison at Fort St. David consisted of 200 Europeans, 100 Topasses, a few Mahratta horse and 2000 Indians. (Wilson, *o.c.*, 24).

241. De La Tour, *Ibid*.

money to any distance, charging their carriage at so much per league. They were highly dependable and universally respected for carrying out their promises. It is related that one of them having carried off a large sum belonging to a banker at Madras, the rest of his community assembled and reimbursed the banker, though under no obligation to do so. Two of them, having got scent of the whereabouts of the runaway Sowcār, repaired to Goa, where he was reported to have taken refuge, and cutting off his head, brought it to Madras, where it was carried to all the bankers to be seen, in order that the punishment meted out for the crime might ensure a continuation of their confidence.[242] Besides dealing in money, these Sowcārs dealt in precious stones, coral, pearls, and gold and silver plate. Some of them also developed a system of insurance to ensure the safety of valuables, and specialized in this kind of business. There were, during the 18th century, such insurance offices of great credit at Sūrat, Madras and Calcutta, entirely composed of Guzerāt bankers. The Gujerāti-pettah, near Chicacole, in the Madras Presidency, and Sowcārpet in Madras City derive their origins from the association of these Guzerāti bankers with these

242. Letters of Exchange are probably of more ancient date in India than in Europe. In India, however, such a letter is not drawn to order, which creates difficulties in case of death or absence of the person in whose favour it is drawn. To obviate these difficulties, the names of several persons are mentioned in the same bill, the letter of exchange being in this case drawn in these words :—" Pay to John, or in his absence to Peter, or in his absence to James, etc." (De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 73-74, f.n.). Orme, the historian, mentions the fact that Major Allen, the French officer, and the so-called Bishop of Halicarnassus offered " substantial shroffs as security " for the delivery of Thiaghur (Tyāgadurg) and Gingee, and Rs. 50,000 to the Mahratta general for his assistance against the English who were besieging the French at Pondicherry in 1761. Commenting on this, Orme expresses surprise, saying, " how this wary tribe of money-changers were induced to this venture, when there was not so much in Fondicherry, nor likely to come, remains unaccountable." He suggests that either the Mahratta general put up the bankers to increase his demand on the Nawāb of the Karnātic or it was the work of Haidar, who stood to gain by the Mahrattas passing into the Karnātic (*Indostan*, II. 715).

places. Some of them were very rich and were thus in a position to have large dealings with States, lending and making money by such lending on a scale which should have helped them to wipe off the effects of plunder to which they were not infrequently subjected during troublous times. Thus, Haidar, at the very commencement of his regime (in 1761) is known to have called on the Court Banker to render an account of his dealings with the Royal House. On the ground of making a correct account of the State revenue and the treasure and jewels, he made inquiries. He found the greatest part of the Royal jewels with the Court Banker, who had advanced money to buy Salābat Jang and Bussy. Having heard that this banker had made his immense fortune in the service of the State, Haidar felt displeased that he had demanded pledges for lending money to it. He ordered the jewels to be taken out of his hands and his dues paid to him. At the same time, he appointed a commission to make an inspection of his accounts. The commissioners having adjudged him guilty of fraud and extortion in his dealings with the State—the grounds are not stated—Haidar condemned him to perpetual imprisonment and confiscated all his property to the State. But Haidar allowed him, at the same time, a pension to subsist on, and placed his sons in the service and showed them preferment.[243] Haidar was evidently

243. De La Tour adds that the luxury of this banker was enormous. It is said that his children had cradles of gold suspended from the ceiling by chains of the same metal (*o.c.*, I. 75), a proverbial way of describing a very rich man in India. Evidently De La Tour was misled into believing an obvious exaggeration as a fact. On the question of Bankers about a hundred years ago, see Prof. V. G. Kale's paper on *Poona Banker and Bombay Branch Manager*, read before the 21st session of the Indian Economic Conference, Hyderabad (Deccan), December 1937. The "Chinapatan" referred to on pp. 5 and 6 of this paper must be identified with Madras which is also known as *Chennapatnam*, corrupted into *Chinapatam*. Haidar's credit and influence with the Sāhukārs was great. On his personal security, they rendered themselves responsible for the money agreed to by him (Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 412-413). See also, on Bankers, Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 117.

anxious to restore the finances of the State and took some extra-judicial steps to induce the Court Banker to part with the excess profits he presumably had made during a time of crisis. However that might be, the Court Banker was a great factor in maintaining the army in a contented and satisfactory condition.

Other financial sources tapped.

In later times, to meet his heavy army expenditure, Haidar devised modes of raising money, unknown to his predecessors. Land revenue was the primary source. Though Haidar left the fiscal institutions of Chikkadēva-rāja as he found them, he seems to have countenanced any secret additions made to the established revenue by the local revenue authorities. As much was taken from the cultivator as would not render him destitute or compel him to reduce the area he cultivated. The plundering of local chiefs and their territories added much to the State coffers. Thus the conquests of the Pāḷegār chiefs and the Bednūr country brought in vast amounts, Bednūr alone contributing something like 12 millions sterling. He indulged in confiscations of private fortunes, some of his most trusted officers not escaping this favourite mode of replenishing falling revenues. His demands on the tributaries brought a large *peshkāsh*. Thus Ànegondi, the old capital of Vijayanagar which represented that ancient Empire, paid, from 1776, 7000 pagodas, raised subsequently to 12,000 pagodas. He also levied upon the whole country forced contributions under the name of free gift (*Nazarāna*) for the support of the war he waged. Sometimes he did not spare even the bankers, with whom he carried considerable credit. When he did this, he appears to have dealt the most destructive blow to all future confidence. But the exigencies of the army requirements were such that Haidar, in looking to the needs of the immediate present, forgot to calculate the consequences for the future. His

excuse must be that if his aims and objectives were good and patriotic, the steps he took to achieve them might be more than ordinary.[244]

Formation of a Fleet.

Haidar also aimed at forming a fleet, largely influenced by the free use that the European nations who had settled in India were making of the sea both for bringing in troops and for trading purposes. He had a double motive in organizing it: to defend the West Coast, to which Mysore's territorial area extended under him, against the Mahrattas and the pirates who infested it, and to make use of it for warlike purposes. In view of the greater efforts put forth by Tipū, his son, we may note the fact that Haidar led the way in this matter as well, quite early in his career. After 1761, he tried to extend his influence to the West Coast as far as Mangalore, both to get the aid of the Portuguese and the Dutch settled here and to subdue Cochin and Travancore as soon as he could. The conquest of the South included the absorption of these kingdoms; indeed the conquest of Travancore was undoubtedly part of Haidar's plan of operations, which was eventually put into execution by his son and successor Tipū. With this end in view, immediately he took Bednūr (1763), Haidar fortified it. Thereafter, he occupied the four ports of Canara, *i.e.*, Honāvar, Basrūr, Bārakūr and Mangalore, with the frontiers of the uplands.[245] He tried to make himself strong at sea by building some ships, *palens*, *gallevats* and other vessels.[246] When Alī Rāja of Cannanore sought his aid, Haidar created him his High Admiral on the

244. *Vide*, on this point, Wilks, *Ibid*, I. 171, 508, 705-709, 729. The case of Fuzzul-Ullāh Khān is quoted by Wilks as the most striking example of Haidar's "ingratitude and oppression" (*Ibid*, I. 706-708). See also *Ibid*, I. 754, where the case of Appāji Rām is mentioned. Haidar's credit with even his enemy's bankers was very great (*Ibid*, I, 412).

245. See Moens' *Memo* (p. 151) in *Dutch Records* No. 13.

246. *Ibid*. *Palens* evidently indicates what the English records call *balloons*, from Portg. *Ballao*. *Gallevats* are large row-boats.

West Coast, and made his brother, Shaik Alī, intendant of the marine of the ports and of the maritime commerce of Mysore. He also entrusted him with considerable sums for the purposes of buying or building vessels. Alī Rāja formed a fleet bearing the Mysore colours, and invaded the Maldives and took possession of it in behalf of Mysore. But he was so foolish as to put out the eyes of the Sultān of those islands, that Haidar, greatly annoyed at his wanton cruelty, deprived him of his command of the fleet and bestowed it on one Stanet, an Englishman.[247] Haidar used to some purpose his fleet in his war against the Zāmorin of Calicut, when crossing the river at Cannanore.[248] Haidar made also friends with the Portuguese who assisted him on the sly by allowing him many private soldiers and even officers to enter his service, evidently to keep him as their friend. During the course of his negotiations with the Dutch in 1766, Haidar was so far advanced with the organization of his fleet that he proposed to aid them—in case they agreed to a perpetual alliance with him and accomodate him whenever he stood in need of anything—not only with 30,000 troops but also with his fleet. At this time, Haidar's fleet could not have attained any respectable size. De La Tour, indeed, says that he would not "reckon the fleet of Ayder among his forces" at about this period of his career. It was then composed of a ship purchased from the Danes, pierced for sixty guns, but furnished with no more than fifty; three others of thirty-two guns; eighteen *palens*, vessels both for rowing and sailing, and carrying fourteen guns; and about twenty large *gallevats*, carrying eighty men and two cannons.[249] Haidar had selected an Englishman and appointed him admiral of his fleet, and he evidently had designs of

247. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 96-98.
248. *Ibid*, I.107, 110. 249. *Ibid*, II. 15.

improving and augmenting the fleet.[250] Three or four of the English Company's frigates that were always ready armed in the Indian Ocean, would have been sufficient to disperse this little fleet. Still the fact that Haidar was bent on organizing a fleet to serve his purposes may be noted here as showing the very comprehensive view he held in the matter of equipping himself for warfare against the Europeans who had settled themselves in the land and had made the navy their chief source of strength.

Arsenals.

Haidar maintained depots at various centres for military and naval arms and stores. These were located in well-chosen places, intended to serve large areas adjacent to them. Thus there were arsenals at Seringapatam, Diṇḍigal, Calicut, Bednūr, Ārṇi and Mangalore. Naval stores were concentrated at Mangalore and Calicut.[251]

Limitations on French and other European aid.

Though Haidar adopted the new European discipline to remake his army, he did not depend on the French from whom he received great aid in this connection. He knew well that he could not rely on the French as against the English or any other European nation. He well remembered how the French had conducted themselves at Trichinopoly. Then, again, the French troops under his employ had refused to fight in his

250. The story goes that when Stanet, Haidar's admiral, took one of the larger vessels to Bombay to refit, it was seized and declared good prize as soon as the commencement of hostilities (in 1767) was known, an action Haidar "always regarded as perfidious on the part of the English" (*Ibid*, II. 15-16).

251. The magazine at Ārṇi was evidently a big one. It is described by Robson as the "grand magazine at Arni" (*o.c.*, 150, 152). In the war of 1782, Col. Coote chose Ārṇi for inflicting a crushing defeat on Haidar, because Haidar was anxious "to save his grand magazine" there (*Ibid*). Major Charles Stewart also speaks of the "grand depot of military stores and supplies" at Ārṇi (*Memoirs*, 40). Ārṇi was evidently an artillery arsenal. At Mangalore and Calicut, Haidar seems to have established dockyards.

behalf in the taking of fort Rama, a fortress on the point of a cape of the same name, the only barrier that could stop his progress to Goa.[252] They, in fact, refused to give him the least assistance, preferring rather to retire into the fort than to combat with the Portuguese. Mon. Hughel, siding with the French troops, also abandoned him. Haidar, finding he could not take this fort unaided, made peace with the Portuguese who surrendered Kārvār to him. "This inconstancy of the French," as De La Tour plainly acknowledges,[253] and other similar events gave Haidar to understand that he could not well support a war with any European power unless he was well organized from a military point of view, and that he could not depend upon any class of Europeans in his service, excepting when they themselves were at war with his enemies. He knew that the French were interested in his friendship only to the extent that it served their own purposes. The French knew, at the same time, that his friendship would prove useful to them because he was against Muhammad Alī, the Nawāb of the Karnātic, whom the English had espoused. The French and Haidar agreed in their dislike for Muhammad Alī and they both desired to see him ousted from his place. While his friendship for the French brought to Haidar some able French officers and troops, besides much war material, Haidar's friendship enabled the French to keep so powerful a person on their side, with a view "to make use of him in time and when circumstances changed."[254] Haidar fully understood this fact and kept his powder dry. The key to his military policy is to be found in this fact; he took French aid for reorganizing his army but did not depend on them solely.

252. It was about this time that the well-known incident took place, *viz.*, that 400 of these Frenchmen, cavalry and infantry, deserted with their horses and weapons and sought refuge in Goa, being discontented on account of ill-treatment (Moens' *Memo*, 152).

253. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 92-93.

254. Moens' *Memo*, l.c.

He took in men of other European nations as well for the same purpose; and he did not depend on them either. He treated all equally as men who worked for the dignity and salary they severally enjoyed, and he was always supreme. He wanted the discipline they represented, but he was the master they should always look to for orders and directions of any kind. The French found themselves powerless before him. Contemporary opinion fully confirms this. Moens[255] indeed goes to the extreme of saying that he respected no one, not even those who had been good to him. The French had, as a fact, done many a kind turn and assisted him with ammunition when he was engaged in war with the English. But they never obtained anything useful or advantageous from him. On the contrary, Moens says they had had to submit to insult, first at Calicut when the Zāmorin transferred his kingdom to them and later on at Mahé, when he not only seized the territory of a certain Kunjan Nair[256] who had long been under the protection of the French, but also demanded from the French, because they opposed this, Rupees one lakh. The French had not only to meet this exaction but also to abandon Kunjan Nair to Haidar's violence. Despite all this, the French continued to seek Haidar's friendship in order in course of time to do harm to the English through him. The French attitude was dictated by their policy. They could not well act otherwise; they could not embroil themselves with Haidar on account of their policy.[257] The Portuguese at Goa did not fare better at

255. *Ibid*, 165.

256. See Moens, who spells the name as *Cunje Nair* (*Ibid*).

257. Moens' account is most instructive at this point. Writing in 1781, he says: "I remember still how a French Lieutenant-Colonel, who was sent as an envoy to him (Haidar) to settle the case of Cunje Nair (Kunjan Nair), stayed here (Cochin town) a few days on his way back to Pondicherry. When he related the case to me, he was nearly bursting with rage, because he had not been able to bring the fine down to less than one lakh of rupees. He added these words in substance:

his hands. He had had secret help from them against the Mahrattas when they attacked him after his conquest of Canara. But when the danger had been overcome, he extended his territory to the north of Goa. Here he made the Indian chiefs, so far under the Portuguese suzerainty, to pass under his yoke. The Portuguese had to acquiesce. They had even to surrender a stretch of land to the north of Goa, of which they had been in possession till then, Haidar claiming it as formerly belonging to the kingdoms he had conquered. When the Portuguese refused to allow him to pass within range of the guns of their fortresses on his march against Murāri Rao, he showed his displeasure in a variety of ways against them, including the tearing up of the Portuguese flag in front of their residence at Mangalore.[258] The Dutch did not feel that they could make common cause with him. They feared he would not treat them better than he had treated the French and the Portuguese. Moens plainly states that "far from allowing himself to be made a tool of to further the interests of others (like Muhammad Alī), he would not allow himself to be made to do anything except what would be in his own and not in our interests." It was clear to Moens' mind that Haidar had his own objectives to attain and that he would use those whose aid he sought only as pawns in his own game, and not prove their pageant as Muhammad Alī had proved to the English at Madras. In this estimate, Moens was correct. Haidar was determined to use the European nations established in India, if necessary, with the aid of offensive and defensive alliances, to further his own aims and ambitions,

what can we do, we cannot embroil ourselves with him on account of our policy." Moens' account of Haidar's personal character was based on information gathered from deserters who visited him and from Haidar's French physician who stayed some weeks with him in 1781 and is not always just to Haidar. It has to be taken *cum grano salis.*

258. *Ibid*, 166.

namely, the expansion of Mysore in all directions and avenging the treachery of Muhammad Alī, which had made Mysore lose in the South what she was justly entitled to both by right of conquest and by virtue of the terms of the secret treaty which had been grossly violated.

Character of Haidar's Revolution.

Haidar thus aimed at a revolution, not so much internal as external. He clutched at power in order to avenge the wrong that had been inflicted on Mysore. He prepared for the coming struggle—for the struggle was there—in a deliberate and calculating manner. His policy of unification within and force abroad was one intended not only to impress his possible adversaries but also to help towards a smooth working out of the ideas that dominated his mind. One thing is clear. He had no wrong notions about what he could expect as help from outside. He had realized that neither the Mahrattas nor the Nizām could be expected to idly look on while he executed his plans. He also had begun to perceive that the European nations would stand apart unless he impressed them. The use of force abroad was thus to impress first and then to make headway. Force, however, could prove effective only when backed by careful organization. The key to Haidar's army reform—for it was no less—is to be found here. He modernised it because it was to be used with a definite objective—to conquer, to annex, and to extend Mysore territory. His internal policy of unification was the counterpart of the external policy. He gathered power in his hands with a view to action. Though he set himself certain limits in regard to his public acts, there is no doubt that he transgressed them sometimes and involved himself in dangerous situations, which cost him dearly. But there can be no doubt that he was moved less by personal ambition than by zeal for the public good. We shall see

him as he progresses from stage to stage during the twenty-two years that cover his period of office as *Sarvādhikāri* of Mysore (1761-1782). We will see as much the sagacity and skill he displayed in diplomacy and war as the weakness and vanity he displayed in yielding to the baser instincts to which man so often succumbs. We will see how in the moment of success he is unable to gather in the fruits of the victory he has won. We will also see what stood between him and the realization of his central aim and object. And when he failed, we will see why his son Tipū could not succeed.

An appreciation of Haidar's work as the creator of a new army: comparison between the armies of Haidar, the Nizām and the Mahrattas.

To correctly appreciate the work of Haidar as the creator of a new army in Mysore, we have only to turn to two other indigenous armies of the period, and note their organization and equipment. These were the armies of the Nizām at Hyderabad and of the Mahrattas at Poona. A study of this kind is the more necessary because of the strong line taken by Haidar in evolving a new army. While he displaced materially the old discipline, or what was left of it, by the new western discipline he had imbibed, he did not break away from the old system wholesale but adapted it in an artful way to the exigencies of his own times. He was more a practical reformer than a crazy innovator. The system evolved by him resembled at many points Śivāji's as will be shown presently, but it differed from Śivāji's in certain important aspects. The essential point to remember is that these two great military heroes lived a century apart from each other, and each formed an army system suited to his own particular times. The army of the Nizāms of Hyderabad, however, stood on a footing of its own. It showed no signs of improvement despite the French influence at their court from 1748 to 1766, and thereafter of the English.

The Nizām and his army organization.

Asaf Jāh, the founder of the family of the Nizāms of Hyderabad, was the son of Ghāzi-ud-dīn, a favourite officer of Aurangzīb, under whom he had seen personal service. Subsequently he rose to be Viceroy of the Deccan. During the reign of Muhammad Shah, who succeeded Farruksiyar in 1719, Asaf Jāh felt so disgusted with affairs at Delhi that he returned to Hyderabad, where he virtually declared himself independent about 1724. Glad to get rid of him, Muhammad Shah bestowed on him the title of *Vakīl-i-mutlak*, or Lieutenant of the Empire. But a turn of events, chiefly influenced by the vigour shown by Bāji Rao, the Pēshwa, drew him forth once again to Delhi, where he, in 1737, became *Vazīr*. Two years later, in 1739, when Nādir Shah invaded India, Asaf Jāh, in conjunction with Sādat Khān, the Viceroy of Oudh, opposed him. But both failed, and after Nādir Shah's return home, internal dissensions broke out at Delhi and the position became intolerable to Asaf Jāh. The Mahrattas also resumed their offensive. Nāzir Jang, Asaf Jāh's second son, beat off the Mahrattas for the time being, but himself rebelled against his father in 1741, with the result that Asaf Jāh turned his back on Delhi and returned to Hyderabad. Here he put down his son's insurrection and took over the reins of government. He also made terms with the Mahrattas by agreeing to their claim to *chaut* in his area, agreeably to what had been allowed to them by Aurangzīb. During the next seven years, he engaged himself in trying to restore order in his own dominions, but hardly had he commenced his task than he died, in 1748, at the age of 72 years. A man so steeped as Asaf Jāh was in the Mughal system of government cannot but have been a reproducer in his own charge of what he knew and what he had practised for long. The *mansabdāri* system was thus fully planted in Hyderabad, having been already in vogue there

in one form or another. The army was thus made of the contingents furnished by the *mansabdārs*, who were required to pay the cost of their quotas of horses and elephants and also to provide their own transport. The *mansabdārs*, in return, were paid liberal salaries, usually in cash, but more generally by assignments of land revenue. These troops, as fighting troops, had no value. There is an extraordinarily striking description of them, as they appeared as late as 1792, when the Nizām supplied a corps of cavalry to Lord Cornwallis to serve with his army. The men were some ten thousand in number, though rated as fifteen thousand. They were well mounted on horses in excellent condition—and that was the best part of the show they made. Their arms and equipment were novel and interesting because of their age and antiquity. "It is probable," wrote Wilks, describing them evidently from personal observation,[259] "that no national or private collection of ancient armour in Europe contains any weapon or article of personal equipment which cannot be traced in this motley crowd; the Parthian bow and arrow, the iron club of Scythia, sabres of every age and nation, lances of every length and description, and matchlocks of every form, metallic helmets of every pattern, simple defences of the head, a steel bar descending diagonally as a protection to the face; defences of bars, scales or chain work descending behind or on the shoulders, cuirasses, suits of armour, or detached pieces for the arm, complete coats of mail in chain work, shields, bucklers, and quilted jackets, sabre-

259. Wilks was born about 1760: joined at 22, the military service of the E. I. Co., at Madras, 1782; became Deputy Secretary to the Military Board, Fort St. George, Madras, 1786; Secretary to Sir Barry Close's Mission to Mysore, 1787; A. D. C. to the Governor, Madras, 1789; A. D. C. and Military Secretary to Col. James Stuart in the war against Tipū Sultan, 1790-1795; Military and Private Secretary to the Governor, Lord Clive (afterwards Earl Powis), 1798-1803. He had thus served in the Cornwallis campaign, while as regards the final campaign against Tipū, he occupied the most important post on the Governor's staff.

proof."[260] The ostentatious display of these antique novelties would appear to have been equally curious in its way. "The free and equal use," adds Wilks,[261] "of two swords, the precise and perfect command of a balanced spear 18 feet long, of the club which was to shiver an iron helmet, of the arrow discharged in flight, but above all the total absence of every symptom of order, or obedience, or command, excepting groups collected round their respective flags; every individual an independent warrior, self-impelled, affecting to be the champion whose single arm was to achieve victory; scampering among each other in wild confusion. The whole exhibition presented to the mind an imagery scarcely more allied to previous impressions of reality, than the fictions of an eastern tale, or the picturesque disorder of a dramatic scene." The impossibility of relying on such a body for the execution of any combined movement was sufficiently obvious to the English in the Cornwallis campaign; they were found to be useless even for the limited purposes of enlarging the limits of observation; for relieving the regular cavalry from the duties of the light troops; and for an extended command over the sources of the country to be traversed. Fifteen days of experience, under an officer known for his skill, conciliation and example, showed the total disappointment of the meagre hopes of success.[262] They were so ill-trained even for self-defence, that those who opposed them practised on them on every successive day of their advance some enterprise or stratagem, always successful. What was worse, they showed themselves unequal even to the protection of their foragers on ordinary occasions.[263] Haidar discerned the uselessness of the Nizām's troops even earlier than those who took part in the Cornwallis

260. Wilks, *Mysoor*, II. 444.
261. *Ibid*, 444-445.
262. *Ibid*, 445. The officer referred to was Brigadier-Major Dallas.
263. *Ibid*.

campaign. On the eve of the battle of Tiruvaṇṇāmalai (1768),[264] Haidar sent word to the Nizām about his impressions of the forces which he had brought with him. If Kīrmāṇi is to be believed, he was plain to him to a degree. He sent him (the Nizām) a message to the effect that the expectations formed of his brave troops and the ability and experience of his Amīrs and officers had been well proved, inasmuch as that, in time of need, not a thousand of men with their arms, nor one Amīr of respectability had remained with the stirrup (*i.e.*, the Nizām); that with such troops, therefore, strong only in numbers and show, it was evident, he said, they could never expect to conquer the stormy, warlike English.[265] Haidar, accordingly, advised the Nizām to retire to a safe distance and leave him—"his particular friend," as he called himself—"by every art and device which knowledge could supply," to oppose and defeat the English and put them to flight. The Nizām was wise enough to adopt the advice and marched off to a safe place.[266] Kīrmāṇi also records what impression the Nizām's army left on General Richard Smith and the English officers with him when they acquainted themselves with its strength and description, as distinguished from the troops of Haidar. "They did not," he deliberately remarks,[267] "estimate the Moghul army at the value of a grain of barley." In another place, Kīrmāṇi is equally emphatic. Comparing the Nizām's troops with those of the Mahrattas, he says that the "Moghul (*i.e.*, the Nizām's) soldiers are a motley assemblage of proud, indolent, and effeminate men," that they could not stand against the Mahrattas in the field, that

264. *Trinomali* of Wilks and *Turnamul* of Kīrmāṇi.
265. Kīrmāṇi, *Neshauni-Hyduri*, 255.
266. *Ibid.*
267. *Ibid*, 252. "The Moghul army" means the army of the Nizām, the Nizām being the representative of the Mughal Emperor.

they were "in one battle overthrown," and that they fled "leaving their master at the mercy of the Mahrattas."[268] De La Tour, an eye-witness to the conditions of the times, writes equally plainly of the ineffectiveness of the Nizām's troops. "The cavalry," he says, "was good, but much better for show than service; every chief being proprietor and absolute master of his own troop." Following the army of the Nizām, for the most part, only as his vassals, they were, he adds,[269] very little disposed "to risque their life and their cattle in any war, except when animated by the desire of revenge, the hope of plunder, or some other passion." The Nizām's artillery was all fine European brass cannon, but ill-provided with ammunition, badly mounted and served by unskilful Indian gunners.[270] Wilks suggests that the contemptible state of the Nizām's cavalry may, in some measure, have arisen from the effeminacy and decline which marked the general character of the government to which they belonged and partly even from men of no military pretensions being put in charge of them. It is true that most of these owed their commands more to court intrigues than to military ability, or capacity to manipulate accounts in their master's behalves than to military knowledge. But there can be no question that the *mansabdāri* system had so far degenerated as to be perfectly incapable, at the time we are writing of, of providing soldiers of any capacity. The system had nearly exhausted itself and the credit of understanding

268. *Ibid*, 230-231. This description of the Nizām's army occurs in Kīrmāṇi's account of the fight between the Mahrattas and the Nizām, which ended in the latter's agreeing to the payment of the *chaut* of Bidar, Aurangabad, Berar, etc.

269. De La Tour, *Ayder Ali*, II. 12.

270. *Ibid*, II. 14. Thirty of these were, it is recorded by De La Tour, French pieces, cast in the reign of Louis XIV, being the remaining artillery of the squadron of M. de la Haye, which was lost in a hurricane at Masulipatam. They were recovered from the sunken vessels by the Nizām, to whom this port then belonged (*Ibid*).

that point clearly must go to Haidar among the Indian military leaders of his day.[271]

The Mahratta army system as evolved by Śivāji.

It is a trite saying that the Mahrattas were welded into a nation by Śivāji. He achieved this great result by organizing them for civil and military purposes in a manner unknown to the Mughals. His army system was, indeed, more strict and methodical than that of the Mughals.[272] The army, both infantry and cavalry, was formed into uniform divisions, commanded by a regular chain of officers, from heads of ten, fifty, etc., up to heads of five thousand, above which there was no authority but that of the general nominated to command a particular army. It is necessary to note that these officers were not feudal chiefs—as under the *mansabdāri* system—but servants of the Government placed over soldiers mustered and paid by its agents. Both troops and officers received high pay and were obliged to surrender their plunder of every description to the State. Śivāji not only paid the closest attention to economy in every department of public service but also provided for the suitable combination of civil and military authority in its highest ranks, with a view to obtain the advantages of centralization and efficiency. He may be said to have anticipated Haidar in some of these matters. His system of civil Government effectively aided the administration on the

271. The interested reader will find a vivid description of the effeminacy that had set into the Imperial Mughal army about the time of Aurangzīb in Elphinstone, *History of India*, 659-661. There was, according to him, both individual inefficiency and a total relaxation of discipline.

272. On this subject, see Elphinstone, *Ibid*, 631. Apart from Grant-Duff, Elphinstone was the first to write with an adequate appreciation of Śivāji's system of civil and military administration. He published his *History* in 1841. Elphinstone's account is in keeping with Grant-Duff's and may be described as an abstract of it, see Grant-Duff, *History of the Marathas* I. 164-174. Elphinstone was probably indebted to Grant-Duff for his material. Grant-Duff was Assistant to Elphinstone when the latter was Resident at Poona, 1811. He published his *History* in 1826.

military side. It was thoroughly regular, highly vigorous and uniformly strict, both towards its own officers and village heads, as much in checking oppression of the cultivator as in suppressing frauds against the State. The civil officers were all Brāhmans, those of the highest rank being often invested with military commands as well.

(*a*) Infantry.

The foundation of Śivāji's power was his infantry. It was raised locally, partly in the Ghāt-Mahta and partly in the Konkan. Those from the former tract were known as Māvlis, those from the latter Hētkuris. These men provided their own arms, the ammunition being furnished by the government. Their dress generally consisted of a pair of short drawers coming half way down the thigh, a strong narrow band of considerable length, tightly girt about the loins, a turban, and sometimes a cotton frock. Most of them wore also a cloth round their waist. They were commonly armed with the sword, shield and matchlock. Some of the Hētkuris, especially those from Sāwantwāḍi, used a species of firelock, the invention of the lock for the flint having been early received from the Portuguese, with whom they had come into contact. Every tenth man, instead of fire-arms, carried a bow and arrows which were useful in night attacks and surprizes, when the fire-arms were kept in reserve or prohibited. The Hētkuris excelled as marksmen, but they could seldom be brought to desperate attacks, sword in hand, for which the Māvlis became famous. But both of them possessed an extraordinary facility of climbing, and could mount a precipice, or scale a rock with ease, where others would have run great risk of being dashed to pieces. Every ten men had an officer called *Nāyak*; over five *Nāyaks*, a *Havāldār;* over two *Havāldārs*, one *Jūmladār;* and over ten *Jūmladārs*, one *Ēk-Hazāri*. There were also officers of

five thousand, *Pānch-Hazāri*, between whom and the chief commander, called *Sar-i-naubat*,[273] there was no intermediate gradation. The pay of a private in the infantry, a Māvli or Hētkuri, varied from one to three pagodas a month. A *Jūmladār* received seven pagodas. All plunder, as well as prize, was the property of Government. But its surrender was followed by some small compensation and, being made openly in *Durbār*, was followed by praise and promotion.

(*b*) Cavalry.

The cavalry was of two kinds, Bārgīrs and Sillāhdārs.[274] Under Śivāji's system, the Bārgīrs were mounted on horses, the property of the State. They were really household troops and called *Paigah*.[275] Śivāji placed greater reliance on the Sillāhdārs, or any horse furnished on contract by individuals. With both these latter, he usually intermixed a proportion of his Paigah, to overawe the disobedient, to perfect his system of intelligence, to prevent embezzlement, and to frustrate treachery. The dress of the cavalry consisted of a pair of light breeches covering the knee; a turban which was commonly fastened by passing a fold of it under the chin; a frock of quilted cotton; and a cloth round the waist, with which generally the swords were girded in preference to their being secured with their belts. Their arms consisted of a sword and a shield, a proportion carrying matchlocks as well, though the national weapon was the spear, in the use of which and in the management of the horse Mahratta horsemen showed both grace and dexterity. The spearmen generally wore also a sword, sometimes a

273. The *Surnobut* of Grant-Duff, *Ibid*, 164.

274. The *Bargeers* and *Sillidars* of Grant-Duff, *Ibid*.

275. The *Pagah* of Grant-Duff, *Ibid*, 165. The *Paigah* troops maintained by the Paigah Amirs of Hyderabad, may be traced to these *Paigah* troops of the Mahrattas. In Hyderabad, they date from the time of Rukn-ud-daula, Dewān of Nizām Alī Khān, 1761-1803. They were intended to counterbalance the military strength of his regular troops. Large tracts of the country were alienated for their maintenance.

shield, though the latter being unwieldy they only carried in case the spear should be broken. The gradation of officers was much like what was ordained for the infantry. Over every twenty-five horsemen, there was a Havāldār. To one hundred and twenty-five, there was *Jūmladār;* and to every five Jūmlas, or six hundred and twenty-five, there was a *Subedār.* Every *Subedār* had an accountant and an auditor of accounts attached to him, who were liable to be transferred. To the command of every ten *Subehs,* or six thousand two hundred and fifty horse, which were only rated at five thousand, there was a commander styled *Pānch-Hazāri,* with whom were also associated a *Mazumdār* (auditor of accounts) and *Amīn* who acted as registrar and accountant. These were Government agents, while each *Jūmladār* and *Subedār* had a *Kārkūn* (or clerk) or two in his own pay as well as others in the pay of Government. Above the *Pānch-Hazāris,* there was no superior officer except the *Sar-i-naubat* (or chief commander) of the cavalry, who was different from his namesake of the infantry, there being one such for each section of the army. The pay of the cavalry varied. The Bārgīrs were paid two to five pagodas; and the Sillāhdārs from six to twelve pagodas a month. A *Jūmladār* received twenty pagodas a month, while a *Subedār* got fifty pagodas a month with a palanquin, and a *Pānch-Hazāri* 200 pagodas a month, besides an allowance for a palanquin and other perquisites. Śivāji was from the beginning against paying the military (and civil) servants by permanent assignments on portions of the revenue of the village. He is said to have objected to it not only because he feared it would lead to the oppression of the cultivators, but also because of the apprehension that it would ultimately cause such a division of authority as must weaken his Government and encourage the village and district authorities to

resist it as they frequently did that of Bijāpur.[276] Nor did he approve of the Jahgīr system, though he confirmed many and adapted it for certain purposes in connection with the administration of his forts. He seldom, if ever, bestowed any new military *jahgīrs*, and gave away very few as personal assignments. Śivāji, however, made it easier for his cavalry to maintain itself. During the fair season, the horse subsisted in the enemy's country. During the rains, they were generally allowed to rest at State cost, being cantoned in different situations near pasture lands, under the protection of some fort or other, where the grass of the preceding season was stacked and the gram prepared by the time they returned. For this purpose, persons were appointed, to whom rent-free lands were assigned hereditarily.[277] The troops were mustered and reviewed once every year at the time of the Dasara festival, which was observed by Śivāji with considerable pomp. Each horse was examined and an inventory and valuation of each soldier's effects were taken for comparison with what he brought back, or eventually had to make good. If a horseman's effects were unavoidably lost, his horse killed, maimed or destroyed in the service of the State, they were replaced on due proof being given. But all plunder or articles discovered, of which no satisfactory account could be given, were carried to the credit of the State, either by confiscation of the article, or by deduction of the amount from the soldier's arrears. Accounts were closed annually and balances due by the State were paid either in ready cash or by bills on the collectors of revenue in favour of the officers, but never by separate orders on villagers.[278]

276. In later Mahratta times, the system of assignments was adopted with the expected consequences, see Grant-Duff, *Ibid*, 168.

277. This is the only instance in which the grant of land rent-free is said to have been adopted by Śivāji, see Grant-Duff, *Ibid*, 167-168.

278. See, on the whole subject, Grant-Duff, *Ibid*, 160-174; J. Sarkar, *Shivaji and his Times*, 415-416. Wilks, who published his work

The Mahratta army as it came to be under the Pēshwas.

Such, in brief, was the system gradually evolved by Śivāji. It underwent no change by the extension of his territory, until he assumed the ensigns of royalty. Even then, the alterations were rather directed in matters of form than innovations on established rules. When the Pēshwa's power increased from 1727 onwards, the national character of the Mahratta army changed rapidly until it came to be composed partly of non-Mahrattas. The Mahrattas still held fast to the cavalry, for which their national genius fitted them. Though destitute of all pretensions to tactical discipline, the better part of the Mahratta army still retained its admirable arrangements for forage and subsistence as also its well-known interior organization, which enabled the commander to wield and dispose his seemingly disordered masses. The attraction to the infantry, however, languished with the lapse of time, largely by the dilution of this section of the army by persons recruited from among northern Indian races. This motley crowd of new soldiers broke the solidarity of the original Mahratta army and led partly to its disorganization. The artillery too fell, as may be expected, into foreign hands, being manned and officered by persons recruited from among the Portuguese and Indian Christians drawn from the adjoining Portuguese territory.

between 1810-1814, does not give any detailed account of the Mahratta army administration, though he has some references to it, sometimes critical (see *Mysoor*, II. 623). Grant-Duff has based his account on original documents then in the possession of the Rāja of Satāra and 'a mass of records belonging to one S. Baboo Rao, an official at Satāra, where Duff himself was Political Resident. Dr. S. N. Sen's account in his *Administrative System of the Marathas* (2nd Edn., 1925) is the latest available. But his tacit endorsement of the conclusion that the constitution of the Mahratta government and army was "more calculated to destroy than to create an Empire" seems too large a generalization and contradicted by the evidence furnished by himself. Mr. S. M. Edwards' study of the subject, largely based on Dr. Sen's work, in the *C. H. I.*, V. ch. XXIII, is heavily destructive in spirit and is still reminiscent of the old attitude that treats the Mahrattas as a nation of "freebooters."

Mysore and Mahratta army systems: a comparison and a contrast.

It will be seen that the Mahratta system, unlike the Mughal, made for centralization of army control. Under it, all divisions of the army had to look to one master for orders. Śivāji broke through the *mansabdāri* system and established direct relations with his troops. He created a standing army and provided for its maintenance on stable lines. But Haidar went one step further by modernising both discipline and equipment to a large extent. In another point also, Haidar differed from the Mahrattas. He entertained foreign officers and men and made them part of his army, though they were permitted a certain amount of self-governance. They were part of his fighting forces in all units of the army. There can be no doubt that while Haidar derived much advantage by this association of European forces with his own, the habit of looking to the support derivable from the European wing had the ultimate effect of demoralizing the spirit of his own forces. It weakened their national sentiment and narrowed their patriotic outlook, with the result that when the crisis was reached in Tipū's time, the fighting capacity of the indigenous forces was found to have been completely broken down. It must, however, be owned that during Haidar's lifetime, this adverse effect was not yet visible. On the other hand, he was masterly enough to keep the European commanders and forces under his control and allowed them no chance or ground either to overawe or to disobey or even pretend to any kind of independence. The Mahrattas did not depend either on the aid of such foreign units or on the discipline to be derived through their aid. Still, they were uniformly successful in their warfare with Haidar, who was not only strong in his own indigenous forces but also made them stronger through the new discipline he had imparted to them. It is, however, incontrovertible that the new technique he

developed and the new forces he built up from the derelict European nations in the South of India helped Haidar to counter the many Mahratta blows aimed at him and to try conclusions with the strongest of the European nations that tried to build an Empire in the East.

Haidar's Standing Army.

Haidar, at the time we are writing of (about 1767), had developed a standing army which stood him in good stead throughout his later career. If a contemporary writer is to be believed,[279] he aimed at the establishment of an army of about 180,000 or 200,000 men, of which about 25,000, all told, were to be cavalry and the rest, *i.e.*, 1,75,000 men, infantry. After providing for the garrisoning of forts and the guarding of the frontiers, he appears to have got ready a field army, about 50,000 to 55,000 strong. Of this number, 18,000 formed cavalry of the regular type and about 8,000 cavalry of the irregular kind, made up of Mahrattas, Pindāris and others.[280]

279. This account is based on De La Tour, *Ayder Ali*, II. 6-7. De La Tour's exact words are: "In the year we speak of (1767), all the forces of Ayder Ali Khan were estimated at about one hundred and eighty or two hundred thousand men." His account seems substantially correct, though it has to be followed with care. At the time he wrote, De La Tour was at the head of the artillery section of Haidar's army. There are figures available from other sources—also contemporary—for the same year, but they relate to the actual forces present or supposed to be present on a particular battle-field and not to the army as a whole maintained by him as a regular standing army, including the garrisoning, frontier guarding, and fighting forces. All the sources on this subject will be found collated and discussed at some length in Appendix III to this Volume, to which the attention of the interested reader is invited for further details.

280. Of these, De La Tour (*Ibid*, II. 7) says that they "cannot be better compared than to the Cossacks who follow the Russian army, being fit for no service but to ravage the country, or rob the baggage of an army." They corresponded to the "Looty-Wāllahs" mentioned by Innes Munro, see *Narrative*, 131. They are described as hussars or light-armed cavalry, who slung an old rusty matchlock in the style of a carbine. They are referred to frequently by Kīrmāṇi in his *Neshauni-Hyduri*, *e.g.*, 207, 239. They embraced various classes of people including the Mahrattas, Pindāris, Bēḍars, Rajputs, etc. The most celebrated commander of irregular infantry and cavalry during

The remaining 26 to 31,000 represented the infantry. Of this number, about 20,000 were Topasses, or sepoys, armed with 16,000 good firelocks,[281] and the rest—6,000 to 11,000—were men drawn from the people of the Karnātic, armed with matchlocks and lances.[282] There were, besides, 3,000 men armed in the old style—*i.e.*, with arms out of use, or unknown in contemporary Europe—mounted two and two on running camels, each with firelock of very great length, which threw a ball of about three ounces to a prodigious distance.[283] Another 3,000 men carried rockets of iron.[284] Haidar had,

Haidar's time was one Ghāzi Khān, who was secretly put to death in prison by Mīr Sādak, the Dewān of Tipū, just before the final fall of Seringapatam in 1799. See Kīrmāṇi, *Tipu Sultan*, 189, f.n. 1. In his earlier work, Kīrmāṇi refers to Ghāzi Khān always with respect, styling him "the gallant Ghāzi Khān," see *Neshauni-Hyduri*, 207, where one of his exploits will be found detailed.

281. According to De La Tour (*Ibid*), all the officers in the infantry section, down to the corporals, had no muskets.

282. De La Tour (*Ibid*) refers to them as "*Carnates*, or *Caleros*." The former stands for *Karnāṭakas*, or those belonging to the Karnāṭaka country; the latter name *Caleros* is probably identical with *Kaḷḷars*, spelt by Kīrmāṇi as *Kullers* and by Orme as *Colleries* (*Neshauni-Hyduri*, 273 gives it as *Collurics*). See Orme, *Indostare*, 348, 365, 381-382, 383, 385, 391, 399, 423. Kīrmāṇi calls them "irregulars" (l.c.). Later, De La Tour describes the Carnates as "irregular troops." These have to be identified accordingly with the *Ahashām* foot. These, as we know, were armed with matchlocks. According to De La Tour, as mentioned above, all the officers in the infantry section, down to the corporals, had no muskets.

283. De La Tour's further description may be noted: "These arms have an iron rest fixed to the barrel; and the soldiers, who are excellent marksmen, follow the cavalry, and plant themselves in covered places to flank the enemy, among whose cavalry they keep up a very destructive fire. This body of troops have the singular privilege of an ensign for every ten men; whether it be an honour, or a piece of policy to deceive the enemy into an opinion, from the number of standards, that they are opposed by a very numerous corps of infantry. The troop is very ancient, being, according to all appearance, the first among the Indians that bore fire-arms (*Ibid*, II. 8-9).

284. De La Tour describes these rockets of iron at some length. They were, according to him, boxes of plate-iron, made in the form of fusees, and attached to direction rods. They were of various sizes, some containing more than one pound of powder or composition, and flew to the distance of a thousand yards. Many were charged to burst. Others were sharpened at the end; and others, again, were pierced at the foremost end, being so charged that the wind acted strongly on the flame, and set fire to the things it stuck in its course. De La Tour

besides, a contingent of Nairs, recruited in Malabar after his operations there. The Europeans numbered some 750 men, divided into two companies of dragoons or hussars, 250 cannoneers, and the officers and serjeants dispersed among the regiments of grenadiers and Topasses.[285] The train of artillery was a large one consisting of at least 100 pieces of large cannon,[286] and

remarks that this implement was, on the whole, more expensive than useful, because of the lack of care and attention shown in making it up. He admits, however, that its use was productive sometimes of "dreadful effects," as it set fire to ammunition waggons. He quotes, as a notable example, the battle won by Haidar against Cols. Baillie and Fletcher. In this battle, he says, a rocket having set fire to an ammunition waggon, which in blowing up set fire, in its turn, to two others, the battle was lost to the English. The English infantry was thrown into disorder, as the result of the explosion, and Tipū fell on them with his cavalry, with the result that the English were defeated (*Ibid*, II. 9-10, f.n.). This is confirmed by Kīrmāṇi (*o.c.*, 391). Another purpose for which these rockets were put is also indicated by De La Tour. They were, he says, very well adapted for setting fire to towns and villages in which the enemy had magazines. A body of cavalry, not commonly used to them, would be quickly thrown into disorder by them. The rockets that fell at the feet of the horses emitted a flame resembling that of a forge furnace, which frightened them; and when they burst, they did considerable mischief. It is no small advantage that they described a curved line, and they could therefore be thrown by people that were covered by a line of infantry. De La Tour notes the fact that the English made use of these rockets against the cavalry of Haidar—presumably in 1767—but "as it was habituated to the fire by various exercises performed with paper rockets, the horses, instead of being frightened, marched fiercely over them" (De La Tour, *Ibid*, II. 10).

285. Peixoto, in his *Memoirs*, 154, says that in 1770 the Europeans of all nations in Haidar's service numbered only 250 and that they were distributed among the infantry, cavalry and artillery. The reduction of 500 in the number deserves to be noted. Peixoto's figure is the more remarkable because in 1767, apart from the figure of 750 given in De La Tour, there were 400 French and Portuguese troopers at Bangalore alone, according to the information available to the English at Madras (*Mily. Cons.*, XXVII, 736—August 11, 1767). Those in the infantry were, in Peixoto's opinion, useless, as they were not in one body but divided into several battalions in the station of serjeants. Peixoto failed to note that they were so distributed with the double object of securing the benefit of the new discipline to the various units to which they were posted, and keeping the Europeans out of harm's way.

286. Later, De La Tour states that Haidar and the Nizām, his ally, in 1767, "possessed a very considerable train of artillery, consisting of at least one hundred and ten pieces of large cannon" (*Ibid*, II. 13). According to Peixoto (*Memoirs*, 138), Haidar got ready 120 field-pieces

well provided with ammunition, well mounted and well served by good European cannoneers. According to this account, the total army strength was fixed at about 2 lakhs of men, while about a fourth of it was kept ready to take the field. According to De La Tour, Haidar actually led an army of 50 to 55,000 men against the English at Madras in 1767. Undoubtedly the actual number of his effectives was much more. For we know from another source that the Mysore forces on the field in 1767 numbered 70,000 men.[287] The details of Haidar's forces given by Chevalier St. Lubin, for the same year, however, confirm De La Tour's total of 50,000 as it approximates Europeans and Indians, regulars and irregulars, all told, 40,500.[288] But, as three years earlier, in 1763-64, Haidar put up against the Mahrattas at Raṭṭihaḷḷi a force which was 50,000 strong, it is possible that St. Lubin's forces refer only to the field forces, the more so as he wrote from Haidar's camp. These were made up of 10,000 cavalry (*savār*), 20,000 infantry (*bārr*) and 20,000 irregulars (*ahashām*).[289] The same figures are repeated, for each section of the army, for the year 1768.[290] In 1770, his "whole force" *i.e.*, effective force, is said to have consisted of 15,000 "fire-arms," *i.e.*,

and 10 large cannons for use by the army. De La Tour has, therefore, to be understood as restricting his figure to "large cannon." In any case, Haidar and the Nizām jointly should have had more than 110 pieces of field-pieces and large cannon. This view is confirmed by the figures given by Col. Joseph Smith in his letter to Fort St. George, dated January 22, 1767. He states that Haidar had, in 1767, 50 heavy artillery, 50 medium artillery and 100 field-pieces (*Mily. Cons.*, XXVI. 66). If Chevalier St. Lubin, who gives full details of Haidar's forces of 1767 and who wrote from Haidar's camp, is to be believed, Haidar contributed only 47 pieces of cannon from 32 to 2 lbs. manned by 180 Europeans divided into four companies (*Ibid*, XXVII. 958-960). This is confirmed by Robson, who gives the figures as 49 pieces (*Life of Hyder Ally*, 42). In 1764, in the Mysore-Mahratta War, Haidar had, on his side, already a train of artillery consisting of 100 pieces of cannon (*Mily. Cons.*, XII. 174).

287. *Mily. Cons.*, XXVI. 66—Col. Joseph Smith to Fort St. George, January 22, 1767.

288. *Ibid*, XXVII. 958-960. 289. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 31. 290. *Ibid*, ff. 41

Topasses, 12,000 "horse," *i.e.*, cavalry (*savār*), 2,000 "rocket boys," those of the infantry who carried rockets of iron, as above described; and 60,000 "matchlocks," *i.e.*, *ahashām* foot, who formed the irregular infantry. These made a total of 89,000 men, infantry and cavalry put together.[291] A portion of it may represent additional recruitment between 1767 and 1770, but it is possible that the figure 50 to 55,000 for 1767 is an underestimate of the total effectives actually forming part of the standing army of that year. However this might be, there is ground for believing that Haidar had by 1767 a total standing army of 2,00,000 men, while his effectives, quite apart from the troops intended for garrisoning and other purposes, numbered at least 50,000 men. The garrisoning troops and frontier guards cannot have been small in number, considering the number of hill and other forts to be looked after and many frontier parts to be guarded. The garrisons were composed partly of the infantry, independent of the separate establishment which each fort had for itself, this being semi-military in character. It is thus clear that all the 200,000 men were not brought under the new discipline. According to Peixoto, the contemporary Mahratta army, which was mostly composed of cavalry, totalled 300,000 horse. It would seem that Haidar had not yet the advantage of the Mahrattas in the matter of artillery, in which their strength was much more, but, according to Peixoto,[292]

291. Peixoto, *Memoirs*, 159.

292. Peixoto, *Ibid.* Peixoto, however, did not on this account rate the fighting power of the Mahrattas the lower, on account of their lack of the new discipline that Haidar imparted to his troops. Indeed, he remarks almost immediately that despite the new discipline, Haidar and his troops could not prove a match to the Mahrattas in certain circumstances. "If he (Haidar)," he adds, "resolves to give battle in the plain, or to retire into some stronghold, he is ruined without remission" (*Ibid*). As against Peixoto's opinion must be set that of De La Tour, who remarks that Haidar's cavalry almost always had the advantage of the Mahrattas. And he adds that Mokhdum, Haidar's brother-in-law, had, during Mādhava Rao's campaign, had "the most decided success" (De La Tour, *o.c.*, I-210). Wilks

" in what he has the advantage is that all his troops are better disciplined." One objective aimed at by the formation of the new army was, as we have seen, to do away with the old *mansabdāri* system and the worst evils connected with it. The new army contributed towards the centralization of power in the hands of Haidar, not only military power but all kinds of power, for the control of the army meant the control of everything else needed for effective governance. The new army provided the requisite weapon for keeping order at home, for carrying on aggression abroad, and for avoiding the rise of rival revolutionaries in the land and preventing the development of military forces under their control. It was the new army and the new discipline that largely contributed to the continuance of Haidar's power in Mysore during the two decades following the events of 1761, and even helped Tipū to maintain himself in power, despite his faults, during nearly two other decades immediately following the death of Haidar.

Levies from tributary chiefs.

As his conquests increased, the capacity to add to his standing army by levies from tributary chiefs also increased. Haidar is known—at least after his capture of Gooty (1776)—to have done this fairly systematically. Thus, the Pāḷegār of Chitaldrug furnished 1,000 horse (cavalry) and 4,000 peons (irregulars); the Pāḷegār of Raidurg, 200 horse and 2,000 peons; the Pāḷegār of Ānegondi (representing the derelict Empire of Vijayanagar), 100 horse and 1,000 peons; the Pāḷegār of Kanakagiri, 200 horse and 1,500 peons; and the Nawāb of Cuddapah, 2,000 horse. To these troops, Haidar paid at the rate of four *Haidari Pagodas* (equal to Rs. 16 a

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describes the Mahratta cavalry as entirely " destitute of all pretensions to tactical discipline " though good in its " interior organization " (*Mysoor*, II. 623).

month) for each mounted horseman, and one Pagoda (equal to Rs. 4 a month) for each peon, while absent from their own territorial limits. It may be added that he only paid these troops when called to the field. This system of adding to the effective strength of his standing army enabled Haidar to call into the field, when required, a fairly dependable and numerically not negligible force, the cost of whose maintenance he did not bear but made it part of the duty of the tributary chiefs.[293]

Haidar, the military organiser.

Such was Haidar and such his conception of the greatness of military power. Haidar indeed stands out as an exceedingly capable organizer. He virtually built up a new army; developed a new technique of warfare; and provided for the proper guarding of the Passes that could lead the enemy against him. Even more than all this, he developed a policy that subordinated everything to the single idea of expanding Mysore and making Mysore stand out for the South against foes, whoever they were. If his policy of force did not succeed, it was not because he did not use it but because he failed to use it along lines which would have meant the greatest benefit to him and to his country.

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293. See Wilks, I. 727 (f.n.)-729. According to the *Haid Nām.* (ff. 74), the total number of troopers contributed by the Pāḷegārs of Ānegondī, Harapanahaḷḷi, Jarimale, etc., places, in 1780, was about 15,000.